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1Introduction
Public Economics, or Public Finance, is one of the oldest strands of Economics (Mus-
grave, 2008). Its origins date back to the 17th century, back thenwith an almost exclusive
focus on the analysis of public budgets. Since then, the role of the government within
the economy has steadily been redefined and extended. Nowadays, the public sector
intervenes in every stage of economic activities. Modern democratic states not only
provide a wealth of public goods, including social security, environmental protection,
education and security. These expenditures are funded by amultitude of different taxes
and contributions, levied onworkers, firms, consumers, heirs or house-owners. Further
market interventions appear in the form of labor and product regulations, tariffs, tax
exemptions or direct subsidies. As of 2014, government expenditures account for 47%
of GDP in the OECD on average. This figure alone underscores the importance of ana-
lyzing the role of the state in market economies. The present thesis is devoted to gain a
deeper understanding of the consequences of governmental intervention by conduct-
ing four distinct empirical investigations. To start off, the field of Public Economics is
briefly sketched. This is followed by an outline of the main strands of empirical meth-
ods typically applied in the field. Finally, each thesis chapter is summarized.
1.1 Spheres of government intervention
There have been several attempts to structure Public Economics as a field of research.
The traditional normative strand of public finance theory aims at establishing condi-
tions under which interventions by the government can be justified.1 It departs from
the hypothetical situation of a fully competitive market environment. This refers to a
setting inwhich fully rational agentswith complete information exchange commodities
in a market with perfect competition absent of externalities or uncertainty. According
1 Alternative strands of Public Economics analyze the interior organization of governments and its
implications for government action. This entails the self-interested behavior by actors in the political
system and the mechanisms by which citizens’ preferences translate into policy outcomes. These positive
theories of the state are not subject of this thesis and hence not described in detail. The same holds for
behavioral public finance as a subfield of the general field of behavioral economics. These approaches
try to explain economic phenomenons on the basis of psychological traits and thereby seek to overcome
inconsistencies in mainstream theories.
1
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to the First Welfare Theorem, such a situation is called Pareto-efficient. This implies
that individual actions of self-oriented agents lead to an outcome in which there is no
feasible alternative allocation that makes every individual better off. In order to make
competitive equilibrium work, the minimal role of the state is to “set the rules of the
economic game” (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 2015, p. 4). This includes the provision of laws
on property rights and contracts, and the instruments to enforce these laws. The con-
cept of full competition emphasizes the principle of individual sovereignty. Hence, any
government intervention needs to be justified against the notion that humans should
be allowed to pursue their self-interest, which is a central aspect of the enlightenment
movement (Tresch, 2015, pp. 5f). While a Pareto-efficient setting is attractive as a theo-
retical point of reference, one or several of the assumptionsmade abovewill be violated
in the real world. Each of those failures may give rise to intervention by the state. A
traditional classification distinguishes three spheres for government intervention:
“The responsibilities of the Fiscal Department [. . . ] are derived from a mul-
tiplicity of objectives. [. . . ] [T]hese are grouped under three headings: The
use of fiscal instruments to (1) secure adjustments in the allocation of re-
sources; (2) secure adjustments in the distribution of income and wealth;
and (3) secure economic stabilization.” (Musgrave, 1959, p. 5)
Ifmarket failures are believed to lead to inefficient outcomes, governmentsmay try to al-
ter the allocation of goods. There are numerous examples for this. Atkinson and Stiglitz
(2015) distinguish four main types of market failures. First, the existence of economies
of scale in the production of a certain commodity may imply imperfect competition. If
the number of firms in a market becomes too low, collusion among these firms might
cause the market outcome to differ from the competitive one. This typically leads to
a situation where quantities (prices) are too low (high) compared to the efficient out-
come. Governments may hence decide to enforce antitrust policies or, in the extreme
case, provide these goods on their own. The second type of market failure occurs in
the presence of imperfect information or uncertainty. As an example, individuals typi-
cally underestimate their probability of becoming unemployed or sick. Therefore, they
do not sufficiently insure themselves against this risk, which justifies the introduction
of compulsory unemployment and health insurance. A third reason for state inter-
ventions is the presence of externalities. Externalities appear in virtually all economic
contexts. In the classic example, the industrial production of some commodity causes
societal costs in the form of environmental pollution. These costs however do not en-
ter the manufacturer’s profit-maximization calculus. Implementing an environmental
tax may lead to internalization of these external costs and thereby reduce the level of
pollution caused by the firm. Another common form of externalities appears if indi-
viduals can’t be excluded from the consumption of a certain commodity. In this case,
private provision by one individual directly impacts the utility of others. This lowers
2
Introduction Chapter 1
the individual willingness to contribute to this commodity. As a consequence, govern-
ments have to step in providing these public goods. Examples include the provision of
national security and basic infrastructure. A final category of market failures occurs if
the societal valuation of certain goods differs from the private one. The consumption
of these meritocratic goods (e. g. education) may thus be encouraged by the state. In
the opposite case, the state may discourage the consumption of commodities that are
considered of low societal value, such as drugs.
Turning to the second sphere according to Musgrave, redistributional objectives be-
come relevant if market outcomes are considered not acceptable for society. The impor-
tance of the redistributional motive has been recognized by scholars very early on:
“No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater
part of themembers are poor andmiserable” (Smith, 1776), cited in Sandmo
(2014)
“To determine the laws which regulate this distribution, is the principal
problem in Political Economy” (Ricardo, 1821, p. 5)
In light of rising demand for welfare provision in modern societies, redistributional
questions have becomemore evident than ever before. The need of granting support for
themost disadvantaged part of the population is largely undisputed. Today’s academic
and political debates rather ask for the level and type of inequality that can (not) be
tolerated by the society.
Normative statements on the optimal distribution of commodities are necessarily
based on (explicit or implicit) value judgments. There are a few universally accepted
objective criteria that may guide redistributional policies (Tresch, 2015, pp. 172ff). The
redistributional objective can be summarized in the question on how to tax whom.2 The
primary criterion in tax system design is to tax individuals according to their ability
to pay. Historically, this superseded the benefit principle, according to which the in-
dividual tax burden corresponds to the consumption of public goods. In addition, the
principle of horizontal equity asks for equal treatment of equal economic circumstances.
In the context of tax design, this calls for equal taxation of individuals with the same
level of utility (Feldstein, 1976). Likewise, the principle of vertical equity requires dif-
ferential taxation of individuals with unequal levels of utility. These guidelines, while
widely accepted, are of little help on their own, as they do not answer a number of
crucial questions. This includes the choice of tax base as a surrogate to utility or the
definition of which circumstances should be considered equal. The standard method-
ology to analyze distributional questions is the social welfare function (SWF) approach.
The SWF is supposed to capture the collective preferences regarding distributive justice
2 Note that taxation includes the provision of public transfer payments in the form of negative taxa-
tion.
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and aggregates individual utilities to some extent. The social welfare function is max-
imized subject to budget constraints on markets for products and factor inputs as well
as the tools available to the government. The exact mechanism by which individual
utilities are aggregated already entails value judgments. As an example, social wel-
fare functions of the Rawlsian type put more value to poorer individuals than those of
the utilitarian type. Further value judgments can be incorporated by, e. g., assigning
different weights to different societal groups.
Compared to the first two government objectives, the issue of stabilizing the econ-
omy in times of downturn has gained relatively less attention in the Public Finance
literature. Discretionary stabilization, i. e. policy actions that explicitly aim at smooth-
ing the business cycle, finds little room in standard Public Finance textbooks. This is
partly due to the failure of interventionist economic policy in the 1970s. By that time,
mainstream economics viewed standard government tools as largely incapable of fight-
ing recessions, mainly due to substantial time lags before such policies become effective
(Gruber, 2011, p. 113). Beyond, the question of how short-term state action affects the
economy is largely treated in the field of macroeconomics. A second notable strand is
concerned with the role of automatic stabilizers, such as unemployment insurance or
progressive taxation. In contrast to discretionary measures, automatic stabilizers work
without further (time- and resource-intensive) action by the government. They can
hence offset negative effects on private incomes in times of crisis. Finally, the increasing
level of government debt also in developed economies raises the question of long-term
sustainability of government budgets. In this context, stabilizing government budgets
as a means of securing a functioning state for future generations has been added to the
objective of stabilization.
The theoretical public finance literature has established that achieving these goals
simultaneously is typically not feasible (Tresch, 2015, p. 38). Governments instead usu-
ally face a trade-off between conflicting objectives. The basic result of this literature
states that redistribution without efficiency losses can only be obtained by means of
non-distortionary (lump-sum) taxation. As this is usually not feasible, the different ob-
jectives cannot be treated separate from each other. Theoretical approaches therefore
seek to characterize second-best allocations that employ distortionary tools to simulta-
neously address the goals of efficiency and equity. A seminal contribution in the realm
of tax system design is Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). They analyze the role of direct
and indirect taxation, finding no justification to apply the latter.3 The modern opti-
mal tax literature yields expressions for optimal income tax rates that are based on few
empirically observable parameters on behavioral reactions and the degree of inequal-
ity.4 Another example for the trade-off between several government objectives is the
provision of social assistance as a means of securing basic subsistence for everyone.
3 Later contributions refined this result. See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion.
4 See Piketty and Saez (2013b) for a survey.
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Higher social assistance usually comes at the cost of reducing individual incentives to
participate in the labor market. Virtually any state intervention can be expected to af-
fect several government objectives simultaneously. In democratic societies, this may
cause political opposition from potential (or alleged) losers of a reform. It is this area
of tension where empirical investigations step in. They can contribute to quantify the
magnitude of these trade-offs by measuring the effect of state action. Examples include
the extent to which the behavior of economic agents is altered as a consequence of cer-
tain government interventions. While a specific causal channel might be conceivable in
theory, it might be inexistent or irrelevant in reality. Another example is the evaluation
of redistributional instruments regarding their effectiveness (do they achieve the redis-
tributional objective?) and their efficiency (what side-effects can be expected?). The
output of such research can then be used to inform the academic and political debate
and may finally contribute to better design of policies.
1.2 Empirical Methods in Public Economics
Empirical Economics is interested in measuring the causal effect of a phenomenon X
on an economic outcome Y . Researchers are concerned with both the direction and
the magnitude of this effect. In recent decades, a growing availability of micro data,
i. e. data on individual, household or firm level as the basic economic units, boosted
a new wave of empirical work (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 2015). This literature has made
substantial progress on establishing causal evidence on the magnitude of economic ef-
fects, providing more credible identification than the bulk of traditional cross-sectional
or time-series econometric methods (Angrist and Pischke, 2010).5 These approaches
have also found fruitful use in the field of Public Finance. Public Economics is typically
interested in questions on the national (macro) scale, such as the employment effect of
a tax reform or the price impact of a production subsidy. Nevertheless, there is a lot to
be inferred from micro-based analyses.
If one is interested in the causal effect of X on Y , a regression of Y on X , possi-
bly along with some control variables, does not necessarily reveal an estimate of the
causal impact. As an example, the causation might actually go from Y to X . Alter-
natively, there might be a non-observed variable Z driving X and Y simultaneously.
New research designs that rely on plausibly exogenous variation in X try to overcome
these problems. These research designs aim at mimicking the experimental ideal from
natural sciences, where variation inX is generated by the researcher. This is done by as-
signing the treatment to individuals by a random procedure. Comparing the outcomes
between groups with and without treatment (or, varying assigned values of X) then
delivers the causal effect. Parallel to the tremendous growth of experimental studies
5 This section builds on Gruber (2011, chap. 3).
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in economics as a whole, these designs found increasing use in public finance. As an
example, Hotz et al. (2002) study the labor supply effects of a welfare program to fam-
ilies in California, where a share of randomly chosen recipients was assigned a lower
benefit amount. Another well-known real-world experiment has been carried out by
Chetty et al. (2009). They demonstrate differential consumption behavior for various
degrees of tax salience, captured by whether the sales tax amount is indicated on the
price tag. Experimental studies are however subject to criticism, mostly regarding their
lack of external validity (Levitt and List, 2007). Generalizations beyond the sample of
participants in a given experiment are hard to defend. Moreover, large-scale experi-
ments often come with enormous costs or are constrained with ethical concerns. As a
consequence, researchers increasingly turned to seek for quasi-random assignment in
observational data. If a change in the economic environment creates a treatment and a
control group that are identical with the exception of the treatment, the experimental
ideal is fulfilled (Gruber, 2011, p. 80). The key to proper identification is that the source
of variation is exogenous to the treated individuals. Opportunities for evasion, avoid-
ance or anticipation harms identification as the membership to the treatment or the
control group is affected by (non-observed) factors. Classic sources of variations can
be time (unanticipated tax-benefit reforms) or geography (policies introduced only at
one side of a border). In a prominent application, Saez et al. (2012) exploit a payroll tax
reform that affected employees based on their first year of employment. By comparing
employees just above and below the threshold, the extent to which the changed payroll
tax rates transform intowage changes sheds light on the degree of payroll tax incidence.
A special case in the context of taxation is to measure bunching at discontinuities in tax
rates as a proxy for behavioral costs of taxation (Kleven, 2016).
Experimental and quasi-experimental studies have delivered convincing causal ev-
idence for many economic parameters of interest. Strictly speaking however, their find-
ings apply only to a specific parameter in a given country-context when a particular
policy is applied at a specific point in time. Extrapolating these findings to other con-
texts is generally difficult. Beyond, quasi-experimental approaches rarely provide in-
sights on the underlying mechanisms for a specific finding. To overcome these limita-
tions, the broad field of structural estimations has emerged as a complementary set of
approaches. Structural models are used in contexts where quasi-experiments are not
feasible or where one is interested in the effect on the total population rather than a
specific subgroup. Beyond, structural models allow for an ex ante analysis of coun-
terfactual situations. After estimating the parameters of a structural model, one can
investigate individual responses to changes in the economic environment, e. g. a tax-
benefit reform. The advantage of structural models lies in their theoretical foundation
and in their flexibility regarding the number of counterfactual scenarios. Structural
models are applied in all fields where individual behavior plays a role. Examples in-
clude labor supply, transport or consumption behavior. Depending on the degree of
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detail in the underlying data, a wealth of economic outcomes can be investigated. It
is also possible to cover heterogeneous responses across individuals. The downsides
of structural approaches is their tendency to rely on strong theoretical assumptions.
Examples are the specification of a utility function or the number and selection of alter-
natives (working hours, means of transport) an individual is assumed to choose from.
Beyond, the mechanisms of structural models are harder to communicate. Validation
of structural models, i. e. comparing model predictions with actual outcomes, is also
difficult to achieve.
Summing up, the choice of research design depends, among other things, on the
specific research question and on the availability of appropriate data. There are many
economic phenomena for which natural experiments simply do not exist or where no
data are available. Consequences of demographic change, as an example, take decades
to materialize and are hence not feasible for a quasi-experimental setting. In such con-
texts, structural models may provide interesting insights despite their disadvantages
discussed above. It needs to be stressed that the methodologies outlined above can
also be combined. This represents a middle-ground between the two polar cases of
either providing credible identification or delivering a general picture. As a notable
example, Blundell et al. (1998) estimate labor supply elasticities of married women by
exploiting several tax-benefit reforms over a longer period of time. Under the assump-
tion that certain population subgroups exhibit similar behavior, differential evolution
of net wages across subgroups identifies the elasticity of labor supply. A combination
of ex ante and ex post methods has been carried out, among others, by Imbens et al.
(2001). They estimate a structural labor supply model exploiting random variation in
unearned incomes from lottery wins. In a similar vein, Bargain and Doorley (2016) use
an age discontinuity in welfare eligibility to inform a structural model of labor sup-
ply. This way, the external validity of the discontinuity approach can be tested and the
clearly identified parameter can be applied beyond the scope of the quasi-experiment.
1.3 Chapter summaries
In order to provide a concise overview of the thesis, Table 1.1 assigns each thesis chapter
to one or several of Musgrave’s spheres of government action.6 Chapter 2 has a focus
on redistributional effects of taxation, while Chapter 4 is dealing with the stability of
government budgets in light of demographic change. Allocational issues play a role
in every chapter. They are of particular importance in the form of welfare costs of tax-
ation (Chapter 3) and air pollution (Chapter 5). In addition, each chapter is classified
according to the applied research design—quasi-experimental or structural. Chapter 3
exploits discrete jumps in the German bequest tax schedule to obtain causal estimates
6 This presentation is inspired by Siegloch (2013).
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Table 1.1: Thesis overview
Chap. 2 Chap. 3 Chap. 4 Chap. 5
Government Objective
Allocation × × × ×
Stabilization ×
Distribution ×
Type of research design
Quasi-experimental × ×
Structural × ×
of the elasticity of taxable bequests. Chapter 5 also relies on a quasi-experimental set-
ting. Here, the causal effect of air pollution on the performance of professional football
players is identified from amatch schedule that is exogenous to the individual player or
team. The remaining chapters feature structural models. Chapter 2 carries out estima-
tions on labor supply and household consumption and investigates the distributional
effects of a fundamental tax reform. Chapter 4, in contrast, builds on external structural
estimates on the own-wage elasticities of labor supply and demand.
In the following, each chapter’s key questions are briefly outlined along with a de-
scription of the methodology and the main results.
1.3.1 Chapter 2: Can a shift towards consumption taxation be justi-
fied on equity grounds?
This chapter takes up on a classic question in public finance, that is the right mix be-
tween direct and indirect taxes. Tax theory provides a number of reasons why taxing
consumption might be associated with lower efficiency losses. Broadening the tax base
by shifting a part of the tax burden from labor to consumptionmay hence raise employ-
ment while keeping government budgets constant. On the other hand, consumption
taxes are often seen as falling disproportionately on poorer households. This chapter
makes the point that the unfavorable distributional consequences of such a reform are
substantially dampened once the positive labor supply effects are accounted for. The tax
burden on labor income in Germany is particularly high, manifesting in large marginal
tax rates for many employees. Lowering social security contributions hence seem to be
a promising measure to increase work incentives. The chapter applies a microsimula-
tion of a step-wise increase in the standard VAT rate, accompanied by a revenue-neutral
reduction in personal income taxes or social security contributions. The microsimula-
tion model is able to capture the full heterogeneity of the population and incorporates
a structural model of household labor supply. Not surprisingly, reducing the personal
income tax has a strongly regressive distributional impact. The same holds for lower
social security contributions, albeit to a lower extent. This is because social security con-
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tributions are a regressive tax themselves. Accounting for increasing work incentives,
some households are able to compensate their losses through higher labor earnings. As
a result, the impact on aggregate inequality becomes close to zero. Pensioners remain
as the main losers from the reform and would need to be compensated otherwise.
Result: If higher labor supply can be realized, the overall distributional impact of a tax
shift becomes close to zero, despite the existence of some reform losers. This suggests
that a heavier reliance on consumption taxation can be done in a fashion that is not only
neutral to the government budget, but also to income inequality.
1.3.2 Chapter 3: How responsive are wealth transfers to taxation?
Academic and political interest in bequest taxation is likely to rise in the future as in-
tergenerational transfers are becoming a more important source of income in devel-
oped countries. Moreover, higher bequest taxes are regularly discussed as a means
of cushioning high wealth inequality. As a consequence, understanding the welfare
consequences of bequest taxation will become a more pressing issue. This chapter as-
sesses responsiveness of taxable bequests in Germany by exploiting discontinuities in
marginal tax rates. This creates an exogenous variation in tax rates and allows the iden-
tification of behavioral parameters, upon which the associated welfare costs of taxation
can be gauged. The institutional setting in which intergenerational wealth transfers
take place allows for different tax minimization channels by the donors and recipients.
The quantification of taxpayers’ bunching at kink points reveals differential tax plan-
ning behavior depending on the type of wealth transfer. While there is bunching for
inter-vivo gifts, there is no evidence for inheritance tax bunching. This finding is in line
with the intentional character of inter-vivo gifts and ex ante tax planning by the donor.
Inheritances, in contrast, occur largely accidentally. The donor has thus less control
over the amount of assets each heir receives. The scope for tax planning ex ante by the
recipients does not seem to be of actual relevance. Beyond, tax planning is found to be
more relevant for transfers within the close family and for more valuable assets. A side
results is the presence of focal points, i. e. a tendency to transfer assets amounting to
round numbers.
Result: There is evidence for tax planning forwealth transfers, which ismainly driven
by inter-vivo gifts. Quantitatively, the responsiveness of inherited assets is rather low,
which suggests low short-run distortionary effects of bequest taxation. In the discus-
sion of extending the taxation of bequests as a means of cushioning wealth inequality,
distortionary effects of bequests taxation should hence not be a major concern.
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1.3.3 Chapter 4: How will ageing societies affect public budgets in
the EU?
This chapter tackles the stability of future government finances in the EU-27. In particu-
lar, it asks whether European welfare states can maintain their level of public spending
in light of the ongoing demographic transition. Although demographic change has var-
ious facets, old-age dependency ratios are on the rise throughout the EU, often accom-
panied with a shrinking labor force. This is expected to exert substantial pressure on
fiscal budgets due to higher expenditures for public health and old-age pensions. While
this notion is well-established, it takes a one-sided view on the government expendi-
tures, ignoring potential revenue channels. The inter-linkages between demographic
transitions and labor market outcomes deserve special attention in this context. If, for
example, a shrinking labor force is becoming better educated at the same time (as can
be expected), average wages will increase. Additionally, if there is a scarcity of labor,
neoclassical economic theory predicts that wages should increase in order to stimulate
labor supply. Future tax revenues may therefore increase despite population shrink-
age. Hence, it is crucial to account for reactions on both sides of the labor market when
assessing the effects of demographic changes on future fiscal balances.
This chapter employs detailed population projections for the EU-27. An ageing and
better educated labor force will lead to changing relative scarcities of the factor labor
in different labor markets. Based on this, we obtain the wage effect based on external
estimates on the elasticities of labor supply and demand. With an European tax-benefit
calculator, the impact on household incomes and, subsequently, fiscal budgets are cal-
culated. On top, we simulate the labor market and fiscal effects of a common policy
response to demographic change by raising the statutory retirement age.
It turns out that the majority of countries is likely to face a negative outlook in fis-
cal terms due to demographic change. This is despite revenues from personal taxes
and social security contributions are projected to rise. Accounting for labor market
effects, labor scarcity leads to a strong wage growth and, in turn, small employment
increases. This improves fiscal balances in most countries. Raising the statutory retire-
ment age on top suggests to be sufficient to avoid worsening fiscal balances in nearly all
countries. Although this approach is far from capturing all conceivable implications of
demographic change, the results overall paint a less worrying outlook for government
budgets in the future.
Result: Ageing societies are going toworsen the fiscal outlook in the EU-27, especially
in those countries that are going to face major decreases in the labor force. Our analysis
however suggests that labor market effects and a higher statutory retirement age might
be sufficient in most countries to cover the expected expenditure increases.
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1.3.4 Chapter 5: What is the short-term impact of air pollution on the
performance of professional athletes?
This chapter assesses the impact of ambient air pollution on the performance of pro-
fessional football players. While this is most closely related to health or labor issues,
it bears interesting implications from a Public Economics perspective. Environmental
protection is nowadays acknowledged as a fundamental government objective. Protec-
tion measures come in the form of pigouvian taxation or environmental regulations.
These market interventions are justified by the enormous societal costs associated with
environmental damage. At the same time, environmental policies usually have a re-
distributive component, which impedes implementation of these policies. A deeper
understanding of the extent of environmental costs thus allows a better assessment of
the benefits of environmental protection.
For the case of air pollution, strong negative long-term effects have been well docu-
mented in the literature. Previous empirical studies have found detrimental long-term
effects of air pollution on morbidity, infants’ health, human capital formation and la-
bor supply. In contrast, evidence on the short-term impact of air pollution is relatively
scarce. The existence of adverse effects on productivity of workers could substantially
increase existent estimates of the societal costs of air pollution. Measuring the produc-
tivity impact of environmental factors is however connected to severe empirical chal-
lenges. Individual exposure to air pollution can typically not be considered random
due to e. g. residential sorting or avoidance behavior. In this chapter, we exploit the
fact that time and location of football matches in the German Bundesliga is exogenous
to the participants. Using long-term variation within players, this quasi-experimental
setting allows the causal identification the effect of pollution with particulate matter
on the performance of professional football players. As measure of performance, we
employ the number of passes played as the basic element of the game. Beyond, the
number of passes is strongly related to physical performance and highly relevant for a
team’s success.
Result: We document significant negative short-term effects of air pollution on the
performance of professional football players. The effects are strongly increasing with
the level of pollution. As we cover a selected group of employees, generalizing these
findings to a wider labor force is not straightforward. As our findings are obtained in a
country with relatively low levels of air pollution, it is fair to conclude that short-term
productivity effects of air pollution are substantial when evaluated on a global scale.
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2Shifting Taxes from Labor to Consumption:Distributional and Labor Supply Impact∗
2.1 Introduction
The appropriate choice between direct and indirect tax instruments has been subject to
an extensive debate on their respective merits and disadvantages. Although the ques-
tion of the optimal mix is still open, there are reasons for a coexistence of both forms
of taxation, as they address the economic policy objectives of efficiency and redistri-
bution in different ways. Moreover, in the context of the need for fiscal consolidation,
consumption constitutes an attractive and reliable source for government revenues as a
stable tax base. In addition, shifting the tax burden from labor to consumption, referred
to as fiscal devaluation, is currently considered as an alternative to nominal devaluation
in order to restore competitiveness in some Euro area countries (de Mooij and Keen,
2012; Koske, 2013).
The debate on possible consequences of a tax shift from income towards consump-
tion centers around two issues. First, according to standard economic theory, such a tax
shiftmight be favorablewith respect to employment as a consequence of lowermarginal
tax rates on labor income, implying higher incentives to take up work. Second, higher
consumption taxes are often associated with lower tax progressivity and higher levels
of inequality. However, employment increases from a tax shift may outweigh adverse
distributional impacts. The degree to which there exists a trade-off between higher in-
equality and more employment in this context is an empirical question. We provide
an analysis for Germany to gauge the extent of this trade-off and investigate whether
a shift from income to consumption taxation can be justified in light of positive labor
supply effects. Germany represents a particular interesting case as the tax wedge on
labor income is among the highest in industrialized countries (OECD, 2014).
Despite the theoretical virtues of indirect taxes, the direct to indirect tax ratio has
been on the rise over the last decades, mostly due to increasing social security contri-
butions (Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2010). Consequently, recent years have witnessed a
∗ This chapter, co-authored with Nico Pestel, originated from my Diploma Thesis and is published
as: N. Pestel and E. Sommer (2017). Shifting Taxes from Labor to Consumption: More Employment and
more Inequality? forthcoming in: Review of Income and Wealth.
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growing discussion on a heavier reliance on consumption taxes, such as sales taxes and
the Value Added Tax (VAT) (OECD, 2007, 2010). A concrete policy implementation of
such a tax cut cum base broadening was the 2007 VAT increase in Germany, which was
compensated by simultaneously cutting unemployment insurance contributions.1 This
policy was explicitly motivated by increasing work incentives and generating revenues
at the same time. In the same spirit, in 2009, Hungary financed a five percentage point
reduction in the employer Social Security Contributions rate through a higher VAT.
These policies followed the argumentation that the tax burden on labor in most OECD
countries is too high and implies disincentives for labor market participation. More-
over, payroll taxes constitute a significant share of labor costs for employers (OECD,
2014). A shift away from income and payroll taxes towards consumption taxes could
therefore release unused productive capacities by increasing labor supply and demand.
Moreover, labor constitutes the major tax base for generating revenues in most coun-
tries, which might be questioned in light of a proper application of the Ability to Pay
Principle. Broadening the tax base addresses this issue by treating all sources of income
equally. The distributional consequences of a tax shift are however unclear.
In this chapter, we carry out microsimulations of several revenue-neutral policy sce-
narios. We simulate a step-wise increase of the standard VAT rate of currently 19% in
Germany, accompanied by a reduction in personal income taxes (PIT) or social security
contributions (SSC).2 We add to the existing literature by simulating a range of revenue-
neutral reforms on both PIT and SSC, accounting for labor supply responses at the same
time. As the distributional analysis is differentiated along several socio-demographic
dimensions, the results can help to design specifically targeted policies to compensate
the potential losers from an increase in VAT rates. For example, if pensioners are found
to be worse off, it might be worth considering to split the additional revenue from the
higher VAT on lowering payroll taxes and raising old-age pensions. The analysis is car-
ried out with the behavioral microsimulation model IZAΨMOD (Löﬄer et al., 2014a).
Based on a representative sample of the German population from the Socio-Economic
Panel Study (SOEP) and a detailedmodel of the German tax and transfer system, we are
able to simulate changes in household budgets as well as adjustments in labor supply
behavior. As the information on household consumption in SOEP is insufficient, we
impute expenditures based on estimates from the German Sample Survey of Income
and Expenditures (EVS). Our empirical approach is related to the studies of Decoster
et al. (2009) and Bach et al. (2006), but differs in several aspects. While the former study
1 The standard VAT rate was raised from 16% to 19%, while the total rate of unemployment insurance
contributions was lowered from 6.5% to 4.2%. This specific reform has been ex ante investigated by Bach
et al. (2006).
2 There are two VAT rates in Germany. Apart from the standard rate of 19%, there is a reduced rate
of 7% applied on most food commodities, public transport, books, newspapers, journals, entrance to
cultural facilities and works of art. Moreover, medical, educational and financial services as well as rents
are fully exempted from the VAT.
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depicts only the static changes in household budgets ignoring behavioral responses,
the latter does not consider a revenue-neutral reform.
We find that both scenarios of reducing the direct tax burden, either lowering PIT
or SSC, imply distinct distributional impacts. Due to its strongly progressive design, a
compensated reduction of personal income taxes leads to a higher level of inequality.
Low-income earners, pensioners and unemployed are found to be the main losers from
the policy. For payroll tax reductions, the adverse distributional effects are significantly
less severe, because payroll taxes constitute a regressive tax themselves. Taking into
account behavioral adjustments, we find that the distributional impacts of the tax shift
areweakened. For lowering the PIT level however, a strongly regressive impact persists.
Reducing payroll taxes seems particularly promising, given their potential to raisework
incentives. In these scenarios, some households are able to compensate their losses
through higher labor earnings. Beyond, our results suggest no systematic difference
between augmenting both VAT rates or only the standard rate, which underlines the
limited redistributional power that is often attributed to a differentiation of VAT rates.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the theory on labor ver-
sus consumption taxation and the empirical evidence on tax shifts. Then, we present
related empirical findings on the macro and micro level. In Section 2.3, our microsim-
ulation approach and the underlying data base is presented. Furthermore, our method
to impute expenditures in an income data set is described in detail. In the results sec-
tion 2.4, the simulated labor supply reactions are presented first. Second, a detailed
distributional analysis identifies winners and losers from the reform. A comparison
of several aggregated measures of inequality and progressivity completes the analysis.
Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Background and Literature
2.2.1 Theory
Taxation affects economic incentives and may therefore induce behavioral adjustments
for individuals, causing efficiency costs compared to a hypothetical situation without
taxes. As any feasible tax causes distortions, the theoretical question is how to char-
acterize the second-best setting that implies minimum efficiency losses, given a fixed
government revenue. Economic theory provides intuition for why a shift from income
to consumption taxation might be favorable in efficiency terms, i.e., promoting growth
and employment. Within a static standard utility-maximization framework, it can be
shown that both taxes distort the individual decision between consumption and leisure
equivalently. An income tax reduces the net wage, while a consumption tax reduces
the real value of net earnings. Under non-negative wage and income elasticities of la-
bor supply, both forms of taxation reduce work incentives (Bargain et al., 2014). While
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only a fraction of the population is subject to income taxation, virtually everyone pays
consumption taxes. The consumption tax base is hence broader, as it includes expendi-
tures of pensioners, benefit-recipients and capital-income earners. Hence, consumption
taxes allow for obtaining the same revenue with a lower rate. If one recalls the classic
insight that the excess burden of a tax rises approximately with the square of the tax
rate (Auerbach, 1985), a shift towards a consumption tax induces lower aggregate effi-
ciency costs. The intuition is that the positive effect on labor supply from the higher net
wage exceeds the negative effect from a lower real income, resulting in higher aggregate
labor supply.
A theoretical counter-argument is that throughout the life-cycle, income necessar-
ily equals consumption and therefore implies an equal burden of both taxes (Caspersen
andMetcalf, 1993; Metcalf, 1994). However, this argument only holds if both tax sched-
ules are constant in the long run and if bequests are not considered. Although the only
difference between (labor) income and consumption arises from consumption smooth-
ing, this intuition is hardly relevant in the policy debate on what is understood as a re-
gressive tax.3 Another argument refers to the treatment of capital income. A tax levied
on capital income distorts an individual’s saving decision, as it implicitly taxes future
consumption. If this is a normal good, an income tax discourages savings. In contrast,
the savings decision is neutral to the level of consumption taxation, as the consump-
tion tax does not alter the returns to savings. Reducing the capital income tax in favor
of the consumption tax is therefore expected to increase savings and hence economic
growth (Auerbach and Hines, 2002; Feldstein, 1978).
The interdependencies between both forms of taxation have regularly been addressed
by the optimal taxation literature. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) were the first to cap-
ture the equity-efficiency trade-off of both taxes within a formal framework. Under the
assumption of separable preferences and individuals that are inequality-neutral, they
neglect any role for indirect taxation. Since all commodities are equally substitutable
for leisure, any attempt to offset the distortion between labor and leisure is bound to
cause efficiency losses.4 Later contributions refined this argument by imposing more
realistic assumptions and found commodity taxation to be a necessary component of
any optimal tax structure. Among these assumptions are uncertainty about individ-
ual wages (Cremer and Gahvari, 1995), heterogeneity among agents not only in ability
(Cremer et al., 2001; Saez, 2002), different underlying production technologies (Naito,
2007) or different evasion characteristics of both taxes (Boadway et al., 1994; Richter
and Boadway, 2005). According to Mankiw et al. (2009), the advance of indirect taxes
and VAT in particular can be attributed to findings of optimal taxation theory. Despite
Atkinson and Stiglitz’ wide-known result not to levy any indirect taxes, it seems worth
3 For a treatment of lifetime inequality in a simulation context, see Creedy (1997). A recent empirical
analysis of lifetime inequality among German employees can be found in Bönke et al. (2015).
4 See also the argumentation by Sørensen (2007).
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to consider whether a shift to consumption taxation might adjust the direct to indirect
tax mix towards the optimum (European Commission, 2008).
A proper application of the Ability to Pay Principle might provide further justifica-
tion for a heavier reliance on consumption taxation. Such arguments favor consump-
tion (the use of income) to income (the contribution to national production) as the better
measure for individual ability (Gruber, 2011, chap. 25).5
2.2.2 Empirical Evidence
The efficiency impact of a shift from income to consumption taxation has been inves-
tigated by a number of empirical studies, most of them based on a macrosimulation
framework. They largely reveal positive, but moderate effects from a compensated SSC
reduction on GDP growth rate and employment for the German case.6 All studies sug-
gest positive, butmoderate employment effects not higher than 1%of total employment.
Similar results are obtained for other countries.7 Unions’ behavior in the aftermath of
the reform is found crucial for the long-run effects of the tax shift. Studies that explic-
itly incorporate the mode of wage bargaining draw rather pessimistic conclusions. If
unions’ bargaining power is assumed to be sufficiently high, wage increases as a con-
sequence of increased living costs become likely in the medium term. Another channel
that might work against the effectiveness, though not captured in these studies, are an-
nouncement effects of VAT increases that cause domestic demand to boost before and
to decline in the aftermath of the policy change.
Macro approaches exhibit drawbacks when it comes to distributional questions.
Any conclusions derived from macro simulations do not account for heterogeneity
among individuals. As a consequence, these kinds of questions have been addressed
by a number of microsimulation studies which all focus on SSC reductions. Decoster
et al. (2009) provide a comprehensive study incorporating four European countries.
They simulate a 25% reduction in social security contributions, compensated by a VAT
increase. Their results indicate negative welfare effects for households in low income
deciles, as well as for households with low-educated and unemployed heads. This is
in line with O’Donoghue et al. (2004), who find a general regressive impact in twelve
OECD countries, Portugal being most regressive and Belgium being nearly propor-
tional. Similar results are obtained by Bach et al. (2006), who simulate the effect of the
three percentage points VAT increase implemented by the German government in 2007.
This was complemented by a cut in unemployment insurance contributions by two per-
5 This idea dates as far back as to Thomas Hobbes: “It is fairer to tax people on what they extract from
the economy, as roughly measured by their consumption, than to tax them on what they produce for the
economy, as roughly measured by their income.”(Gruber, 2011, p. 754)
6 See Buscher et al. (2001), Steiner (1996), Meinhardt and Zwiener (2005), Feil and Zika (2005), Feil
et al. (2006), Böhringer et al. (2005).
7 See European Commission (2006, 2008) for a cut in income taxes in the EU as a whole, Altig et al.
(2001) for a shift of the US federal income tax, and Dahlby (2003) for income tax shifting in Canada.
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centage points. It should however be noted that this reform was not revenue-neutral.
Thomas and Picos-Sanchez (2012) simulate a revenue-neutral shift of 5% of the SSC
burden to VAT and find increasing work incentives particularly for low-income earn-
ers across several European countries. Applying the same reform, Picos-Sanchez and
Thomas (2015) identify employees as particular beneficiaries. Meinhardt and Zwiener
(2005) simulate a cut in SSC by two percentage points, combined with an increase in
VAT by the same amount. Although the authors do not report fiscal effects, this reform
is presumably not revenue-neutral as well. They identify civil servants, self-employed
and unemployed as the main losers from the reform, while gains for employed persons
are rather moderate. A related study is provided by Moscarola et al. (2015), who con-
sider a shift of the tax base from labor to property, while accounting for labor market
reactions.
The empirical results partly strengthen the cause for a tax shift for efficiency reasons,
though the positive impact on employment and growth seems to be rather moderate.
As the results for Germany indicate, the magnitude crucially depends on the institu-
tional setting of the economy. The microsimulation studies presented here confirm a
regressive impact. Low-income groups are typically worse off from a tax shift as well
as unemployed and pensioners. This result is not surprising, as these groups typically
face a low burden of income taxes and social security contributions.
2.3 Empirical Approach
Microsimulation models have become a standard tool in the ex-ante assessment of re-
forms of the tax-benefit system and therefore allow to trace changes in highly complex
tax regulations. In particular, the specific institutional setting and the socio-economic
structure in a given country need to be taken into account, which can hardly be accom-
plished by an analysis on an aggregate level.
The basic idea ofmicrosimulation in the context of labor supply is tomodel the indi-
vidual (or household) decision between leisure and consumption. Based on observed
behavior of a representative population sample in a given institutional setting, prefer-
ence parameters can be estimated. If net income (and thus consumption possibilities)
changes as a consequence of a tax-benefit reform, these estimates are used to predict
individual labor supply after the reform. The reform effect is then defined as the differ-
ence in aggregate behavior between the two institutional regimes. For this, a detailed
representation of the tax-benefit system is necessary. We use the IZA Policy SImulation
MODel (IZAΨMOD) of the Institute for the Study of Labor (Löﬄer et al., 2014a). Apart
from replicating the German tax and transfer system, it comprises an econometrically
estimated model of labor supply behavior. It assumes a discrete choice set of working
hours, which facilitates the treatment of family labor supply. As our main database
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does not capture consumption expenditures, we have to extend our database. This is
done by an Engel curve procedure, adopting the approach of Decoster et al. (2013).8
Reform Scenarios. We carry out simulations of two benchmark scenarios, in which
the standard VAT rate of 19% is increased in steps of one percentage point each. For a
given increase in the standard VAT rate dτ > 0, we obtain the resulting additional VAT
revenue from total simulated revenues. We rely on simulated, not official revenues
for this, as our micro-data only capture consumption from private households living
in Germany and therefore cannot depict VAT payments from public consumption, en-
terprises and foreigners.9 On the basis of revenue statistics, we obtain the necessary
proportional reduction on income-related taxes and apply this factor to the simulated
tax liabilities.10 This is done for personal income taxes and social security contributions
separately. This procedure is repeated eleven times until in the last step, an increase in
the standard VAT rate from 19% to 30% is combined with a corresponding reduction
on labor-related taxes. At the same time, we provide more detailed results for a ref-
erence scenario with a standard rate of 25%. While this implies substantial tax shifts,
secondary effects, such as demand for compensation by unions, are less likely to play a
role than for even stronger tax shifts.
Although SSC and income tax payments flow into separate budgets, their impacts
on the overall budget are highly interlinked. Formany years, theGerman statutory pen-
sion system has been partly financed through the tax budget, since SSC revenues are
not sufficient to cover public pension payments. In fact, these payments have become
the largest share of federal expenses.11 For this reason, reforms on either income taxes
or SSC imply equivalent effects for the public budget as a whole. A VAT increase by six
percentage points would result in additional VAT revenue of e29 bn, the correspond-
ing relief amounting to 16.9% for the personal income tax (total status quo revenues:
e174.6 bn) and 15.5% for social security contributions (total status quo revenues from
employees: e190.5 bn). As a consequence, pensions and public health care would need
to receive more tax funding, thus dispersing the welfare state financing away from em-
ployees.
8 Details on the data base, the imputation procedure and the underlying labor supply model are
provided in the Appendix.
9 We however correct the simulated revenue by the under-coverage of total private consumption com-
pared to national accounts, which amounts to 81% for the 2008 EVS.
10 There are numerous ways for governments to reduce the burden of income-related taxes. Here, we
refrain from discussing the various interdependent impacts of instruments, such as reducing marginal
tax rates or raising the exemption level. Instead of providing a blueprint for a tax reform, we rather aim at
gaining a rough insight on the interaction between both forms of taxation with respect to distributional
questions. Therefore, we opt for the most straightforward way to reduce taxes, namely by proportional
reduction. This is the standard approach in the literature.
11 In 2009, e102 bn of tax revenues (roughly one third of total revenues) were spent on financing social
security.
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Income concept. For each reform step, the combined tax change alters household
budget constraints which, in turn, induces adjustments in household labor supply if the
expected utility of an alternative choice category is higher than the status quo. In order
to account for the budget effect of an increased consumption tax, the commonly used
concept of disposable income is not sufficient here, as it ignores consumption taxes. For
the subsequent analysis, the quantity of interest will be Post-VAT Income (PVI), which
is defined as disposable income minus VAT expenses. PVI can be understood as the
amount of money thatwould be left for consumption after paying the Value Added Tax.
This income is of course virtual, as it is not disposable for consumption after VAT has
been paid. PVI is not only the basis for the distributional analysis, but also enters the
utility function and hence determines the labor supply decision. We thereby implic-
itly assume that households have an identical perception of their burden of direct and
indirect taxes. This may be questioned in light of the experimental studies by Sausgru-
ber and Tyran (2005) and Blumkin et al. (2012), both pointing to a lower perception of
consumption taxes. If this is true, households would ignore the VAT increase to some
extent, implying a higher reaction from a reduced direct tax. With positive elasticities
of labor supply, our estimated labor supply reaction should hence be understood as a
lower bound.
Subtracting VAT expenses fromdisposable income is equivalent to full and instanta-
neous VAT shifting from firms to consumers.12 We therefore abstract from the fact that
it may take time until firms shift the higher VAT to consumers, which is in line with the
logic of static models. Our expenditure imputation is also able to depict the effect on
commodity demand through income and price changes.13 This affects savings behavior
as well as adjustments in the expenditure structure across commodity groups. As the
level of basic social assistance in Germany is linked to inflation rates, we address the
importance of this particular channel on our results.14
Incidence and VAT differentiation. Subtracting the revenue-neutral deduction from
household income implicitly assumes that workers bear the full burden of income taxes
and social security contributions. Doubts are however justified, particularly for the
case of payroll taxes, as their payment is split between employers and employees.15 We
address this issue by assuming alternative divisions of the tax incidence in a robustness
12 Full incidence of the German VAT in the medium run has been found by the Bundesbank (2008).
13 See Appendix for details.
14 In practice, the level of the means-tested unemployment benefit (Arbeitslosengeld II) is annually ad-
justed by the change of an index consisting of the price change in basic goods and services (70%) and the
average change in employees’ net wages (30%). As 55% of all expenditures are subject to the standard
VAT rate (see Table 2.4), each percentage point of higher standard VAT rate mechanically raises the price
level and hence the unemployment benefit by 0.46 percentage points.
15 The findings of Saez et al. (2012), exploiting a natural experiment in Greece, suggest that for a payroll
tax increase, the long-term burden of workers is limited to the employee share. It is however unclear
whether their findings are applicable for a different institutional setting and a payroll tax reduction.
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check. If the incidence is low, employees benefit less from a tax reduction. We evaluate
the extent to which this influences the overall distributional impact of the reform.
In a further robustness check, we alter the benchmark scenarios by increasing both
VAT rates simultaneously, thereby addressing the issue of VAT rate differentiation. As
in most OECD countries, expenditures for necessities are taxed with a reduced rate in
Germany. The common justification for this policy are equity concerns. If the reduced
rate is fulfilling its redistributional objective, a simultaneous increase of both VAT rates
should imply more regressive effects than the benchmark scenarios.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Labor Supply Effects
Our microsimulation approach sheds light on whether the expectations of positive ef-
fects onwork incentives can be confirmed. The labor supply effects simulated here have
to be interpreted as medium-term outcomes, i. e., after households have adjusted their
labor supply behavior to the new institutional environment. If one assumes a negative
wage elasticity of labor demand, firms will react to higher labor supply by lowering
offered wages, leading to an equilibrium outcome below the initial labor supply shift
(Peichl and Siegloch, 2012).
Table 2.1: Labor Supply Effects (Standard VAT rate of 25%)
Reform Scenario Base PIT Reduction SSC Reduction
with UB
indexation
no UB
indexation
with UB
indexation
no UB
indexation
changes to Baseline
FT Equivalents 38,039 +242.9 +286.3 +207.9 +249.9
Participation 40,344 +86.3 +125.3 +123.7 +161.6
Own calculations with IZAΨMOD v.3.0.4. Full-Time Equivalent = 40 hours per week.
All figures in thousands.
The simulated labor supply responses, for an increase of the standard VAT rate from
19% to 25%, are displayed in Table 2.1. It shows the aggregate change in hours worked,
measured in full-time equivalents (FTE) of 40 hours per week. The total effect is found
to be positive in the order of 200,000 to 250,000 FTE for both the PIT and the SSC reduc-
tion. This corresponds to an increase in labor supply by around 0.5% of total employ-
ment. This is well in line with results obtained from CGE studies (Buscher et al., 2001,
p. 466; Böhringer et al., 2005, pp. 95ff). Looking at the extensive margin of labor supply,
i.e., the number of individuals entering the labormarket from inactivity, we simulate an
increase by 86,000 (PIT reduction) and 124,000 (SSC reduction) workers respectively, in-
dicating substantially higher activating potential of lower social security contributions
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compared to lower PIT. This is not surprising, as many workers with comparably low
earnings are subject to these contributions, while still exempted from the income tax. If
the increase in labor supply can bemostly realized, i.e., facing limited constraints on the
demand side, our simulation results confirm the theoretical expectations concerning a
moderate growth in total employment.16 In the results presented so far, unemployment
benefits are indexed by the inflation rate. The additional two columns in Table 2.1 re-
veal that ignoring this channel would significantly overestimate potential labor supply
effects. This holds particularly for the extensive margin (up to 1.5 times higher labor
supply effect), as higher unemployment benefits reduce the price for leisure and hence
lower work incentives.
Aggregate labor supply effects for different reform scenarios (i.e. different VAT in-
creases) are depicted in Figure 2.1. This sheds light on the interaction between both
taxes if the shift is smaller. Overall, the total hours effect increases about linearly for
both scenarios, reaching 400,000 (PIT) and 330,000 (SSC) full-time equivalents respec-
tively. For the participation margin, effects are substantial only after the fourth reform
step. Moreover, the labor supply effect of the SSC reduction is stronger than the PIT
reduction across the whole range of reforms for the participation margin. The inverse
holds for the change in aggregate hours.
Figure 2.1: Labor Supply Effects for different VAT rate increases
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Own calculations with IZAΨMOD v.3.0.4. Full-Time Equivalent = 40 hours per week. The vertical line
indicates the reference scenario that displayed in Table 2.1.
The total change in labor supply for the reference scenario is decomposed by in-
come deciles in Figure 2.2. It can be seen that the increase in hours worked in the PIT
scenario (dark gray bars) is mainly driven by higher income groups. The participation
effect is even slightly negative up to the third decile, while most workers entering the
labor market are in the top deciles. These are mostly secondary earners who have been
previously inactive and now face a lower individual marginal tax rate. Shifting from
SSC affects household budgets already at a lower income level and exceeds the hours
16 Microsimulation approaches with demand side restrictions are provided by Creedy and Duncan
(2005) and Peichl and Siegloch (2012). In both studies, at least half of the supply effect is maintained.
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effect from the PIT reduction in the bottom half of the distribution, as indicated by the
light gray bars. If policy-makers seek to reduce entry barriers into the labor market by
reducing the tax wedge, the SSC scenario appears to be better targeted.
Figure 2.2: Labor Supply Effects by Income Deciles (VAT rate of 25%)
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Own calculations with IZAΨMOD v.3.0.4. Income deciles are based on equivalized Post-VAT income.
Full-Time Equivalent = 40 hours per week.
2.4.2 Distributional Impact
Employment Type. The average budget effects with respect to the employment type
are illustrated in Figure 2.3.17 Employees experience modest income gains vis-à-vis the
status quo (+4% in the short run, +5% when accounting for labor supply changes). For
other employment groups, the differences between the scenarios with and without be-
havioral adjustment are negligible.18 Pensioners lose most from the reform, as they
hardly benefit from reductions on the income side. Moreover, they are not able to cush-
ion the adverse budget effect trough increased labor supply. For self-employed and
civil servants, the picture is mixed. On the one hand, these groups significantly benefit
from income tax reductions. However, they are not subject to social security payments.
For this reason, civil servants turn out to be slightly worse off from the SSC reform (see
also Meinhardt and Zwiener (2005)).19
With the exception of pensioners and civil servants, all employment groups are able
to compensate a large share of their losses through increased realized labor supply.
The main losers from the SSC reform are pensioners, who lose around 2% on average.
In relative terms, employees and unemployed workers are the main beneficiaries. The
average budget effect for unemployed (+2%and+4% respectively for the SSC reduction)
is due to substantial increases for some unemployed. For those remaining unemployed
17 Throughout the distributional analysis, incomes are adjusted by equivalenceweights using themod-
ified OECD scale.
18 This is in line with Picos-Sanchez and Thomas (2015). The results for the standard VAT rate of 21%
is complementary to their second reform scenario.
19 The slightly positive budget effect for self-employed is purely due to changes in spouses’ income,
which cause equivalence-weighted household income to change.
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Figure 2.3: Income change by employment type
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Own calculations with IZAΨMOD v.3.0.4. Income changes refer to equivalized Post-VAT income.
First-Round Effects refer to the situation without labor supply reactions. The vertical line indicates
the reference scenario.
the total change in PVI will be about zero, as the increase in VAT expenses is expected
to correspond roughly to the increase in unemployment benefits due to indexation. In
general, these results are in line with expectations as well. Those who are not affected
by the tax that is reduced are, in tendency, worse off from the reform.
Income deciles. The distributional impact along the reform path, differentiated by
(status quo) deciles of Post-VAT-Income, is illustrated in the upper part of Figure 2.4. It
displays the relative income change due to the reform by income deciles. For a clearer
exposition, we restrict the presentation to five selected deciles.
The upper panel of Figure 2.4 demonstrates the increasingly regressive impact of a
shift from personal income tax to VAT. Minor VAT increases hardly affect budgets of
medium-income earners, but rather let the high-income earners better off. After the
final reform step (standard VAT rate of 30%), the lowest decile suffers from an income
loss of around 4%, while the top decile gains more than 8%. This is in principle not
surprising as one would typically expect those households to lose from a shift towards
consumption taxation who bear a low burden of PIT prior to the reform. The higher
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Figure 2.4: Income change by income deciles
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Own calculations with IZAΨMOD v.3.0.4. Income changes refer to equivalized Post-VAT income.
First-Round Effects refer to the situation without labor supply reactions. The vertical line indicates
the reference scenario.
saving ratio of high-income earners exacerbates this effect. The core interest of our in-
vestigation is to analyze to what extent the regressive impact is weakened if behavioral
responses are accounted for. As the right panel shows, the distributional picture how-
ever hardly changes for the PIT scenario, if we consider the budget changes after the
labor supply response. The improvement to the first-round effect is one percentage
point at most across income deciles, leaving the poorest decile 4% worse off compared
to the baseline.
The equivalent analysis is presented in the lower panel of Figure 2.4 for the SSC
reduction. While still implying a regressive impact in the short run, income gains are
not larger than 1.5%. The bottom decile loses around 2% on average. Besides, the 7th
decile experiences larger gains than the 10th income decile. This can be explained by a
low marginal payroll tax burden for top-earners due to the assessment threshold and
a decreasing income share of labor earnings for this group. The labor supply response
causes the picture to change to some extent by raising the income effects for all deciles.
Middle income groups gain relatively more than the highest income decile. The SSC
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reductions shift taxes from one regressive form of taxation to the other, which clearly
has lower adverse distributional effects than the income tax reduction. As the burden
of SSC is more dispersed over the income distribution, the budget changes from the
reform are less pronounced for the second scenario.
Summing up, a shift from labor to consumption taxation indeed exhibits a regres-
sive impact on household budgets. Lower income groups lose while receivers of high
incomes benefit, in tendency, from the reform. This can be easily explained by the fact
that the bottom 50% of the income distribution account only for 5% of total income tax
revenues and thus hardly benefit from a reduction. The regressive impact is substan-
tially less severe for a shift from social security contributions to VAT. Hence, reforming
the personal income tax as suggested here is likely to be confronted with strong po-
litical opposition and is therefore not a realistic policy proposal. As a consequence,
the in-depth analysis in Section 2.4.3 concentrates on the SSC reductions as the more
attractive option for policy-makers.
Tax Progressivity and Inequality. To complete the picture on the distributional im-
pact of the reform, Table 2.2 shows results for the degree of tax progressivity for dif-
ferent components of the tax-benefit system. We analyze two measures of tax progres-
sivity. The Suits index piSuits builds on the Lorenz curve for tax payments. Let LX(p)
and LT (p) denote the Lorenz curves for pre-tax incomes and tax liabilities respectively.
Then the Suits index piSuits is obtained by
piSuits = 2
∫ 1
0
[LX(p)− LT (p)]L′X(p)dp (2.1)
If piSuits is calculated for some parts of the tax-benefit system (as in Table 2.2), the index
for the overall progressivity is a weighted average of the partial indices, with average
tax rate as weights (Suits, 1977). The index takes values in the [-1;1] interval and is
an indicator for the progressivity of the tax schedule. A value of 1 would imply an
extremely progressive system where only one individual would be subject to the tax.
Opposed to this, the Reynold-Smolensky index piRS captures the redistributional impact
of a particular tax by the difference in pre- and post-tax income concentration.
piRS = 2
∫ 1
0
[LX−T (p)− LX(p)]dp = GiniPreTax −GiniPostTax (2.2)
The difference of both indices can be illustrated by the following example. A strongly
progressive tax schedule (as measured by piSuits) only exerts a redistributive impact if
highmarginal tax rates are paid by a significant number of taxpayers (captured by piRS).
Similarly to piSuits, piRS can be decomposed into the relative contributions of certain ele-
ments of the tax system (Lambert, 2001). For both concepts, a progressive (regressive)
tax is associated with a negative (positive) value.
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Table 2.2: Progressivity of Different Taxes
Reference
Scenario
Total PIT SSC VAT
Base
piSuits 0.218 0.346 -0.060 -0.194
piRS 0.076 0.049 -0.007 -0.012
Reform 1: PIT Reduction
piSuits 0.185 0.345 -0.058 -0.188
piRS 0.063 0.040 -0.007 -0.014
Reform 2: SSC Reduction
piSuits 0.212 0.345 -0.059 -0.192
piRS 0.074 0.049 -0.005 -0.015
Own calculations with IZAΨMOD v.3.0.4. Reform effects after Labor Supply adjustment
for VAT standard rate of 25%. All reforms with indexation of basic unemployment ben-
efit.
In the status quo, piSuits for VAT amounts to -0.194, while it is 0.346 for the personal
income tax. Hence, the Value-Added Tax is about half as regressive as the income tax
schedule is progressive.20 At the same time, the distributional impact of VAT as mea-
sured by piRS is regressive (-0.012), but only a quarter compared to the PIT progres-
sivity (0.049). The PIT reduction does not affect the progressivity of the tax tariff, but
reduces redistribution via the income tax. It is also apparent that both reforms make
the VAT schedule more regressive in distributive terms. The Reynold-Smolenksy mea-
sure for VAT is only slightly higher than for SSC. This explains why the SSC reform
is close to neutral in terms of total progressivity (∆piSuits = −2.7%) and redistribution
(∆piRS = −2.6%).
The baseline Gini for our income concepts amounts to 0.303. For the reference sce-
nario, it increases by 0.013 for the PIT reform after Labor Supply. For the SSC reform,
the Gini index increases by only 0.001, leaving inequality nearly unchanged. The per-
centage changes for four basic inequality and progressivity measures are depicted in
Figure 2.5 for each intermediate reform step. The Gini index rises by about 8% for the
full PIT reform and around 1% for the SSC reform. The P90/P10 ratio (upper right
panel) however shows a significant increase also for the SSC reform, suggesting higher
income polarization.
2.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Alternative payroll tax incidence. We deviate from the benchmark SSC reduction
scenario by altering the assumption of full incidence of the payroll tax. This implies
20 See Decoster et al. (2010) for other countries.
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Figure 2.5: Changes in Inequality and Tax progressivity
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Own calculations with IZAΨMOD v.3.0.4. The graphs show the difference in distributional
indices from reducing SSC after labor supply response. Graphs without behavioral response
are available upon request. The vertical line indicates the reference scenario.
that the total payroll tax reduction falls on employees. Instead, we present changes in
aggregate distributionalmeasures in Figure 2.6 for payroll tax incidence values of 100%,
75%, 50%, 25% and 0% respectively. As labor demand is typically estimated to be more
elastic than labor supply (Lichter et al., 2015a), an incidence share of more than 50% for
employees seems most realistic. Incidence below 100% causes employees to gain less
from a payroll tax reduction and hence weakens the positive effect on work incentives.
For the extreme case of no incidence, we simply raise only the Value Added Tax. For
larger SSC reductions, the labor demand channel may gain importance. As labor costs
for firms decrease, hiringmay becomemore attractive. However, this mechanism is out
of our models’ scope.21
As expected, the labor supply response is weaker if the net wage is less affected by
the payroll tax change (left panel of Figure 2.6). For an incidence of 25% or less, aggre-
gate labor supply even decreases for all scenarios. The right panel depicts the corre-
sponding changes of various measures of inequality and tax progressivity, the left bar
representing the benchmark scenario of 100%. While the Gini index is higher for lower
incidence, income polarization, measured by the P90/P10 share, decreases. The intu-
21 This possible positive employment impact would also need to be contrasted with lower commodity
demand.
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Figure 2.6: Alternative Incidence Assumptions
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ition is that earners of higher incomes are losing disproportionately if tax incidence is
lower. Tax regressivity is increasing steadily as assumed incidence decreases; the over-
all redistribution of the tax system does not vary much for different incidence values.
For the most realistic range of 50% and above, our main conclusions with regard to the
overall inequality impact however remain unaffected.
The Suits index indicates a steadily increasing overall regressivity. Interestingly, the
P90/P10 measure slightly decreases for lower tax incidence, suggesting slightly lower
income polarization.
Increasing both VAT rates. So far, our reform scenarios left the reduced VAT rate
of 7% unchanged. Levying reduced VAT rates on necessities is justified, among oth-
ers, by equity considerations. As a consequence, all EU countries with the exception
of Denmark impose differentiated VAT rates. Nonetheless, VAT differentiation is of-
ten criticized for not achieving its social purpose (OECD/Korea Institute of Public Fi-
nance, 2014) and to distort consumers’ choices. In the following, we address the ques-
tion whether shifting the tax burden also on commodities that are taxed at a lower rate
is particularly to the detriment of low-income earners. We alter the SSC reduction sce-
nario such that in each reform step, we increase both rates simultaneously in steps of
one percentage point. A VAT structure with rates of 23% and 11% (Status Quo: 19%
and 7%) is comparable with the reference scenario with regard to the revenue effect. It
is important to note that the zero-rate commodities remain exempted.
The distributional outcome of this reform is depicted in Figure 2.7, contrasted with
the reference scenario for the SSC reform. As there is virtually no difference in the in-
come changes both in the short and medium run, it is fair to conclude that raising both
VAT rates instead of the standard rate does not imply a distinct distributional impact.
This suggests that the reduced VAT rate in Germany hardly achieves its redistributional
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Figure 2.7: Distributional impact of raising both VAT rates for the reference scenario
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Own calculations with IZAΨMOD v.3.0.4. The standard rate scenario corresponds to the base-
line SSC reduction with a standard VAT rate of 25%, the second scenario applies a standard rate
of 23% and a reduced rate of 11%, while reducing SSC. Income changes refer to equivalized
Post-VAT income. First-Round Effects refer to the situation without labor supply reactions.
purpose. The intuition is given in Figure 2.8. Reduced-rate commodities account for
about the same expenditure share across income groups. A further policy proposal
often discussed is the introduction of a uniform VAT rate. If the VAT-exempted com-
modities are left untouched, onewould expect (qualitatively) very similar distributional
effects of this reform as in Figure 2.7.
Figure 2.8: VAT Tax Rates over Income Deciles
Source: EVS 2008. Income deciles for equivalized disposable income. Each bar shows mean values
of expenditures shares by the respective VAT rate applied.
2.5 Conclusions
This chapter examines a partial shift of taxation from labor income to consumption in
Germany. Our empirical approach combines a detailed analysis of changes in house-
30
Shifting Taxes from Labor to Consumption Chapter 2
hold budgetswith amicrosimulation of behavioral reactions on the labormarket. Based
on a dual data base, we carry out a microsimulation of several reform scenarios shift-
ing a substantial share of personal income taxes or social security contributions onto
the Value Added Tax. The policies are designed revenue-neutral. The expectations of
positive effects on household work incentives are confirmed by the simulation. The
total increase in labor supply for the reference scenario (Standard VAT rate of 25%) is
expected to be rather moderate below 1% of total employment for the benchmark sce-
narios. This suggests a limited capacity of this policy instrument for targeting workers
at the margin to enter employment.
The distributional evidence suggests that a shift from personal income tax to VAT
has a regressive impact on household budgets. Negative effects are expected for low-
incomehouseholds, unemployed andpensioners in particular. This budget loss amounts
to up to 4% of equivalized income, whereas the policy clearly favors high-income earn-
ers. The change in aggregate distributional measures supports this view by indicating
higher inequality and a lower degree of the overall tax progressivity. Typically, most
losers have a low burden of direct taxes and thus hardly benefit from a reduction on the
income side. These static (i.e., non-behavioral) results are in line with micro-based ev-
idence from other studies (Meinhardt and Zwiener, 2005; Picos-Sanchez and Thomas,
2015; Thomas and Picos-Sanchez, 2012).
Taking into consideration labor supply effects, the overall picture slightly improves
for the SSC reduction, as income effects turn positive for the majority of people. This is
for two reasons. First, SSC are a regressive form of taxation themselves. Replacing them
with another regressive form of taxation hardly alters its distributional impact. Second,
SSC reductions affect household budgets at a rather low income level, which bears acti-
vating potential. Reducing social security contributions overall entails lower inequality
increases than a shift from personal income taxes. Besides, we demonstrate the negli-
gible redistributive impact of the reduced VAT rate. It is worth noting that our static
approach does not allow conclusions beyond the medium run. It is possible that posi-
tive employment effects vanish in the long run if unions are able to assert higher wages.
Our empirical results may serve as a point of departure for further research in sev-
eral areas. First, it is worth considering possible extensions of the policy proposal in
order to increase both political feasibility and effectiveness with regard to increasing
work incentives for low-income groups (Thomas and Picos-Sanchez, 2012). One could
think of a reform that is both revenue- and inequality-neutral. As Decoster et al. (2010)
suggest, increasing the progressivity of the remaining income tax schedule is one op-
tion. Another waywould be to compensate themain losers by raising old-age pensions.
Our results suggest that designing such a reform is very well possible. In order to get a
broader picture of the overall distribution of the consumption tax burden, incorporat-
ing excise taxes seems promising. A shift towards taxes on fuel or electricity is regularly
31
Chapter 2 Shifting Taxes from Labor to Consumption
discussed in the context of environmental tax reforms that aim at internalizing external
effects.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Dual Database
The main database for IZAΨMOD is the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP),
which is an annual panel study of households and individuals that was launched in
1984 as a representative cross-section of the population living in private households in
Germany (Wagner et al., 2007).22 Since then, the scope and size of the panel has been
steadily extended. Special attention is given to the representativeness of the German
population by explicitly oversampling foreigners and high-income households. As of
now, it covers around 22,000 persons living in more than 12,000 households. Among
others, IZAΨMODexploits information on gross wages, household composition, work-
ing time, age and educational background of household members, as well as employ-
ment status and housing costs. These data serve as input for the tax and benefit module
and for the labor supply estimation.
The 2010 SOEPwave is deliveredwith information on household consumption. The
survey design implies non-response and heaping of values, which are dealt with by
correction methods described in Marcus et al. (2013). However, the consumption cate-
gories do not cover all aspects of household expenditure, which justifies the additional
effort of imputing information from an auxiliary source, namely the German Sample
Survey of Income and Expenditure (Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe, EVS).23 It
is a cross-sectional survey conducted by the Federal Statistical Office that started in
1962/1963 and is repeated every five years. The most recent available wave was con-
ducted in 2008.24 It covers about 55,000 households, of which a 80% subsample is pro-
vided for scientific analyses (44,088 observations). The EVS data contain detailed infor-
mation on every household member’s employment, income from different sources and
assets. Its main focus rests on expenditures for all types of commodities and services.
All participants constantly keep record of their expenditures throughout a three-month
period.
Although EVS and SOEP apply similar concepts of household and household in-
come, both data sets are not fully comparable due to methodological differences.25 In-
come is reported in more detail in the EVS. On the other hand, it shows weaknesses
with respect to representing foreigners and high-income earners accurately. EVS does
not sample households above a monthly gross income threshold of e18,000. In ad-
dition, middle-income groups are slightly over-represented. The measurement error
22 In particular, we use version 29 of the Socio-Economic Panel data for years 1984–2012, doi:10.5684/
soep.v29. We rely on data from the 2009 wave only.
23 Non-covered items include vehicle purchases, home appliances and telephone costs.
24 See Destatis (2013) for a detailed description of themethodology. EVS has been part of the European
Household Budget Survey until 1998. It was then replaced by the another survey (Laufende Wirtschaft-
srechnungen, LWR) which is carried out annually, but with a much smaller sample.
25 See Becker et al. (2003) for further information on the comparability of EVS and SOEP.
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is probably larger in SOEP than in EVS, due to the retrospective methodology of the
SOEP.
2.A.2 Imputation of Expenditures
Major tax shifts, as analyzed in this chapter, are expected not only to affect household
budgets, but also to assert substantial price changes. To capture the effect on house-
hold consumption, the first-best approach would be to fully characterize household
consumer behavior by estimating a demand system (Banks et al., 1997). This is un-
fortunately not possible based on one cross-section due to lack of price variation. We
hence follow a middle-path by estimating Engel curve relationships in a first step, with
the aim to reproduce the expenditure patterns observed in EVS in the SOEP data. In a
second step, we incorporate externally estimated price elasticities.
For the imputation of expenditures, we adopt the approach by Decoster et al. (2013),
who carry out a parametric estimation of Engel curves. This approach is briefly outlined
in the following.26 A similar approach has recently been applied by Savage and Callan
(2015).
As the EVS is based on quarterly, rather than annual data, significant singular pur-
chases may bias the picture by yielding inappropriately high expenditure values. For
this reason, we clear the EVS from households with negative disposable income. Fur-
thermore, we drop observations where either the statistical difference between income
and expenditures or the amount of durable expenditures exceeds twice the disposable
income. In total, less than 1% of observations are excluded, leaving us with a sample
of 43,632 households.
We classify expenditures into 16 categories; 15 non-durables and one category for
durable consumption goods.27 Durable expenditures require special treatment, as their
purchase may not be observed in the three-month window, while the actual consump-
tion stream persists from previous periods. For this reason, we distribute total durable
expenditures equally among households with identical cells, defined by seven income
26 The main difference to Decoster et al. (2013) is that they impute expenditures into the German EU-
SILC data, which is distinct from SOEP. We do not have any reason to believe that the imputation quality
should be much different when applied to SOEP, as both data sets are a comprehensive samples of the
same population. Apart from that, we employ further household covariates, such as the flat size. We
also do not estimate a probit model for durable commodities first, as for our choice of cells, we are left
with a negligible number of zero durable expenditures. Finally, we use a tobit specification for the four
expenditure groups with many zero observations.
27 The 15 nondurable commodity classes aremostly in linewith the COICOP classifications (UN, 2012).
Deviations occur for household services, which encompasses items fromhousing (COICOP 4) and house-
holdmaintenance (COICOP 5). They are defined as follows: Food and non-alcoholic beverages; alcoholic
beverages; tobacco; clothes and shoes; home fuels and electricity; rents; household services; health; pri-
vate transport; public transport; communication; recreation and culture; education; restaurants and ho-
tels; other expenditures. Durable consumption entails, among others, expenditures on furniture, home
appliances, means of transport and household entertainment.
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groups, seven age cohorts and four household types.28 Afterwards, two Engel curves
for the total of durable and non-durable consumption are estimated.29
ln cji = αj + βj ln yi + γj ln(y
2
i ) + δjXi + εji (2.3)
where j is durable or nondurable total expenditure and yi denotes households dispos-
able income, Xi is a vector of households characteristics contained in both data sets,
such as flat size, community size, number of children in several age groups, number
of working household members and geographical region. Further covariates reflect
characteristics of the household head, namely age, age squared, sex, education and em-
ployment status. We further include an interaction term between yi and household size.
Note that this framework explicitly allows negative savings, as the sum for durable and
nondurable expenditures may exceed yi. Based on these estimates, the total amount
of durable and nondurable expenditure can be predicted for SOEP households. As the
dependent variable in Equation (2.3) is in logs, the prediction bias needs to be corrected.
In a second step, we regress 15 nondurable expenditure shares on the log and log
squared of total nondurable consumption. This functional form is regularly used for
estimating commodity demand systems. Four nondurable categories (tobacco, rents,
public transport and education) exhibit a substantial share of zero expenditures, which
needs to be accounted for. We therefore fit a tobit model for these k = (1, . . . , 4) cate-
gories.
ω∗ki = αk + βk ln c
nd
i + γk ln (c
nd
i )
2
+ δkXi + εki (2.4)
ωki = max(0, ω
∗
ki) (2.5)
The remaining l = (1, . . . , 11) shares are estimated by unrestricted OLS using cresti
as total expenditures. This is defined as total nondurable expenditures from these 11
categories: cresti = cndi −
∑4
j=1 cj . This secures that predicted shares sum up to one.
ωli = αl + βl ln c
rest
i + γl ln(c
rest
i )
2 + δlXi + εli (2.6)
Based on these estimates, the 15 nondurable consumption shares ω̂miwithm = (1, . . . , 15)
can be predicted based on imputed total amounts ĉndi and ĉresti . For the tobit models, we
predict the unconditional expenditure and assign a lower limit of zero. For the standard
OLS estimates, negative predicted values occur in few cases. These amount however to
single-digit values and are set to zero. The remaining expenditures are then corrected
such that they sum up to one.
28 This approach follows Beznoska and Ochmann (2013). Income and age groups are defined by quan-
tiles within household types. The mean number of observations per cell is 324, with a minimum of 17.
29 All estimations are carried out using sample weights; monetary amounts are in monthly terms.
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The accuracy of the matching procedure is evaluated in Figure 2.9, comparing the
mean expenditure share for each of the 16 categories, separately for four types of house-
hold composition (Single, Single Parents, Couples, Families with children). As can be
seen, the major expenditure items are durable commodities, food and drinks, rents and
culture and recreation. All observed expenditure shares are replicated in SOEP with
minor deviations not exceeding two percentage points. Rents are the only group with
larger deviations. This is however a minor issue for the accuracy of the imputed VAT
burden, as the average VAT rate for this particular group is only 3.7%. One problem
with our procedure may arise for top-income earners, as there are none in EVS (see
Section 2.A.1). As a consequence, their imputed VAT burden might be wrong if their
expenditure behavior cannot be described by extrapolation from lower income groups.
The direction of this bias is however not clear.
In order to allow household expenditures to react to price increases, we have to in-
corporate external estimates on the price elasticities of demand. To our knowledge, the
only estimation of a full demand system based on EVS is provided by (Kohn and Mis-
song, 2003). Wemake use of their own-price elasticities, differentiated by six household
types (Table 2.3) while using the mean value over all income levels.30 When simulating
the tax reforms, the Engel curve estimations are used to depict consumption reactions
from changing disposable income. The price reaction is calculated afterwards. In the
reference scenario, consumption decreases by about 1% in average. This comparable
to the change from labor supply adjustments and underscores the need to account for
price reactions. On the other hand, this has a minor impact on the distributional im-
plications of the reform, as price elasticities do not show large differences across demo-
graphic groups.
Table 2.3: Own-price Elasticities of Commodity Demand
Commodity Household Type
Singles Single
Parents
Couples,
no ch
Couples,
1 ch
Couples,
2 ch
Couples,
3 ch
Food, Alcohol,
Tobacco
-0.391 -0.291 -0.292 -0.274 -0.262 -0.254
Clothing -0.438 -0.264 -0.351 -0.294 -0.277 -0.272
Energy, Rents,
Household Services
-0.324 -0.287 -0.325 -0.306 -0.296 -0.287
Health -0.403 -0.273 -0.330 -0.320 -0.299 -0.296
Transport -0.437 -0.306 -0.384 -0.325 -0.322 -0.318
Communication,
Culture, Hotels,
Restaurants, Other
-0.523 -0.366 -0.423 -0.402 -0.396 -0.397
Education -0.446 -0.288 -0.400 -0.331 -0.306 -0.296
Source: Kohn and Missong (2003, Table 5), using means across income groups.
30 The authors were not able to identify cross-price elasticities.
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Figure 2.9: Mean Expenditure shares in both data sets
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Calculation of VAT payments. In order to identify the consumption shares of goods
with different VAT rates, we make use of the weighting scheme applied by the German
Federal Statistical Office for capturing price level changes (the so-called “representative
basket of products”). As an example, non-al-co-ho-lic drinks (taxed with the standard
rate) are assigned aweight of 9.3% of total expenditures in expenditure category 1 (food
andbeverages). Therefore, 9.3%of this consumption component is allotted the standard
VAT rate, while the rest is taxed with the reduced rate.
The treatment of VAT-exempted commodities for which no input tax deduction can
be claimed deserves special attention. Despite their revenues being formally exempted,
it is reasonable to assume that firms shift a certain share of their input tax burden to
consumers through increased prices. The most notable case of exempted goods are
rents. Landlords might be able to charge higher rents in order to compensate for taxes
paid in connection to restorations or construction works. The extent to which this oc-
curs is however hard to estimate, as the possibility to increase rents is restricted and
depends on local market characteristics. Hence, there is no agreement in the literature
on the extent to which rents are burdened with VAT.31 Following RWI and FiFo (2007),
we assume that 11% of expenditures on rents are subject to the standard VAT rate. This
rather low assumption can be justified in light of the overall (rather short) time hori-
zon of our model. Similar incidence assumptions are made for medical and financial
services. Table 2.4 depicts the resulting VAT rate shares by consumption category.
The corresponding distribution of VAT payments is visualized in Figure 2.10. In line
with other studies (OECD/Korea Institute of Public Finance, 2014), we clearly confirm
a regressive pattern of the German VAT. As income rises, the VAT share of disposable
income decreases from 12% for the first decile to 4% for decile 10, which is belowOECD
average. With regard to expenditures, the pattern is rather flat, the VAT burden ranging
between 9% and 10%.
31 See RWI and FiFo (2007), Fritzsche et al. (2003) and Bach (2005).
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Table 2.4: VAT Shares by Expenditure categories
Expenditure category Avg. Share of
Total
Expenditures
Share of
VAT 0%
(%)
Share of
VAT 7%
(%)
Share of
VAT 19%
(%)
1 Food and beverages 16.3 — 90.7 9.3
2 Alcoholic Beverages 1.3 — — 100.0
3 Tobacco 0.9 — — 100.0
4 Clothing and footwear 5.6 — — 100.0
5 Household Fuels, Energy 8.0 — 15.6 84.4
6 Rents 11.8 80.3 — 19.7
7 Household Services 2.5 — 36.2 63.8
8 Health 4.6 43.2 16.2 40.6
9 Private Transport 8.5 — — 100.0
10 Public Transport 2.5 5.0 57.0 38.0
11 Communication 3.7 — 7.4 92.6
12 Recreation and culture 11.9 9.4 33.4 57.2
13 Education 1.0 92.4 — 7.6
14 Restaurants and hotels 6.0 — 70.2 29.8
15 Other goods and services 4.7 30.6 — 69.4
16 Durable commodities 10.8 20.2 2.4 77.4
Total 100.0 17.3 27.8 55.0
Source: Own calculations.
Figure 2.10: VAT incidence
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2.A.3 Tax-Benefit and Labor Supply Modules
We calculate household disposable income from gross income and household charac-
teristics from the SOEP data by means of a tax-benefit calculator. It reproduces the
regulations of the system of direct taxes, social security contributions and benefits in
Germany. As the latest available EVS wave is from 2008, we apply the legal status of
that year.
In the last decades, VAT has become the main source of revenue for the German
government. VAT and income tax together nowadays account for about two thirds of
total tax revenues. The personal income tax is designed progressively, with a rate of
14% for incomes just above the basic allowance and with a top marginal rate of 42%.32
Social security contributions, in contrast, are calculated as a constant share of labor
income until an upper threshold is reached. SSC payments are, in general, equally split
between employer and employee.33 Civil servants and self-employed do generally not
contribute to the public social welfare system.
At the core of our microsimulation approach, a behavioral labor supply module es-
timates preference parameters for the optimal choice between leisure time and dispos-
able income on the household level. The household decision is implemented following
the discrete choice household labor supply model (see Löﬄer et al., 2014b, for technical
details on discrete choice modelling). In case of couple households, it assumes a joint
utility function for both spouses. The model is discrete in the sense that a household
n can choose between a finite number of combinations in consumption and leisure, de-
noted with Jn. We restrict the choice set to seven time categories of weekly working
hours (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 hours). For households that are flexible in their labor sup-
ply decision, this results in seven alternatives for singles and couples with one flexible
spouse.34 For couples with two flexible spouses, the choice set expands to 49 alterna-
tives. In addition we further expand the choice set in order to account for an endoge-
nous decision on whether or not to apply for public benefits (Hoynes, 1996). This way,
we address the potential presence of welfare stigma. We specify the utility U for every
choice alternative j ∈ Jn as a function of household consumption Cnj (after subtract-
32 In addition, a so-called solidarity surcharge is levied, amounting to 5.5%of the total income tax burden.
For earners of income above e250,000 per year, a marginal tax rate of 45% is applied. In 2008, capital
income was taxed the same way as earnings before introducing a dual income tax regime in 2009.
33 In 2008, the following rates apply for employees (overall): OldAge Pension Insurance: 9.95% (19.8%);
Health Insurance: 7.9% (14.9%); Unemployment Insurance: 1.65% (3.3%); Care Insurance: 0.85% (1.7%).
34 Self-employed persons and civil servants are assumed inflexible in their choice of labor supply.
Even though they might adjust their labor supply, we assume that it is based their consumption/leisure
decision follows a different rationale than those of employees. Hence, we treat their labor supply as fixed.
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ing consumption taxes), leisure of the spouses Lsj , s ∈ {m, f} and a dummy for welfare
participation Pnj .35
U
(
Cnj, L
m
j , L
f
j , Pnj
)
= x1njβ
′
1 lnCnj + β2(lnCnj)
2 + β3 lnCnj lnL
m
j + β4 lnCnj lnL
f
j
+ x2njβ
′
5 lnL
m
j + β6(lnL
m
j )
2 + x3njβ
′
7 lnL
f
j + β8(lnL
f
j )
2
+ δ′Pnj + x4njγ
′ + εnj (2.7)
Leisure follows directly from working hours, assuming a time endowment of 80 hours
per week. Disposable income for counterfactual choice categories are calculated by
keeping hourly wages constant. The vectors x1nj to x4nj capture individual and house-
hold characteristics, such as age, number of children, handicap status and the presence
of a needy person in the household. By interacting themwith leisure and consumption,
we account for observed heterogeneity.36 The parameter δ captures welfare stigma. The
vector x4nj contains dummies on part-time and full-time work. The hence reflect mar-
ket restrictions due to working hours regulations. Equation 2.7 simplifies for the case of
single households, as leisure of the second person and interactions thereof are dropped.
Under the assumption that the error term εnj in Equation 2.7 follows an extreme
value type I distribution, McFadden (1974) showed that the probability of household n
to choose alternative i over all other alternatives can be expressed as follows:
P (Uni > Unj,∀j 6= i) =
exp
(
ϕ
[
Cni, L
f
ni, L
m
ni
])
∑
s∈Jn exp
(
ϕ
[
Cns, L
f
ns, Lmns
]) (2.8)
The term ϕ captures the observed part of the utility function 2.7. The structural utility
parameters can be obtained by estimating equation 2.8 via maximum likelihood. Re-
sults are given in Table 2.5. Based on these estimates, the individual reactions following
a change in households’ net income can be simulated. This is done by predicting the
choice probabilities for each working time category under the old and the new regime.
Labor supply for each household is then obtained by multiplying predicted probabili-
ties with the respective amount of hours. The presented reform effects should thus be
interpreted as an expected value of supplied hours. A similar logic applies to income
amounts. The simulated labor supply elasticities are in line with extant micro-based
literature and range from 0.1 for single men to 0.3 for women in couples (see Table 4 in
Löﬄer et al. (2014a)).
35 As Löﬄer et al. (2014b) demonstrate, the type of utility function is of minor importance for the
implied elasticity of labor supply.
36 We assume the coefficients β1 to β8 to be fixed. Assuming some of these to be random would allow
for unobserved heterogeneity, but this is particularly more burdensome in terms of computation.
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Table 2.5: Estimates of structural labor supply model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SingleM SingleF CoupleM CoupleF CoupleMF
C -5.725∗∗∗ -2.607 3.512∗ -1.907 2.391∗
(1.360) (1.460) (1.451) (1.564) (1.037)
C2 0.199∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.118∗ 0.221∗∗∗
(0.0290) (0.0303) (0.0399) (0.0516) (0.0165)
C×
Agem 0.0413 0.0475 0.0866
∗
(0.0291) (0.0580) (0.0348)
Age2m -0.000516 -0.000351 -0.00103
∗∗
(0.000337) (0.000744) (0.000371)
Handcm -0.100 0.789 0.208
(0.116) (1.354) (0.242)
Agef 0.0958
∗ 0.214∗ -0.0336
(0.0396) (0.105) (0.0386)
Age2f -0.00112
∗ -0.00251∗ 0.000464
(0.000480) (0.00126) (0.000434)
Handcf -0.322∗ -0.359 0.0612
(0.161) (0.399) (0.200)
Care -0.301 -0.745 -0.0971
(0.231) (0.417) (0.159)
Child ≤ 2y 0.441 0.0448 0.217
(1.020) (1.581) (0.260)
Child 3–6y 0.132 -0.138 -0.0403
(0.369) (1.066) (0.138)
Child 7–16y 0.376 0.826 -0.00863
(0.217) (0.570) (0.0730)
C × L1 0.943∗∗∗ -0.00331 -1.274∗∗∗ -0.522∗ -0.894∗∗∗
(0.246) (0.272) (0.233) (0.205) (0.125)
L1 18.96∗∗∗ 23.20∗∗∗ 55.75∗∗∗ 22.64∗∗∗ 47.04∗∗∗
(4.312) (4.456) (4.862) (3.542) (2.641)
(L1)2 -3.095∗∗∗ -2.073∗∗∗ -6.586∗∗∗ -1.884∗∗∗ -5.452∗∗∗
(0.459) (0.396) (0.597) (0.356) (0.261)
L1×
Agem -0.241
∗∗ -0.0361 -0.205∗∗∗
(0.0773) (0.0868) (0.0451)
Age2m 0.00297
∗∗ 0.000845 0.00262∗∗∗
(0.000929) (0.00100) (0.000518)
Handcm 1.844∗∗∗ 0.683 0.508
(0.458) (1.046) (0.314)
Agef -0.424
∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗
(0.0837) (0.0932)
Age2f 0.00582
∗∗∗ 0.00396∗∗∗
(0.00103) (0.00108)
Handcf -0.103 0.365
(0.544) (0.555)
Care 4.369∗∗ -0.170
(1.342) (0.623)
Child ≤ 2y 2.393 1.421
(1.239) (0.900)
Child 3–6y 2.166∗∗∗ 2.008∗∗∗
(0.489) (0.568)
Child 7–16y 1.353∗∗∗ 1.118∗∗∗
(0.240) (0.246)
C × L2 -0.192
(0.147)
L2 18.16∗∗∗
(2.657)
(L2)2 -1.899∗∗∗
(0.221)
L2×
Agef -0.221
∗∗∗
(0.0518)
Age2f 0.00352
∗∗∗
(0.000632)
Handcf 0.434
(0.393)
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Table 2.5 — continued
Care 1.433∗∗
(0.487)
Child ≤ 2y 3.380∗∗∗
(0.394)
Child 3–6y 1.694∗∗∗
(0.188)
Child 7–16y 1.148∗∗∗
(0.0935)
L1 × L2 0.451∗
(0.181)
Dummy Variables
Workm -4.460∗∗∗ -6.851∗∗∗ -5.773∗∗∗
(0.380) (0.586) (0.239)
Parttimem 0.135 0.834∗ 0.199
(0.260) (0.418) (0.190)
Fulltimem 0.928∗∗∗ 1.148∗∗∗ 1.145∗∗∗
(0.0946) (0.116) (0.0510)
Benefit Takeup -1.052∗∗∗ -0.992∗∗∗ -1.789∗∗∗ -1.448∗∗∗ -1.619∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.114) (0.215) (0.230) (0.0928)
Workf -1.292∗∗∗ -1.259∗∗∗ -1.039∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.153) (0.0849)
Parttimef -0.0593 0.370∗∗∗ -0.0177
(0.117) (0.0975) (0.0593)
Fulltimef 0.968∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗ 0.806∗∗∗
(0.0842) (0.101) (0.0574)
N 8237 12133 6405 8397 205897
AIC 2707.9 4249.2 2225.9 4001.8 21022.9
Own estimations with IZAΨMOD v.3.0.4, based on SOEP 2009. Standard errors in parentheses ∗ (p<0.05),
∗∗ (p<0.01), ∗∗∗ (p<0.001). Columns (3) and (4) encompass men and women respectively with a non-flexible
spouse (due to retirement, self-employment or disability). The choice set consists of 7 choices for weekly hours in
the first 4 columns, and 49 choices in the last column. The choice set is further expanded to allow for endogeneity
of benefit take-up. L1 andL2 indicate leisure of the first and the second adult in the household respectively. Hand-
icap indicates a handicap degree ≥ 50. Care indicates the presence of a person in need of care in the household.
Household utility is specified as translog (Equation 2.7.). AIC = Akaike Information Criterion.
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3Wealth Transfers and Tax Planning:Evidence for the German Bequest Tax
3.1 Introduction
For the past one hundred years, privatewealth in developed economies has largely been
a result of business and labor market activities. According to recent findings, this trend
has reversed as inheritances are becoming an increasingly important source of income
(Piketty, 2011; Piketty and Zucman, 2014). A recent rise in the capital-to-income ratio
has been confirmed for a number of countries.1 This is explained by decades of stable
capital accumulation in times of peace, alongwith shrinking fertility rates, which causes
more wealth to be distributed among fewer individuals.
Moreover, wealth is typically much more unequally distributed than income. In
particular, Germany is found to display one of the highest wealth inequality levels in
the EU (Carroll et al., 2014). According to Corneo et al. (2016), private wealth in Ger-
many stems to about one third frombequests, this share being rather constant across the
wealth distribution. As inherited aﬄuence is not associated with individual labor mar-
ket effort, this gives rise to equity concerns. As a consequence, the taxation of wealth
and wealth transfers in order to reduce wealth inequality has re-appeared in the policy
debate.2 Taxing the stock of wealth is often seen as inefficient due to a mobile tax base
and high administrative costs. In contrast, extending the taxation of wealth transfers
as a source of effortless personal income is generally more accepted and seems more
feasible than taxing the stock of wealth. Around three quarters of OECD countries cur-
rently levy some form of wealth transfer tax. Their overall importance is however low
with revenues of 0.13 percent of GDP in average, or 0.36 percent of total tax revenues.3
1 See Piketty (2011) for France, Schinke (2012) for Germany, Ohlsson et al. (2014) for Sweden and
Atkinson (2013) for the UK.
2 Whether inheritances amplify or dampen wealth inequality is an empirical question. Apart from
the wealth distribution of bequest receivers and recipients, it crucially depends on the volatility of the
tax base, i. e., on the extent to which taxpayers are able to circumvent the tax. Most studies find that
inheritances lead to stronger wealth concentration and inequality. There are however contradictory find-
ings. See Elinder et al. (2015) and the literature overview therein. For Germany, such a study has not
been undertaken yet.
3 Germany: 0.16% of GDP, 0.45% of tax revenue (OECD, 2013b). See Boadway et al. (2010) for an
illustration of the historical development of wealth transfer taxation.
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In 2016, annual bequest tax revenues increased for the second time in a row by 15%,
which may reflect the rising trend in overall bequests.
The normative literature on how to solve the trade-off between equity and efficiency
in the context of wealth transfer taxation is controversial. A classic result is that if the
utility of bequest receivers is not regarded, there is no reason to tax bequests separately
(Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976). By allowing for altruism of parents, Farhi and Werning
(2010) argue for negative optimal marginal tax rates on estates. The optimal pattern
of these subsidies is progressive, i. e. higher estates are taxed at a higher (negative)
rate. In their model, the amount of bequests are fully determined by individual abil-
ity. This assumption is relaxed by Piketty and Saez (2013a), by allowing for multiple
sources of inequality. This reflects the fact that the distribution of bequests received is
typically more skewed than the earnings distribution. They thus find a substantial role
for bequest taxation, yielding optimal inheritance tax rates well above 50%.
Empirical evidence on the behavioral reactions to bequest taxation is scarce for coun-
tries outside the US. This chapter aims at closing this gap by exploiting the design of the
German bequest tax schedule. I build on previous literature that identifies the elasticity
of taxable income (ETI) from taxpayers’ bunching at discrete jumps in the tax schedule
(Saez, 2010). This chapter applies a bunching approach to the taxation of wealth trans-
fers, which has rarely been done before.4 Two recent studies also investigate bunching
with inheritance taxes. Goupille-Lebret and Infante (2016) exploit time and age notches
in the tax treatment of French life insurance schemes to estimate inter-temporal substi-
tution in the accumulation of assets. Most closely to this chapter, Glogowsky (2016)
also analyzes bunching for the German bequest tax. Relying on administrative data
from 2002, he finds bunching in particular for predefined inheritances, i.e. inheritances
whose exact value (as opposed to the share) is defined by a descendant’s last will.5 My
findings are relevant for tax policy in at least two aspects. If transferred wealth is found
to be very responsive to taxation, taxpayers might avoid bequest taxation. Apart from
lowering tax revenue, this might harm the intended effects of higher bequest taxation,
such as lowering wealth inequality.
Behavioral responses to taxation can broadly be classified as real or shifting responses
(Kopczuk, 2013). In the context of bequest taxation, one example for a real response is
the effect on investment decisions. If future transfers are anticipated, individual sav-
ing might be discouraged by bequest taxation (Kopczuk and Slemrod, 2001). Another
example are labor supply responses to bequest taxation. If wealth shocks reduce indi-
vidual labor supply, higher bequest taxes could prevent this.6 Pure shifting responses
might affect timing and volume of intendedwealth transfers. These channels have been
4 Most previous bunching studies focus on income taxation (see, e. g. Bastani and Selin, 2014; Chetty
et al., 2011). Liu and Lockwood (2015) study value added taxes, while Best and Kleven (2016) investigate
property transfer taxation.
5 For this reason, I do not investigate bunching for predefined inheritances in this chapter.
6 See Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993) for the US and Doorley and Pestel (2016) for Germany.
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studied extensively, albeit with an almost exclusive focus on the US estate and gift tax.
Previous cross-sectional studies find inter-vivo gifts to be very responsive to gift tax
rates in the short run (Page, 2003), in particular forwealthy households (Bernheim et al.,
2004; Joulfaian, 2005). This holds both for the decision between gifts and inheritances
and for the timing of wealth transfers. Exploiting pre-announced increases in the taxa-
tion of gifts, Joulfaian (2004) reports substantial effects on gift tax revenues just before
the reform. In Germany, an individual may receive tax-free inter-vivo gifts up to his
exemption over the course of ten years. This makes inter-vivo gifts a promising tool for
tax planning in the long run. For the US regime, which offers annual exclusion thresh-
olds, Joulfaian and McGarry (2004) and Poterba (2001) find this tool to be underused
from a tax-minimizing perspective. These results suggest that wealth-owners seek to
retain some control over their assets, be it for wealth-loving or precautionary motives.
Evidence for inheritance tax planning is more scarce. Most notably, Kopczuk (2007)
finds evidence for tax planning if the deceased endured severe illness before death. In
a similar vein, Kopczuk and Slemrod (2003) find date of deaths to be postponed to a
date after an estate tax decrease, although this is likely a result from manipulating of
the official time of death.
This chapter also relates to the theoretical literature on taxing inheritances versus
inter-vivo gifts. Both types of transfers are usually taxed in a similar manner, but this
may be questionable if both kinds of transfers are associated with distinct behavioral
responses and hence different efficiency costs. Moreover, the optimal tax treatment de-
pends on the nature of the bequest motive (Cremer and Pestieau, 2006; Kopczuk, 2010).
Individuals may leave bequests for a variety of reasons. As a basic classification, be-
quests can be either accidental or intentional. If they are fully accidental, i. e. wealth
is kept until death because of an intrinsic utility of wealth or due to precautionary rea-
sons, efficiency costs of bequest taxation are low. In this case, the amount of bequests
will not be affected by the presence or extent of bequest taxation. On the other hand,
parents might plan their wealth transfers, either because they participate in their off-
spring’s utility (altruistic motive) or because of strategic considerations. If these kind
of motives are predominant, bequest taxation may have a sizable impact on the timing
and amount of transferred wealth and tax-induced distortions can be sizable.
The findings can be summarized as follows. I find differential evidence for tax plan-
ning for inheritances and inter-vivo gifts. While inheritances are distributed rather
smoothly around kink points, there is sharp bunching for inter-vivo gifts. This sug-
gest that only a subset of conceivable tax planning channels are effectively used. The
tax schedule hence seems to imply limited behavioral distortions, presumably due to
the presence of optimization frictions. It is donors rather than receivers of bequests
who seek to minimize their tax burden. Further heterogeneity analyses show that tax
planning is most prominent for transfers to close relatives. Beyond, I find evidence that
tax planning increases with the value of transferred wealth. Quantitatively, the overall
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welfare costs of bequest taxation are however estimated to be rather low; the elasticity
of taxable bequests is estimated to be 0.02 at the highest.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents the in-
stitutional setting in which bequests and their taxation take place. Section 3.4 discusses
the dimensions on which tax planning can be expected. Section 3.3 presents the data
base and descriptive statistics. Section 3.5 delivers the empirical estimates, before sec-
tion 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Institutional Background
Succession and division of estate In the event of death, an estate is in principle di-
vided equally among the descendants of the deceased person. In case there are no
descendants, the next in line of succession are parents of the deceased, including their
offspring. If the deceased person was married, the spouse receives one quarter of the
estate and the remaining amount is divided among the group of beneficiaries. These
rules however only apply in case the deceased did not express a last will. Testators do
not have full control over the distribution of their estate. The last will might determine
different heirs or a different distribution of the estate among them. Alternatively, the
last will might contain predefined inheritances to certain recipients (Vermächtnis), de-
termining a specific asset or a specific amount of money. The minimum inheritance
for descendants is half the amount they would have received in absence of a last will.7
These restrictions obviously do not apply to inter-vivo gifts, as both the amount of the
gift and the recipient can be freely determined by the donor.
Tax Treatment of wealth transfers As most EU countries, Germany imposes an in-
heritance tax that is levied on the recipients of a wealth transfer. In contrast to the estate
tax applied in the US and the UK, the tax is levied on the transfer received and not on
the total estate. This allows for granting exemptions depending on the personal char-
acteristics of the taxpayer. A second dimension affects the treatment of inter-vivo gifts.
While the US levies a federal gift tax distinct to the estate tax, both forms of transfers are
treated equally in Germany. For this reason, the German system will here be referred
to as a bequest tax, applying to wealth transfers in general.
TheGermanBequest Tax (Erbschaft- und Schenkungsteuer) is imposed on the recipient
of an inheritance or a gift. All wealth types are in principle taxed, including cash, real
estate, businesses and stock assets. Real estate can be transferred tax-free to spouses or
children in case the property remains owner-occupied. There are substantial personal
exemptions, depending on the relation between donor and recipient. Since 2009, these
7 As an example, if there are five descendants (and no spouse), each receives 20% of the estate in
absence of a last will. If the last will determines an alternative distribution or includes other beneficiaries,
each descendant still receives at least the minimum share of 10%.
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amount to e500k for spouses including same-sex marriages and to e400k for children
and stepchildren. Lower thresholds apply for other relatives. In case of non-relatives
and legal persons, the allowance is e20k. In case of inheritances, there is an additional
personal deduction of e256k for spouses (Versorgungsfreibetrag), and an age-dependent
allowance for children amounting up to e52k (see Table 3.4 for details). If someone
receives a transfer from the same donor within a time span of 10 years, this transfer
is additionally considered. This implies that bequests are tax-free only if the sum of
transfers received from a specific person over the course of ten years is lower than the
personal allowance.
Table 3.1: Tax Rates by year and taxable bequests
Taxable
bequests
(1,000 e)
before 2009 Taxable
bequests
(1,000 e)
2009 after 2009
Tax Class Tax Class
I II III I II III I II III
K1 52 7 12 17 75 7 30 30 7 15 30
K2 256 11 17 23 300 11 30 30 11 20 30
K3 512 15 22 29 600 15 30 30 15 25 30
K4 5,113 19 27 35 6,000 19 30 30 19 30 30
K5 12,783 23 32 41 13,000 23 50 50 23 35 50
K6 25,565 27 37 47 26,000 27 50 50 27 40 50
K7 ≥ 25,565 30 40 50 ≥ 26,000 30 50 50 30 43 50
Tax Class I encompasses spouses, children, grandchildren and parents. Tax Class II encom-
passes siblings and their offspring, parents (for the case of inter-vivo gifts) and divorced
spouses. For other recipients, including companies and foundations, Tax Class III is applied.
The tax liability is determined on the gross estate, net of liabilities and exemptions,
and after adding previous transfers from the same donor. Table 3.1 shows the full tax
schedule; Figure 3.1 visualizes the current schedule over the range of taxable bequests
relevant for the empirical part. There are three different schedules (tax classes (TC)),
depending on the relationship between donor and recipient. The lowest tax rates apply
for Tax Class I, encompassing spouses, children, grandchildren and parents. Tax Class
II affects siblings and their offspring, divorced spouses and parents (in case of inter-vivo
gifts). In case of other recipients, Tax Class III is applied, which features the highest tax
rates. The tariff consists of brackets in the average tax rate. For example, the tax rate that
is applied to the total sum of taxable bequests flips from 7% to 11% for TC I if the taxable
bequest b exceedse75k. In absence of further rules, this would imply a discontinuity in
the tax liability, i. e. a notch. The transition between two tax rates is in fact smoothened
by an additional rule which effectively caps the marginal tax rate at 0.5 in the relevant
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range.8 This is visualized in Figure 3.1b. The tariff induces discrete jumps in marginal
tax rates (kink points). In the areas marked grey for TC1, it is particularly attractive
to shift the value of total bequests towards the kink point.9 My data base spans the
years 2007 to 2011, encompassing two reforms. In 2009, tax rates were increased for tax
classes II and III. Moreover, personal exemptions were substantially raised. The 2010
reform altered tax rates for tax classes II and III again.
8 If the taxable bequest b lies between two kink points Kl and Ku (with respective tax rates τl and
τu), the tax liability, depending on the tax class C, is obtained by TC(b) = min(τCu b; τCl Kl + τk(b−Kl));
τk =
{
0.5 if τCu < 0.3
0.75 if τCu ≥ 0.3 .
9 As Glogowsky (2016) notes, this is essentially a setting with two kinks, a convex kink with ∆τ > 0,
followed by a concave kink with a tax rate decrease (∆τ < 0). Bunching at the second kink is however
unlikely, because its value is not explicitly stated in the tax rules but has to be inferred.
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Figure 3.1: The German Bequest Tax Schedule
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The figure visualizes the tariff in place since 2010. Tax Class I encompasses spouses, children,
grandchildren and parents. Tax Class II encompasses siblings and their offspring, parents
(for the case of inter-vivo gifts) and divorced spouses. For other recipients, Tax Class III is
applied with a constant ATR (MTR) of 30 % in the depicted range (not displayed). The full
tariff, including higher amounts of taxable bequests, is given in Table 3.1. K1,K2 andK3
indicate the kink points where bunching is going to be investigated. For Tax Class I, the grey
areas indicate the regions where manipulating the sum of taxable bequests is particularly
attractive due to high marginal tax rates.
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3.3 Data
My empirical analysis is based on annual German administrative bequest tax return
data (Erbschaft- und Schenkungsteuerstatistik), spanning the years 2007 to 2011. They
cover the universe of bequests and gifts for which a tax claim was requested. This
includes also bequests that were eventually not taxed. Due to high exemption rates, the
majority of wealth transfers does not show up in the bequest tax data. For 2010, Bach
et al. (2014) estimate that the tax data cover 30% of all bequests, accounting for 73% of
transferred wealth in total.10 The data years refer to the first assessment of the tax lia-
bility. They might deviate from the actual gift or death event by several years because
tax authorities do not approach heirs before a couple of months after the death event.
It may also take a long time until tax authorities learn about a taxable event. This holds
particularly for inter-vivo gifts. Larger deviations may be caused by disputes among
heirs or in case of foreign-based assets. The latter occur more often for valuable be-
quests entailing a multitude of assets. Lags between the taxable event and the actual
tax assessment indeed increase with the total sum of bequests. Nevertheless, around
90% of tax cases get assessed within the first two years (Schinke, 2012). Independent of
the time lag, thewealth transfer is always subject to the tax regime in force at the time of
the taxable event. The existence of the time lagmakes the sample less representative for
more recent years. This sample selection does not pose a problem to the identification
of the elasticity of taxable bequests if the propensity for tax planning is uncorrelated
with the time lag.
Table 3.5 indicates that the majority of bequests come in the form of inheritances.
As argued in section 3.4, not all types of inheritances are equally suited for tax plan-
ning. Inheritances where the heir receives exclusively predefined inheritances account
for 15% of all inheritances. Adding ’standard’ inheritances that accrue to one heir only
yields that around one quarter of all inheritances are particularly suspect of tax plan-
ning. The Panel B of Table 3.5 reveals a three-way split of tax cases regarding the type of
recipient. One third remains in the inner family, another third goes to other relatives,
while the last third of bequests is received by non-family members. Bequests differ
considerably in value by relationship, the value of gross bequests diminishes for non-
family recipients. Gross inheritances greatly exceed gross gifts in value formost groups
of recipients. After subtracting exemptions and accounting for prior transfers from the
same person, taxable taxable gifts are worth around e300k on average, compared to
only e160k for taxable inheritances.
10 This implies an annual sum of inheritances and gifts of e62 bn, based on survey data (GSOEP).
Estimates based on national accounts yield total annual volumes in the range of e200 bn. According to
Houben and Maiterth (2013), such macro-based approaches are however less suited for estimating the
bequest tax base. On the other hand, survey-based estimates might suffer from under-reporting. There
is hence considerable uncertainty regarding the overall volume of annual bequests.
52
Wealth Transfers and Tax Planning Chapter 3
The bottom panel of Table 3.5 finally shows that gifts and inheritances differ not
only in value, but also in asset type. Inheritances consist, in average, to 68% of financial
assets and to 28% of real estate. Gifts, in contrast, consist only to 12% of financial assets.
Real Estate accounts, in average, for 52% of a gifts’ value.
Table 3.2: Personal characteristics of donors and recipients
Donor Recipient
Type of Transfer Men Women Men Women
Inheritance Shares 0.399 0.601 0.438 0.562Mean Age 67.7 71.6 57.0 60.4
Gifts Shares 0.509 0.491 0.539 0.461Mean Age 74.6 62.7 45.3 47.5
Source: Administrative bequest tax return data from 2007 to 2011.
Personal information on taxpayers is limited as usual in administrative data. In the
present case, these are restricted to age and sex of both donor and recipient of the be-
quest (Table 3.2). Gift recipients are around 12 years younger than heirs. Nonetheless,
they are already in their forties on average. As noted by Kaplow (2001), receiving gifts
at an earlier stage in life, e. g. while being in education, might be more efficient as this
could ease liquidity constraints for the recipients. Interestingly, women are around 12
years younger than men when leaving gifts, which could reflect a stronger altruistic
motive. Finally, the majority of inheritances is left by women, which could simply be
an artifact of higher female life expectancy.
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3.4 Salience and Scope for Tax Planning
In order to detect bunching of taxpayers, two prerequisites need to be met. First, tax-
payers need to be aware of the incentives provided by the tax tariff. External tax ad-
visors are usually employed when large fortunes are transferred. As consultant fees
can be deducted from the tax due, this information is available in the data. Tax con-
sultant payments above the standard deduction are reported for 95% of tax cases. A
further point illustrating the salience of bequest taxes is made in Figure 3.2. It com-
pares weekly means of daily views on the German Wikipedia for the main articles on
bequest and income tax in Germany.11 Both articles provide extensive information on
the respective issue and exclusively treat the German rules.12 Information on the be-
quest tax is gathered around two thirds as often as on the income tax. This is in contrast
to the enormous relative importance of the income tax in terms of the total number of
annual taxpayers (30 million versus 200,000). Against this backdrop, it seems plausible
that taxpayers (or their advisors) are sufficiently aware of the incentives to reduce their
bequest tax due.
Figure 3.2: Daily Wikipedia Article Views
The graph plots daily article views at the German Wikipedia for the year 2015, comparing the main
articles on bequest tax (solid line) and income tax (dashed line) in Germany. Intra-week fluctuations are
eliminated by showing weekly mean values. Page view counts are obtained from
https://dumps.wikimedia.org/other/pagecounts-raw.
As a second prerequisite, taxpayers need to be able tomanipulate the sum of taxable
bequests. In Germany, tax authorities learn about events of death directly from the reg-
11 See Hoopes et al. (2015) for use of Wikipedia article view counts in the context of tax rule salience.
12 This is opposed to corresponding regulations in Switzerland or Austria, for which the German
Wikipedia would also be a preferred source of information.
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istry. Moreover, banks, asset managers, insurance companies, notaries etc. are obliged
to inform tax authorities about transfers of bank accounts, real estate or businesses. In-
fact, most inter-vivo gifts are indicated by notaries and hardly by taxpayers (Reis, 2005).
If the tax authorities expect assets to be in a tax-relevant range, they request recipients
to claim the sum of their assets. The presence of substantial third-party reporting ren-
ders full escape of bequest taxes unlikely (Kleven et al., 2011), particularly if transferred
assets are home-based. There is however a considerable degree of freedom regarding
the intensive margin.
Strategies to manipulate the tax base on the intensive margin are quite distinct be-
tween inter-vivo gifts and inheritances. Inter-vivo gifts clearly constitute a deliberate
choice by the donor. When choosing the amount of the gift, he can target the total sum
to one of the kink points in order to minimize the tax burden for the recipient. This
is conceivable if the donor would have optimally chosen an amount slightly above a
kink point (Nordblom and Ohlsson, 2006). Altering the taxable amount by the recipi-
ent is also possible, e. g. bymisreporting the received sum to the authorities. While this
chapter cannot disentangle both possible mechanisms, ex-post manipulations (misre-
porting, re-evaluation) however seem quite costly as some of them can be clearly clas-
sified as illegal evasion.
For inheritances, the case is somewhat different. If the deceased person did not
leave a last will, there is by definition no tax planning on his behalf. Even if there is a
last will, the testator would need to have a precise estimate of the total sum of assets his
offspring will receive. The fact that personal exemptions might differ among recipients
complicates tax planning by the testator. A third option is a predefined inheritance,
where certain assets or a specific amount of money is dedicated to a specific person.
This setting is highly comparable to giving an inter-vivo gift. Tax planning by the donor
is hence rather unlikely for most cases of inheritances, but might be rather done by the
recipient. A numerical example illustrates this: A bequest b worth e493k to a child of
18 years is, after subtracting the personal allowance of e400k and the additional age-
dependent (rounded) allowance of e10k, associated with a taxable amount of e83k.
Applying the tax rate of 11% (tax class I), the tax liability ise9,130. Reducing the taxable
sum to e75k lowers the average tax rate to 7% and the tax due to e5,250, thus saving
e3,880 in bequest taxes. The necessary reduction ofe8,000 is tiny compared to the total
bequest b (1.6%). It is hence sufficient to reduce the tax base by a few thousand Euros
if b lies in (or slightly above) one of the grey areas in Figure 3.1. There are several ways
to achieve this, e. g. by not claiming some household items or by re-evaluating real
estate.13
13 The value of transferred assets is subject to evaluation. Since 2009, most assets are to be valued
by their market value. Before, the so-called property value was used for real estates. This concept is
primarily used for the assessment of the property tax and is supposed to reflect the market value of 1964.
Although the concept of market value is more appropriate in terms of the utility an individual accrues
from the additional wealth, it leaves considerable scope for underreporting the sum of transferred assets.
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It is important to note that the present approach measures short-term responses to
bequest taxation, occurring around the time of the actual transfer. As discussed above,
bunching for gifts presumably reflects tax planning by the donor, while for inheritance
taxes, tax planning is conceivable by both. Concerning longer-term strategies, wealthy
persons can exploit the higher personal exemptions for own children by adoption. Per-
sonal exemptions can further be used several times by giving away the wealth piece-
wise every 10 years.14 When transferring property, the donor can reduce the tax liability
by claiming the further right to occupy the premises for himself. In this case, the future
value of this usage is subtracted from the taxed transfer. While these channels are po-
tentially of high relevance, the time coverage of the data used in this chapter is too short
to fully capture these kinds of responses. Nonetheless, the observed giving behavior
might be partly motivated by exploiting the 10-year threshold.
3.5 Quantifying the amount of tax planning
3.5.1 Empirical Approach
In order to gauge the extent of tax planning, I quantify the amount of excess bunch-
ing of taxpayers. I apply the widely-used methodology of Chetty et al. (2011) who
analyze bunching at kink points in the Danish income tax schedule. They assume a
consumption-leisure trade-off, where only a share of households adjust their labor sup-
ply to the tax schedule. This could be due to heterogeneity in consumption-leisure pref-
erences. Alternatively, it might be too costly to relocate on the tax schedule due to fric-
tions, such as hours constraints or search costs. Carrying this idea to bequest taxation
requires a different framework when thinking about expected behavioral responses.
An inter-generational setting that features the decision between gifts and inheritances
is provided byNordblomandOhlsson (2006). The introduction of a bequest tax induces
distortions between both types of transfers andmight lead to bunching at the kink point
in order to minimize tax payments. Real responses to bequest taxation, e. g. on labor
supply or saving behavior, are well conceivable, but they would not show up in the tax
records. Shifting responses of the bequest tax base are hence the only channels that can
be directly observed. This setting is comparable to the bunching evidence for house
transaction taxes by Best and Kleven (2016). They find strong evidence for bunching of
house prices at notches in the tax schedule. The authors explain this response with a
low degree of frictions in the market due to the high number of professional real estate
agents.
14 This behavior has been documented by McGarry (2001) for the US.
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According to Saez (2010), the local elasticity of taxable bequests eB at a kink point
K can be approximated by
eB ' b̂
K ln
(
1−τ1
1−τ2
) , (3.1)
where b denotes the excess mass, i. e. the extent to which tax payers cluster at the kink
point relative to a hypothetical situation in absence of the kink. τ1 and τ2 denote tax rates
below and above the kink. Intuitively, Equation 3.1 relates the amount of bunching to
the size of the kink. In order to estimate b̂, taxable income is first grouped into equally
sized bins, indicated by j. Then, a flexible polynomial function of the 7th degree is
fitted on the density of tax cases excluding R bins to the left and to the right of the kink
point.15
Cj =
7∑
i=0
βi(Zj)
i +
R∑
i=−R
γi · 1[j = i] + εj (3.2)
As bunching is found to be very sharp under the kink point (Figure 3.3), R is set
to 2, except for the first kink point (R = 4). Zj denotes the number of tax cases with
taxable assets falling in bin j relative to the kink point of interest. In order to provide
estimates with the highest precision, small bin widths are desirable. The baseline re-
sults hence rely on a bin width of e100. This delivers the highest precision possible,
as taxable amounts are in practice rounded down to the next multiplier of 100. For
the more detailed analyses that build on smaller samples, the bin width is increased to
e500 to secure a continuous density. The counterfactual density values Ĉj are obtained
from linear prediction of the coefficients. Finally, b̂ is calculated from the cumulated
difference between both densities in the area of interest, normalized by the mean of the
counterfactual values in that range.
b̂ =
∑R
j=−R Cj − Ĉj
Ĉj
(3.3)
Plugging b̂ into Equation 3.1 delivers the estimate for the local elasticity. A bootstrap
procedure yields standard errors for b̂.
3.5.2 Bunching Estimates
I investigate excess bunching at the first three kink points in the tax schedule.16 Be-
yond the third kink, i. e., for taxable amounts of e6 millions and higher, the number of
15 As in Best and Kleven (2016) and Chetty et al. (2011), varying the polynomial degree has a negligible
effect on the estimates.
16 As the tax return data also include non-taxed cases, one could also investigate bunching at the
exemption level for gross bequests (the ’0th kink’). At the time of writing, these results were not made
available by the tax authorities. Preliminary evidence reveals bunching at the exemption in magnitude
similar to what will be shown for the first three kinks.
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Figure 3.3: Bunching Graphs — Full Sample
(a) First Kink PointK1 (b) Second Kink PointK2
(c) Third Kink PointK3
Note: Each dot represents the number of tax cases in a given e100 bin. The dashed line represents the
counterfactual distribution of tax cases, based on a polynomial fit of the 7th degree. b is estimated
according to Equation 3.3. Graphs are created with the Stata program bunch_count, as used in Chetty
et al. (2011). K1 amounts to e52k before 2009 and e72k afterwards. K2 equals e256k before 2009 and
e300k afterwards. K3 equals e512k before 2009 and e600k afterwards.
observations becomes too small. Figure 3.3 shows density plots for these kink points,
underlying a pooled sample from all five years, restricted to the taxpayers who can
potentially bunch. This encompasses all wealth transfers with a tax schedule featur-
ing kinks, i. e. all transfers from tax class I, tax class II (not in 2009), and tax class III
before 2009 (see Table 3.1). The horizontal axes show the difference to the respective
kink point. The tax schedule, and thereby the kink points, were shifted to the right in
2009. There is visual evidence for bunching at the kink in all graphs. Each of the excess
masses is estimated to be significantly different from zero. It is highest for K3, located
at e512k or e600k. This is particularly remarkable in light of less than 20 observations
in each bin which is far below what related studies rely on.
The two spikes left to the kink point in Figure 3.3a stem from transfers amounting
to round figures. The first spike represents transfers of exactly e100,000 to children.
Subtracting the pre-2009 exemption of e51,200 results in taxable gifts of e48,800, rep-
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resenting the 32nd bin below K1.17 The second spike at the 23rd bin left to the kink
represents transfers to grandchildren worth exactly e60,000. The tendency to transfer
round-number amounts suggests the existence of reference points, induced by non-
financial incentives (Kleven, 2016).
Figure 3.4: Bunching Graphs — Inheritances versus Gifts
(a) First Kink PointK1 — Inheritances (b) First Kink PointK1 —Gifts
(c) Second Kink PointK2 — Inheritances (d) Second Kink PointK2 —Gifts
Note: Each dot represents the number of tax cases in a given e100 bin. The dashed line represents the
counterfactual distribution of tax cases, based on a polynomial fit of the 7th degree. b is estimated
according to Equation 3.3. Graphs are created with the Stata program bunch_count, as used in Chetty
et al. (2011). K1 amounts to e52k before 2009 and e72k afterwards. K2 equals e256k before 2009 and
e300k afterwards. Bunching graphs forK3 could not be produced due to an insufficient number of
observations.
In a next step, the sample is split by considering inheritances and gifts separately.
While both types of transfers are treated equally by the tax schedule, tax planning be-
havior can be expected to take different forms for both types of transfers. Figure 3.4
shows bunching estimates by type of transfer for the first two kink points.18 For in-
heritances, no bunching can be observed at the first kink, while there is some visual,
albeit not statistically significant, evidence for bunching at the second kink point. In
17 After 2009, the exemption amounts to e400,000, rendering such transfers to children tax-free.
18 Around the third kink point, the number of tax cases is not sufficient to form a smooth distribution.
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contrast, gifts display sharp and significant bunching at the first two kink points. This
is supportive of the notion that tax planning for gifts is in principle easier.
Figure 3.5: Bunching graphs — by family relationship (2nd kink)
(a) Spouse & Children (b) Other relatives
(c) Non-relatives
Notes: The graph shows bunching estimates by tax class for the second kink pointK2. Each dot
represents the number of tax cases in a given e500 bin. The dashed line represents the counterfactual
distribution of tax cases, based on a polynomial fit of the 7th degree. b is estimated according to
Equation 3.3. Graphs are created with the Stata program bunch_count, as used in Chetty et al. (2011).
The second kink pointK2 equals e256k before 2009 and e300k afterwards. The density spike left to the
kink in Figures 3.5b and 3.5c represents transfers worth exactly e250k.
As a further decomposition, I consider differential responses by tax class, reflect-
ing different relationships between donor and recipient (Figure 3.5).19 For transfers to
spouses, children and grandchildren, bunching is estimated to be higher than for more
distant relatives. No bunching is detected for non-relatives. There are two possible
explanations for this finding. On the one hand, stronger family ties could facilitate col-
lusion between donor and recipient in order to target the transferred sum. Similarly,
donors might care more about the tax due of close family members which increases the
motivation to engage in tax planning. On the other hand, tax exemptions are substan-
tially higher for family members, implying that the gross bequests to family members
19 Figure 3.5 shows results for the second kink. Results for the first kink are shown in Figure 3.7.
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are higher for comparable values of taxable bequests. The higher amount of transferred
wealth then might raise the probability of tax planning.
Figure 3.6: Bunching graphs — gifts only, before and after 2009 reform (1st kink)
(a) until 2009 (b) 2009 and later
Notes: Each dot represents the number of tax cases in a given e500 bin. The dashed line represents the
counterfactual distribution of tax cases, based on a polynomial fit of the 7th degree. b is estimated
according to Equation 3.3. Graphs are created with the Stata program bunch_count, as used in Chetty
et al. (2011). The 2009 reform implied higher tax rates for tax class II, affecting relatives other than
spouses or children. Beyond, personal exemptions were raised substantially. For spouses, the personal
exemption changed from e307k to e500k. For children, it increased from e51.2k to e400k. See Table
3.4 for details.
To illuminate this channel further, Figure 3.6 contrasts densities at the first kink for
inter-vivo gifts before and after the 2009 reform. The reform increased tax rates for tax
class II, while maintaining the tax rate difference of 5 percentage points. At the same
time, personal exemptions were raised by e193k for spouses and by around e350k for
children. This substantially raises the gross value of taxed transfers for the years 2009
and later. Bunching is found to be substantially higher after the reform, which is in line
with a higher awareness of post-reform taxed transfers.
So far, the presentationwas restricted to visual bunching evidence. In order to gauge
welfare costs associatedwith these estimates, Table 3.3 shows the respective elasticities.
They are based on Equation 3.1, assuming that taxpayers perceive a kink. As discussed
above, the tax schedule however features notches at first sight. The additional rule of
capping marginal tax rates receives little attention on lawyers’ websites that provide
advice on bequest tax avoidance. Beyond, the precise extent of the areas with high
marginal tax rates is not explicitly stated in the tax code. The bunching I observe could
therefore be partially a response to a perceived notch. This would imply far higher tax
base elasticities, as the respective change in tax rates is lower and hence imply distinct
quantitative welfare implications.
Even the sharp significant bunching estimates for inter-vivo gifts turn out to trans-
late into rather low elasticities. The highest estimate (within the sample containing all
years) is obtained at the first kink point for gifts, with a precisely estimated elasticity of
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0.021. This means that the amount of bunching is small relative to the monetary gain.
One could question the economic significance of an elasticity of 0.02 maximum. Such
small effects might however become relevant for the recipient if one takes long-term
wealth accumulation into account. A standard explanation for the (partial) absence of
behavioral reactions is the presence of substantial optimization frictions (Chetty et al.,
2011). These can take various forms. An obvious one are legal hurdles. While tax
avoidance by targeting the sum of taxable bequests ex ante is obviously legal, ex post
adjustments might be considered illegal.20 It might also point to higher (pecuniary and
non-pecuniary) costs of tax planning ex post versus ex ante. In light of the heavy in-
volvement of professional tax advisors, informational frictions seem to play less of a role
in the present context. The visual evidence in Figures 3.3 to 3.6 reveals the presence of
bunching not only at kink points, but also at certain round numbers. The amount of
bunching is in magnitude comparable to the bunching at kink points. This implies the
presence of reference points other than those implied by the tax code which are of sim-
ilar significance to people. The fact that a sizable number of wealth transfers amounts
to round numbers suggests psychological focal points. Targeting these focal points by
the tax code could be addressed by future reforms (Kleven, 2016).
The fact that gifts are more responsive than inheritances is in line with the inten-
tional character of gifts. From a welfare perspective, a higher elasticity of gifts would
suggest a preferential tax treatment of inter-vivo gifts (Piketty and Saez, 2013a). In-
creasing the personal allowance for inter-vivo gifts relative to inheritances might hence
induce people to make gifts earlier. Recipients, in turn, might then receive gifts at a life
stage with liquidity constraints (Cremer and Pestieau, 2006; Kaplow, 2001). An equiva-
lent effect can be expected from reducing the exclusion threshold of currently 10 years
in which transfers are considered for taxation.
20 For the common bequest tax payer, the probability of being audited can be neglected. Only in case
of transferred businesses, auditors might verify the prerequisites for favorable tax treatment.
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Table 3.3: Local elasticities of taxable bequests
All Years pooled before 2009 after 2009
All Close
rela-
tives
Further
rela-
tives
All Close
rela-
tives
Further
rela-
tives
All Close
rela-
tives
Full Sample
K1 0.007*** 0.002 0.011 0.001 -0.002 0.013 0.009 0.048∗
K2 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.005∗ 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004 0.012*** 0.026***
K3 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004∗∗
Gifts
K1 0.021*** -0.006 0.039 0.006 -0.006 0.040 0.048
K2 0.002*** 0.007***
K3 0.004***
Inheritances
K1 0.002 0.005 0.005 -0.001 0.001 0.007 0.005
K2 0.001∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.006***
K3 0.002∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003
Inheritances,
Single Heirs
K1 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.009 0.002 0.004
K2 0.000 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.005**
Notes: The table shows elasticity estimates according to Equation 3.1, based on the estimated excess mass bˆ, the
tax rates at the kink point (τ1, τ2) and the amount of taxable bequests at the kink K. The pooled estimations may
correspond to different levels of tax rates and kinks due to the 2009 reform and to different tax classes. When pooling
several tax classes, the lowest tax rates (for tax class I) are applied. When pooling several years, the tax rates and
kinks for the pre-2009 schedule are applied. Empty cells denote cases where the taxpayer density was not sufficient to
measure bunching with a bin width of e500. Significance levels correspond to those from the bootstrapped standard
errors of b̂ in the excess mass estimation: (***) = 0.01, (**) = 0.05, (*) = 0.1.
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3.6 Conclusion
Parallel to the rise of bequests as a source of income, interest in taxation of wealth trans-
fers is likely to thrive in the future. A heavier taxation of bequests potentially cushions
rising wealth inequality, but little is known about distortionary effects on the decision
on whether and how much to leave. This chapter estimates shifting responses of tax-
able bequests in Germany. Relying on administrative data, I make use of the tax sched-
ule featuring discrete jumps in marginal tax rates. Building on the empirical literature
on bunching at kink points, I find sharp and significant bunching for taxable bequests
above the basic allowance. These are confined to the subsample of inter-vivo gifts, while
the distribution of inheritances is rather smooth around kink points. Gift bunching is
sharp and significant even for high amounts, where the number of observations be-
come small. These findings are in line with previous cross-sectional evidence on the
responsiveness of gift behavior to taxation (Bernheim et al., 2004; Joulfaian, 2004, 2005;
Page, 2003), albeit with rather low elasticities.
My findings shed light on tax planning in the context of wealth transfers. Tax plan-
ning for gifts presumably takes place on behalf of the donor. The fact that gift amounts
are affected by tax incentives is in line with the intentional character of inter-vivo gifts.
Inheritances, on the other hand, are rather of an accidental nature, which usually pre-
vents tax planning on behalf of the donor. I hence do not find evidence for deathbed
planning as in Kopczuk (2007). Beyond, there is hardly evidence for tax planning by
the recipient. In light of high salience of bequest tax rules, this suggests the presence of
optimization frictions, presumably in the form of legal hurdles and adjustments costs.
The overall low level of responsiveness is surprising given that professionals are in-
volved in most transactions. A side result is the presence of focal points not induced by
the tax code for gifts and predefined inheritances. Their importance is comparable to
the bunching at kink points in the tax schedule.
The main message of the chapter is that overall efficiency costs of bequest taxation
are rather low. Regarding the on-going discussion on raising bequest taxes, this finding
provides no reason to abstain from higher taxes for concerns of generating additional
revenue. From the higher responsiveness of inter-vivo gifts, the case for a preferential
tax treatment of gifts could be derived, possibly in the form of higher exemptions. This
could raise the volume of deliberate giving or even advance them to an earlier point in
time. Whether this is desirable from a societies’ perspective however depends on the
welfare weights attributed to younger and older wealth owners.
In order to investigate the issue in more detail, data covering a longer time span
would be required. It is particularly promising to investigate the extent to which the
ten-year exclusion threshold is exploited.
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3.A Appendix
Table 3.4: Personal Exemptions by relationship between donor and recipient
before 2009 since 2009
in e
Spousesa 307,000 500,000
Children, Stepchildren, Children of deceased
(step-)childrenb
51,200 400,000
Children of living (step-)children 51,200 200,000
Parents (inheritances only) 51,200 100,000
Parents (gifts only), Siblings, Nieces, Nephews,
Step-parents, divorced spouses, children and
parents-in-law
10,300 20,000
Other (Non-relative, firm, trust) 5,200 20,000
a For inheritances, spouses are granted an additional exemption of e256,000.
b For inheritances, children are granted an additional age-dependent exemption. It amounts to
e52,000 for children below 5 years, e41,000 for children between 5 and 10 years, e30,700 for
children between 11 and 15 years, e20,500 for children between 16 and 20 years, and e10,300 for
children between 21 and 27 years.
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Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Observations by year and type of bequest
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
All observations 214,232 264,332 247,109 202,154 210,899
Inter-vivo gifts 59,830 78,681 71,337 53,058 54,755
Inheritances 154,402 185,651 175,772 149,096 156,144
thereof (shares):
Predefined inheritance only 20.0% 20.1% 13.6% 11.4% 10.9%
Inheritances with one heira 23.4% 24.0% 23.7% 25.6% 26.7%
Panel B: Value of transfers by family relationshipb
Inheritances Gifts
Relationship Observations gross
bequestc
taxable
transferd
gross
bequest
taxable
transfer
mean value in e
Spouses 42,631 973,324 415,830 417,007 492,806
Children 276,568 756,858 511,056 477,446 474,730
Grandchildren 32,266 446,393 302,274 274,940 285,999
Parent 25,082 158,665 91,997 38,240 24,813
Other relatives 388,144 99,505 79,739 200,795 87,510
Non-relatives 372,026 93,731 73,575 83,925 91,233
Total 1,138,917 326,299 159,021 316,590 297,504
Panel C: Asset composition
Land Financial
Assets
Real Estate Business Other
Means of asset sharese
Inheritances 0.7% 68.0% 28.2% 1.8% 1.3%
Gifts 3.1% 12.4% 51.8% 16.0% 16.7%
Source: Inheritance and Gift Tax Returns from 2007 to 2011.
a including predefined inheritances as a special case.
b only bequests with overall positive value (transferred wealth > transferred debts).
c Gross bequests equal the share of the estate accruing to the recipient, possibly after division among all heirs.
d Taxable transfer = gross bequest – exemptions + prior transfers within 10 years.
e Average share of gross bequest
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Figure 3.7: Bunching graphs — by family relationship (1st kink)
(a) Spouse & Children (b) Other relatives
(c) Non-relatives
Notes: The Graph shows bunching estimates by tax class around the first kink pointK1, equalling e52k
before 2009 and e72k afterwards. Each dot represents the number of tax cases in a given e500 bin. The
dashed line represents the counterfactual distribution of tax cases, based on a polynomial fit of the 7th
degree. b is estimated according to Equation 3.3. Graphs are created with the Stata program
bunch_count, as used in Chetty et al. (2011).
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Figure 3.8: Bunching graphs — inheritances, single heirs only
(a) First Kink (b) Second Kink
Notes: Each dot represents the number of tax cases in a given e100 bin. The dashed line represents the
counterfactual distribution of tax cases, based on a polynomial fit of the 7th degree. b is estimated
according to Equation 3.3. Graphs are created with the Stata program bunch_count, as used in Chetty
et al. (2011).
68
4Fiscal Sustainability and the DemographicTransition in the EU∗
4.1 Introduction
Ongoing long-term demographic changes are widely considered a risk to fiscal sustain-
ability in developed countries. A shrinking labor force, combined with a growing old-
age dependency ratio, is expected to negatively affect tax revenues and raise pension
expenditures. Thismay threaten governments’ capacities to fund socialwelfare systems
and the provision of other public goods. As a consequence, pension systems in virtually
all industrialized countries have been subject to recent reforms (OECD, 2013a). While
the expectations of growing pension expenditures have been supported by a number of
studies, the case is less clear-cut for the evolution of fiscal revenues. The inter-linkages
between demographic transitions and labor market outcomes deserve special attention
in this context. If, for example, a shrinking labor force is becoming better educated at
the same time (as is projected), average wages will increase. Additionally, if there is
a scarcity of labor, neoclassical economic theory predicts that wages should increase
in order to stimulate labor supply. Future tax revenues may therefore increase despite
population shrinkage. Hence, it is crucial to account for reactions on both sides of the la-
bormarketwhen assessing the effects of demographic changes on future fiscal balances.
Most studies however do not systematically account for labor supply and demand re-
sponses. We study fiscal sustainability in the EU, combining population projections for
2030 with micro-based elasticities of labor supply and demand, allowing us to over-
come this limitation.
Specifically, this chapter outlines the extent of the challenges for public budgets from
demographic changes in a four-step analysis. First, we incorporate two scenarios of pro-
jected demographic changes via a reweighting procedure into micro data sets for the
EU-27 countries. In a second step, the implied wage effects are analyzed by modeling
the demand and supply side of the labor market. Supply elasticities are differentiated
by skill, gender and household type for each EU-27 country. On the demand side, we
∗ This chapter, co-authored with Mathias Dolls, Karina Doorley, Alari Paulus, Hilmar Schneider and
Sebastian Siegloch, is also published as: M. Dolls et al. (2015). Fiscal Sustainability and Demographic
Change: A Micro Approach for 27 EU countries. IZA Discussion Paper No. 9618.
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differentiate own-wage elasticities of demand by country and skill group, drawing on
a meta-analysis approach. Next, the consequences for fiscal budgets are investigated
with a tax-benefit simulation. We capture personal taxes, social insurance contribu-
tions, social transfers, public pensions, and main demography-related public expen-
ditures. Finally, we analyze the impact of an increase in the statutory retirement age,
which is an obvious and widely discussed policy response to demographic change.
Our approach ismicro-driven and accounts for the full heterogeneity in populations
and tax-benefit rules, required to model essential interactions between demograph-
ics, labor market behavior and fiscal systems. Unlike computable general equilibrium
(CGE) approaches, the only assumptions we impose concern the elasticities of labor
supply and demand or stem from the demographic projections.
Our findings contribute to a broad academic debate on the consequences of demo-
graphic change. The impact of demographic ageing and decreasing population size on
long-term economic growth has been treated in a number of endogenous growth mod-
els (Prettner and Prskawetz, 2010). In thesemodels, the association between population
size and economic growth is ambiguous and subject to the modeling framework. This
literature regularly predicts positive growth effects from population ageing, as house-
holds seek to save more during their working life. This triggers investments and hence
growth. Incorporating social security however may reverse this result, as rising payroll
taxes crowd out private savings (Kotlikoff et al., 2007). Notable studies investigating
the fiscal implications of population ageing in an overlapping generations setting are
Fehr (2000) and Börsch-Supan et al. (2014). This literature pays particular attention to
the pension system when dependency ratios rise, while treating the tax system in a
rather simplistic manner. Börsch-Supan et al. (2014) argue that, while sticking to a pay-
as-you-go system, living standards in Europe can be maintained in spite of population
ageing if total employment can be moderately increased. A similar point is made by
Ang and Madsen (2015), who show empirically, using a long-term country panel, that
an ageing work force is usually more productive. This suggests that the contribution
of older workers with tertiary education to national production can outweigh higher
pension and health costs. Finally, Kudrna et al. (2016) explore the welfare effects from
cutting pensions versus raising taxes.
Concerning the fiscal implications of demographic changes, there are a number of
studies on the sustainability of pension systems. Comprehensive projections can be
found in Dekkers et al. (2010), European Commission (2012) and OECD (2013a). There
is however little work dealing with the impact of population ageing on public revenues.
The complexity of existing tax-benefit system calls for micro-based approaches rather
than representative agent models. Notable exceptions are Decoster et al. (2014) and de
Blander et al. (2013) for Belgium and Aaberge et al. (2007) for Norway.
We aim to fill this gap by amicro-founded approach for 27 EU countries, that is able
to capture heterogeneous developments between population subgroups. Our treat-
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ment of the tax and contribution systems is able to capture far more detail than macro
models generally can. This comes at the cost of ignoring potential general-equilibrium
effects — we return to this limitation in the next section.
Our chapter further extends the literature by exploring the scope of effective pol-
icy responses. Surprisingly, despite the relevance of the topic, there are only very few
ex-ante studies investigating the effects of reforms to pension systems.1 Leombruni and
Richiardi (2006) set up an agent-based microsimulation model of labor supply to ana-
lyze the evolution of the Italian labor force-, taking into account demographic projec-
tions. Explicitly modeling retirement rules as well as behavior, they simulate the effects
of an Italian retirement reform from the 2000s on the labor market. Mara and Narazani
(2011) simulate the effects on employment and retirement behavior of a reduction in
pension benefits in combination with targeted income support in Austria. They show
that such a reform increases social welfare as well as the employment of middle-income
males (aged 55–60). Another simulation study by Fehr et al. (2012) investigates the re-
cent increase in the German statutory retirement age from 65 to 67 years. They show
that this rise will postpone effective retirement by about one year and redistribute to-
wards future cohorts. Yet, the reform is found to be not sufficient to offset the projected
future increase in old-age poverty. None of the studies above deals with reforms of the
pension system in a comparative European perspective, taking into account different
country-specific fertility profiles and pension systems. Comparing the effects of pen-
sion system reforms across Europe helps to shed light on the role that systemic elements
of pension policies play in shaping the fiscal budget effects.
Our results show themagnitude of fiscal strain expected from demographic change,
revealing a negative outlook for the majority of countries. Taking into account labor
market effects substantially improves the balance. Increasing the retirement age, as
implemented in many countries, further improves fiscal outcomes, leading to mostly
positive outcomes.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes our approach ofmodeling
demographic change and the labor market in more detail. Section 4.3 describes our im-
plementation of the retirement age reform. Section 4.4 presents results on labor market
and fiscal outcomes. Section 4.5 contains results on the inter-generational distribution
of funding public finances. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Data and methodology
Microsimulation Models (MSM) have become a standard tool for the ex-ante evalua-
tion of tax-benefit reforms (Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2006). The basic idea of MSM
is to apply different sets of tax rules to the same sample of households and compare
1 In addition there are ex-post studies investigating the effects of pension reforms, see e.g. Cribb et al.
(2013), Manoli and Weber (2016), Staubli and Zweimüller (2013), and Vestad (2012).
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the outcomes across various dimensions such as inequality and employment. It offers
a suitable framework to deal with the questions we pose due to its ability to account
for the full heterogeneity within a given population. This is in contrast to approaches
relying on representative agents, including CGE models. Moreover, the MSM results
can be aggregated to the macro level, while this can be problematic for representative
agent models due to potential biases. In the context of divergent demographic trends
across EU countries, a micro-based approach is particularly useful, as we can account
for the fact that the age composition, educational attainment and household composi-
tion are affected differently by demographic change across countries. In this chapter,
wemake twomain advances inMSM thatmay be valuable for other research and policy
analyses in the future. First, past MSM studies have been focused on modeling labor
supply behaviorwhile being relatively agnostic as far as labor demand feed-back effects
were concerned. By introducing a novel labor supply and labor demand link (explained
in Section 4.2.2), we overcome this shortfall and add a more realistic (partial) equilib-
rium notion to MSM. Second, demographic changes are accounted for by reweighting
the micro data, which allows us to not only study labor market adjustments to policy
reforms in current years but also in relatively distant future (see Section 4.2.1). Our
chosen framework proposes, therefore, a middle ground between micro andmacro ap-
proaches by making MSM outcomes more plausible when accounting for labor market
effects. At the same time, the method is parsimonious, straightforward to implement
and does not rest on too many assumptions, avoiding a black box.
The main parameters we employ, apart from assumptions underlying the demo-
graphic projections, are the elasticities of labor supply and demand. Throughout the
analysis, we keep these elasticities constant, even though it is unlikely to be the case
in practice. Time-persistent elasticities imply that responses of supply and demand to
relative scarcities in the labor market are not changing over time. While the mechanics
of the labor market might change over time, it is a priori not clear in which direction
they might change and how much variation there could be. For that reason, it seems
more reasonable to proceed with the assumption that there are no substantial changes
to labor supply or demand elasticities in this time period.
4.2.1 Population Projections
We draw on Huisman et al. (2013) population projections for EU-27 in 2030, which
are differentiated along the dimensions of age, gender, household type and education,
separately for each country. The projections start from assumptions underlying the Eu-
rostat projections, EUROPOP2010, but allow for additional variation, captured with
two scenarios — the tough and the friendly scenario. The scenarios make different as-
sumptions about international and internal migration, educational attainment, life ex-
pectancy, fertility andGDP growth. Broadly speaking, the tough scenario implies more
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severe challenges for European policy makers than the friendly scenario as it assumes
lower fertility, lower educational attainment, less international migration and a higher
life expectancy.2 The latter scenario is assumed to cause a strong increase in the old-age
dependency ratio. In contrast, the friendly scenario assumes higher net international
immigration to Europe which has a positive impact on the working-age population as
well as increasing the level of educational attainment.3
Figure 4.1: Projected change in population and labor force by 2030
Own calculations based on Huisman et al. (2013). See also Tables 4.3 and 4.4 in the Appendix.
We incorporate these projections into our micro data — European Union Statistics
on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) survey — by a reweighting procedure.
The EU-SILC data are representative for the population in each country and contain
rich information about socio-demographic characteristics and incomes of households,
serving as input for the tax-benefit calculator (explained further below). Essentially,
we adjust the respective sample weights for each observation proportionally to meet
the target size in a given stratum.4 By means of reweighting, we are able to analyze
2 Huisman et al. (2013) use a cohort component model to project the age and sex distribution while
education projections are based on KC et al. (2010). Comparing their population projections by skill level
to those of the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (CEDEFOP), which provides
an EU-wide population projection for 2020, shows that the two are well aligned in terms of head-counts
(CEDEFOP, 2012).
3 The recent influx of asylum seekers could not be incorporated. This is partly due to lack of reliable
information on composition and size of the refugee influx. Moreover, there is huge uncertainty with
regard to the length of stay in the host country. According to Hatton (2013), the rate of accepted asylum
seekers dropped sharply in the course of the 1990s refugee inflow in the OECD due to tighter asylum
policies. The effects on labor force composition in medium to long run is hence far from certain.
4 For a similar application of sample reweighting in the context in tax-benefit microsimulation for
Australia, see Cai et al. (2006).
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how the European labor force will change over the course of two decades. Using the
implied changes in the skill and age composition, we get a projection for the future
labor force and aggregate labor supply before wage adjustments. Tables 4.3 and 4.4
detail by country how the population and the labor force can be expected to change
in each European country by 2030. Figure 4.1 contrasts country-wise changes in labor
force, defined as the population between age 15 and 64, and population for both scenar-
ios. With few exceptions, the labor force is expected to shrink across countries in both
the tough and friendly scenario— on average by 9.2% and 1.0%, respectively. The most
drastic decreases are expected for Bulgaria, Romania, the Baltic countries andGermany.
Although fertility rates are kept constant at the 2010 levels in the tough scenario, this
assumption cannot be the main driver for the stark differences in headcounts between
the two scenarios, asmost new-born childrenwill not be in the labor force in 2030. From
all the different assumptions between both scenarios, migration has the most direct im-
pact on the size of the labor force. As Table 4.5 shows, net migration flows are projected
to be negative for the whole EU in the tough scenario. On the other hand, the friendly
scenario implies a substantial overall annual inflow of 2.7 million migrants in 2030.
Figure 4.2: Structural changes in the work force composition
Projected Changes in percentage points between 2010 and 2030. Shares refer to total labor force. Older
workers are defined as 50 years and older. High education is defined as completed tertiary education.
Apart from an overall decrease in size, the European labor force will undergo two
major transitions, namely a shift towards older and higher-skill workers. The share of
older workers is projected to rise in nearly all countries, most notably in the Southern
European countries. This development is accompanied by increasing educational at-
tainment, resulting in significant increases in the share of high-skilled workers in every
country. This holds for both demographic scenarios and is particularly pronounced in
the friendly scenario. In the tough (friendly) scenario, the share of high-skilled rises by
only 0.9 ppt (8.0 ppt) in Germany, while other countries exhibit stronger increases, e. g.
10.7 ppt and 15.8 ppt respectively in Poland. The developments along both dimensions
are visualized in Figure 4.2.
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4.2.2 Labor Market Effects
In most countries, the total amount of hours worked, before accounting for wage ad-
justments, is projected to decrease as a result of demographic changes, ceteris paribus
(Table 7, columns labeledD). It is unlikely that major transitions in the number of hours
worked, as implied by our projections, would leave the behavior of labor market par-
ticipants unaffected. In a neo-classical model of the labor market, greater scarcity of
the production factor (labor) is expected to induce a wage increase which, in turn, may
cause workers to supply more hours of work as potential disposable income rises. We
model these wage adjustments by taking into account labor supply and demand elas-
ticities as explained below.
Supply Side Elasticities Our estimates of labor supply elasticities stem from the anal-
ysis of Bargain et al. (2014). While the empirical literature on own-wage labor supply
elasticities is vast, Bargain et al. (2014) is the first study to carry out estimations for a
multitude of countries relying on a uniform methodological framework. They apply a
flexible discrete choice model where couples are assumed to maximize a joint utility
function over a discrete set of working hour choices. The utility function is specified
to account for fixed costs of work, labor market restrictions within countries or even
states, preference heterogeneity with respect to age, the presence and number of chil-
dren as well as unobserved heterogeneity components. We draw on their elasticity
estimates, distinguished by sex, marital status and skill level.5 As the study covers only
17 EU countries, we use the respective country groupmean (see Table 4.2) if a particular
country is not covered.6
Demand Side Elasticities To capture reactions on the demand side of the labor mar-
ket, we use skill-specific demand elasticities from the meta-analysis in Lichter et al.
(2015a), shown at the bottom of Table 4.2. On the basis of empirical findings from 105
studies covering 30 years, the authors run ameta-regression of the estimated own-wage
elasticity of labor demand. This allows them to obtain mean estimates for a given coun-
try, controlling for characteristics of the study, such as the time period or the estimation
methods. We estimate a regression model on their dataset which follows their main
specification (Lichter et al., 2015a, p. 101,) but adds an interaction term between skill
level and country group. We then use our specification to predict conditional mean
values, setting the time trend to 2030. Due to lack of available empirical studies, the
demand elasticities can only be differentiated by skill level (low-skilled vs others) and
country group. The latter may not be too problematic given the convergence processes
5 See the Appendix for more details.
6 The country groups are defined as follows. Continental: AT, BE, DE, FR, LU, NL; Nordic: DK, FI,
SE; Southern: CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT; Eastern: BG, CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SI, SK. Anglo-Saxon: UK,
IE.
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among countries in the same geographic region. The meta-study reveals negative own-
wage elasticities of demand which are larger than the supply side elasticities.
Figure 4.3: Linking Labor Supply and Demand
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The graph illustrates the implied supply and demand shifts with overall decreasing labor sup-
ply and demand. While this is projected to happen in 15 countries in the tough scenario, the
opposite may also occur (see Figure 4.1).
Labor Market Equilibrium Figure 4.3 visualizes our approach to combine both mar-
ket sides to obtain the new labor market equilibrium. A formal representation is pro-
vided in the Appendix. We build on the approach of linking labor supply and demand
in structural labor supply models by Peichl and Siegloch (2012).7 In line with them,
we differentiate supply-side responses by marital status, gender and skill level, lead-
ing to twelve distinct labor markets. This ensures a flexible adjustment process as it
incorporates the main sources of heterogeneous labor market behavior. As we project a
shrinking labor force for 18 out of 27 EU countries, even for the optimistic scenario (Fig-
ure 4.1), starting from the initial equilibrium A, the labor supply curve shifts to the left
due to a shrinking labor force in the future.8 Under constantwages, employmentwould
7 The key difference to Peichl and Siegloch (2012) is the absence of a labor supply shock on the individ-
ual level. In our setting, the initial labor supply shock arises from demographic change. Our approach
is more restrictive as it requires constant elasticities on both sides of the labor market. This way, the
new equilibrium can be obtained analytically and does not require the iterative procedure of Peichl and
Siegloch (2012).
8 Under the assumption of constant elasticities, any supply/demand curve can be fully characterized
by the elasticity and a single observation of hours. This assumption is crucial for this framework. While
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change by the magnitude of the labor supply shock (Point B). This is the pure demo-
graphic effect. Negative elasticities on the demand side however imply higher wages
due to greater scarcity of labor. We additionally take into account the demand shift
that can be expected. As the total population is projected to decrease in the majority of
countries, the aggregate demand for goods and services can be expected to decrease as
well leading to a lower demand for labor. This is represented by a proportional shift of
the demand curve, reflecting the relative population change in the respective country.
A lower overall population hence manifests in a leftward shift of the LD curve. The
new labor market equilibrium is hence defined by the intersection of LS2030 and LD2030
(Point C), featuring (in this example) higher employment and wages than in Point B.
Figure 4.4 displays the resulting averagewage changes across the EU-27 for both sce-
narios. On average, we project wages to grow by 11.5% (12.4%) in the tough (friendly)
scenario. It is crucial to note that, despite an average increase, there are many work-
ers experiencing lower wages. With a few exceptions, average wage changes in a given
country are very similar across demographic scenarios.9 The starkest changes are pro-
jected for Germany and Austria. The smallest average wage increases are projected for
Hungary, Latvia and Slovakia.
Our simulated wage changes are moderate given the time horizon of 20 years. As-
suming a value of 1% for the annual productivity growth of labor over the period under
consideration, onewould end upwith a total increase in labor productivity of 22% from
2010 to 2030.10 Such productivity effects would add to the implied wage changes. Our
labor market model does not explicitly address changing skill premiums due to tech-
nological change. The educational trends in the population projections are arguably
driven to some extent by an anticipated rise in skill premiums, but they are taken ex-
ogenous in our model.
4.2.3 Tax-Benefit Calculator
Any analysis of the fiscal effects of demographic change necessarily needs to address
the full heterogeneity of the population of a country, as tax-transfer rules are highly
complex and the individual burden of taxation (or eligibility for transfers) depends
on personal and household circumstances. The requirements for such ex ante analy-
sis are well met by fiscal microsimulation models (see e.g. O’Donoghue, 2014), which
are commonly used in the analysis of public policies (Figari et al., 2014). Given our
behavioral responses might be quite stable over time, this may not hold under substantial wage changes.
Specifying supply/demand curves with non-constant elasticities is of course possible, but the empirical
foundation for this assumption would be weak.
9 For an intuition of the wage effects, see Equation 4.6 in the Appendix. The wage change depends
on the changes in total population and supplied hours, as well as on the elasticities on labor supply and
demand.
10 Comparable studies even assume an annual productivity growth rate of 1.5%, e.g. European Com-
mission (2012, p. 75) and Börsch-Supan et al. (2014).
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Figure 4.4: Average wage changes
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cross-national focus and the EU-wide scope of analysis, a natural choice is to use EU-
ROMOD,which is the only tax-benefitmicrosimulationmodel covering all EU-27 coun-
tries (Sutherland and Figari, 2013).11 EUROMOD enables us to conduct a comparative
analysis of tax and benefit systems consistently in a common framework.
EUROMOD calculates household disposable income, based on household charac-
teristics, their market incomes and a given set of tax-benefit rules. The model covers
social insurance contributions from employees, employers and self-employed, income
taxes, other direct taxes as well as cash benefits. It is mainly based on nationally rep-
resentative micro-data from the EU-SILC released by Eurostat, or its national counter-
parts where available and when they provide more detailed information. We use ver-
sion F6.0 of EUROMOD with input datasets based primarily on the SILC 2008 wave.12
The sample size for each country varies from about 10 thousand individuals for Lux-
embourg and Cyprus to more than 50 thousand individuals for Italy and the UK.
We define a concept of Fiscal Balance (FB) as our outcome of interest. FB encom-
passes the sum of all personal taxes and social insurance contributions (SIC) paid less
cash benefits received, that are either simulated in EUROMODor contained in the SILC
data. We further subtract public expenditures that are closely linked to the population
structure, i.e. expenditures for health care, old-age care, child care and education. As
these are not provided by EUROMOD, we rely on Eurostat (2013), that provides re-
spective per capita expenditures by age group and country. This allows us to impute
11 As examples of recent applications, see Immervoll et al. (2007), Bargain et al. (2013) and Dolls et al.
(2012).
12 For France, the 2007 wave is used, for Malta the 2009 wave and for the UK, the Family Resources
Survey 2008/09 is used.
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these expenditures on the personal level.13 This definition of fiscal balance is partial as
it ignores other government expenditure items such as infrastructure or defense, and
non-household or indirect taxes (corporate income tax, VAT). However, it is still an in-
formative indicator to broadly measure changes in public finances collected or spent in
the labor market in this context as it captures the main revenue items (income taxes,
SIC) and expenditures (public pensions, health and education) affected by changes in
the population structure and by retirement age policies. For the year 2010, our fiscal
concept covers on average around 50% of total government revenues and 61% of total
expenditures.
In order to facilitate the comparison between governments of different size, the total
balance is normalised and shown as the share of total household disposable income in
2010.14 Note that we assume an unchanged institutional environment. Our setting does
not incorporate a commodity market, there are hence no price effects. All fiscal results
can therefore be understood in constant prices. Equivalently, one could think of policy
parameters that are uprated according to the inflation rate.
4.3 Modeling Retirement Age reform
Our policy scenario raises the gender-specific retirement age in each country by 5 years,
which roughly corresponds to the average forecasted increase in the life expectancy in
the friendly scenario (see Huisman et al., 2013, Table 3).15 The statutory retirement age
varied notably in 2008 (which is the reference period for our sample), from 60 in France
to 68 for males in Finland — see Table 4.6 in the Appendix. Between 2008 and 2015, 21
out of 27 EU countries have implemented a raise in the statutory retirement age, mostly
in the range of two to three years (European Commission, 2015, pp. 182ff). Our policy
scenario hence anticipates some of the measures already undertaken.
The first complication for implementing the reform arises from the fact that aver-
age effective retirement age is usually lower than the statutory retirement age. There
are substantial fractions of the population that retire before they reach the statutory re-
tirement age, for instance due to health related concerns and/or country-specific reg-
ulations that facilitate early retirement. This is true for current retirement ages across
Europe andwith all likelihood also be the case after raising the legal retirement age. As
13 Eurostat (2013) does not provide numbers for RO, BG, CY,MT, LV and LT. Similarly to the behavioral
parameters, we assume in those cases the average age-related pattern of public expenditures as found in
the respective country group. Although expenditure effects for these countries should be treated with
caution, this facilitates cross-country comparability.
14 A numerical example for Austria (AT) illustrates this. Here, the baseline fiscal balance amounts to
e–11.2 bn anddecreases toe–23.4 bn in the friendly scenario, considering demographic change only. The
difference divided by the total household income in 2010 (e124.3 bn) is hence –9.82%, which is reported
in Table 4.13.
15 It also addresses the Barcelona target of raising the retirement age gradually by 5 years (European
Council, 2002). We additionally ran a second reform scenario that introduces a universal retirement age
of 70. The main conclusions are not fundamentally different and the results are available upon request.
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a result, employment rates tend to decrease relatively smoothly around the statutory
retirement age rather than exhibiting a very clear and sharp drop. This means that we
need to predict employment rates under the new policy regime not only for the group
of people affected by the increase of retirement age directly, i.e. those above the current
age threshold and below the new one, but for a wider group of people. In the absence
of a structural model determining the retirement decision (see, e.g. Manoli et al., 2015),
we base the employment rate of the target group on a 5-year younger cohort (taking the
three-year moving average to obtain smoother patterns).16 We apply this approach to
four separate groups of people, distinguished by gender and singles/couples to obtain
new employment rates for all age groups older than 40, which is where employment
rates peak in most countries, though the largest changes occur naturally for age groups
around the current statutory retirement age.17
Figure 4.5 demonstrates our approach, taking male workers in Germany as an ex-
ample: the solid lines are observed employment rates by age in the status quo (2010)
under the current statutory retirement age of 65 (indicated by the first dashed vertical
line). We basically assume that an increase in the statutory retirement age from 65 to
70 (under the first reform) shifts the employment curve to the right (by five years as
well), shown with the dashed lines. For example, as the (smoothed) employment rate
of single men at the retirement age of 65 was 0.19, we assume it will also be 0.19 at a
new retirement age of 70. The area between the solid and the dashed line reflects the
total increase in employment.
After deriving target employment rates, we assign a corresponding number of re-
tirees from the affected age groups back to work. As the exit into retirement before
reaching the statutory age is likely to be non-random, we need to identify individuals
with the highest probability to be in employment under the new retirement rules. We
estimate the probability of being in work for all individuals i between 45 and 75 years
using the following probit model:18
Pr(work)i = Φ (α + βXi + εi) for agei ∈ [45; 75] (4.1)
The probability of being employed is a function of individual characteristicsXi such as
age (a cubic polynomial), the number of children, disability status, dummies for educa-
tional attainment, capital income, region, marital status as well as employment status
and income of the partner.19 Partner’s status is crucial in couples, as the motivation to
16 We also rule out decreases in the employment rate by setting the minimum level equal to what is
observed currently for a given cohort.
17 The age variable for Malta is grouped in 5-year intervals, hence, our retirement age related adjust-
ments are also inevitably cruder in this case.
18 A similar approach has been used for example by Brewer et al. (2011).
19 Some occupations or industries might bear higher health risks, implying that workers retire earlier.
In order to take this into account, we would need information on pensioners’ previous occupation or
industry. Unfortunately, this information is not available.
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Figure 4.5: Age-specific employment rates
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men in Germany after a shift of the statutory retirement age from 65 to 70.
continue work might be low in the presence of a high-earning spouse. We estimate the
model for each country separately for male and female workers (see Table 4.14 and 4.15
in the Appendix with the estimation results).
Having obtained the vector of coefficients β, we are able to predict the probability
of being employed for those currently out of work. We then order these potential work-
ers by the employment probability and, starting with the individuals with the highest
probability, assign current retirees back to work until we meet the projected target em-
ployment rate by gender for each cohort. For those assigned into work, we assume
individual labor supply to be equal to the cell-specific (defined by age, sex and educa-
tion) mean value in weekly hours. The individual gross hourly wage is obtained from a
regression that relates wages to observable individual characteristics and uses the stan-
dard Heckman (1979) technique to control for the unobservable factors that influence
the selection into work.20
Once we have adjusted relevant labor market characteristics and imputed gross
wage for individuals assigned back to employment, we use EUROMOD to calculate
new tax liabilities and benefit entitlements. Note that we are not able to account for in-
creased old-age pension claims from longer employment trajectories as public pensions
are not simulated in the model, but taken from observed micro-data.21 The relation be-
tween additional time in employment and the individual pension claim depends on
the country-specific pension system. As an example, countries differ in the number
20 The estimation results are available upon request.
21 Note that pension claims might also change due to changed individual earnings (Section 4.2.2).
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of years in employment on which the pension amount is calculated and how earnings
from various points in time are weighted (OECD, 2013a, pp. 124f). Accounting for al-
tered pension claims would require a dynamic modelling of individual earnings pro-
files, combined with the full set of institutional rules of the respective pension system,
ideally also capturing interactionswith private and occupational pension schemes. The
European Commission (2015, p. 218) demonstrates the heterogeneity in pension claims
if careers become slightly longer. For working two additional years, the change in the
replacement rate (i. e. the ratio of pension entitlements to previous earnings) ranges
from 0 to 20 percentage points across EU countries.
Note that the above description of deriving the market equilibrium abstracted from
any policy reaction to the projected demographic transitions. Yet, the logic of our
supply-demand link can be easily extended to any additional policy reform. To see
how an increase in the retirement age interacts with our labor market model, return
to Figure 4.3. Starting from the equilibrium with no policy reform, i.e. point C, an in-
crease in the retirement age will increase labor supply and thus lead to an additional
shift of the labor supply curve to the right. The new equilibrium point yields higher
employment and lower wages compared to C.
4.4 Labor Market and Fiscal Results
In this section, we present our main simulation results. We focus on two outcomes (i)
changes in hours worked and (ii) the effect of the fiscal balance. For both outcomes,
we estimate effects at three different stages: (a) only taking into account demographic
change (stage D), which isolates the external shock to labor supply for given wages;
(b) after the demographic change and wage adjustments effects (stage DW), which cap-
tures interactions between labor demand and supply following initial supply shock;
and (c) after the demographic change and the counterfactual policy reform of a 5-year
increase in the retirement age (stage DRW), taking into account wage reactions. Results
for the three different stages are shown estimated for both the tough and the friendly
demographic scenario and for all countries. For clarity, we report the results by coun-
try group, roughly reflecting welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ferrera, 1996).
Detailed results by country are reported in Tables 4.7 to 4.13 in the Appendix.
The upper panel of Table 4.1 shows changes in total hours worked. The pure de-
mographic effect (D) is -7.0% (+3.0%) in the tough (friendly) scenario for the EU-27.
This represents the total labor market effect, capturing both intensive and extensive re-
actions. Isolating the extensive margin, i. e., the change in total employment, reveals
similar effects of -7.4% and +2.5% respectively (see Table 4.8 in the Appendix). East-
ern and Continental Europe are projected to face the largest declines, while total hours
actually rise in both scenarios in the Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries. Comparing
changes in hours to changes in the labor force size (-9.2% and -1.0% for the tough and
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friendly scenarios respectively) suggests that focusing on head-count overestimates the
reduction in effective labor and ignores differential labor supply behavior across socio-
demographic groups. The change in hours partly compensates for the reduction in
labor force. This suggests that demographic changes will increase the share of people
with a stronger preference for working.
Wage reactions to initial shocks in labor supply, and accounting for demand-side
adjustments at the same time, (columns labeledDWof Table 4.1) lead to additional neg-
ative effects on aggregate hours on top of what is induced by the demographic changes
only. The wage adjustments to the demographic change do not, therefore, have a sta-
bilising effect on aggregate employment.22 The additional decrease in aggregate hours
due towage adjustment is particularly felt in southern European countries. It should be
however stressed that the aggregate difference is a sum of positive and negative trends
for the 12 distinct labor market simulations we employ.
As expected, the hours effects from raising the statutory retirement age by 5 years
are substantial (columns labeled DRW in Table 4.1) with the change in aggregate hours
going from −8.5% (1.9%) to −5.5% (16.7%). The largest improvement in hours of work
is seen in Continental and Southern European countries. This suggests that undertak-
ing this reform can counterbalance the decrease in hours worked from demographic
changes even in the tough scenario. There are, however, a few countries (Bulgaria, Es-
tonia, Latvia) where the decline in total hours still exceeds 10% (Table 4.7).
Panel B of Table 4.1 shows how the changes in total hours translate into fiscal out-
comes. The figures refer to relative differences in the fiscal balance, normalized by the
total disposable income in 2010:
∆FB∑
Y
disp
2010
=
∆SIC + ∆Tax−∆Benefits−∆Other Exp.∑
Y
disp
2010
(4.2)
We first quantify the scale of fiscal stress which the demographic change is likely to
lead to. Under constant wages (columns labeled D in Table 4.1), public fiscal balances
would decrease by around 6% of household disposable income in both scenarios. The
negative budgetary effect in the friendly scenario occurs despite hours increasing 3%
on average. Figures 4.6 and 4.7 decompose the change in fiscal balances for the tough
and friendly scenarios. The components include income tax, social security contribu-
tions, cash benefits and government expenditure (including health, old-age care, child
care and educational expenditures as explained in Section 2.3). From these figures, we
can see that the negative fiscal balance estimated before accounting for wage changes
or introducing the retirement reform (bars labelled D in Figures 4.6 and 4.7) is driven
by increased spending on (old age) cash benefits, partly counterbalanced by increased
taxes and social insurance contributions though not always. The fiscal outlook is similar
22 Considering the transition in and out of employment only gives a similar, albeit slightly more posi-
tive picture. Average changes amount to -7% and +3.8% respectively.
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Table 4.1: Labor Market and Fiscal Effects by Country Groups
D DW DRW
tough friendly tough friendly tough friendly
Panel A: Hours worked, relative change
Continental -10.0% -2.4% -10.6% -2.5% 4.9% 14.4%
Nordic 1.8% 7.1% 0.3% 6.4% 7.7% 13.8%
Anglo-Saxon 3.1% 9.4% 2.8% 9.5% 14.1% 20.9%
Southern -2.9% 8.1% -6.7% 4.6% 12.6% 25.0%
Eastern -14.5% -2.8% -16.0% -4.1% -3.0% 9.9%
EU-27
Average
-7.0% 3.0% -8.5% 1.9% 5.5% 16.7%
EU-27 Labor
Force Change
-9.18% -1.02%
Panel B: Change in Fiscal Balance
Continental -7.9% -8.6% -1.9% -0.8% -1.1% -0.3%
Nordic -4.0% -4.8% 1.5% 8.5% 2.2% 6.8%
Anglo-Saxon -1.9% -2.1% 1.7% 0.0% -0.2% -1.9%
Southern -3.8% -4.5% -2.9% -2.8% 2.4% 2.8%
Eastern -6.8% -5.4% -4.8% -3.7% -2.1% -0.4%
EU-27
Average
-5.8% -5.8% -2.6% -1.3% -0.1% 1.1%
D=demographic change only; DR=Retirement Age Reform. W indicates scenarios with wage
effect. Panel A shows mean percentage changes in aggregate hours by country group. Results
broken down by country are provided in Tables 4.4 and 4.7 in the Appendix. Panel B refer to
percentage changes in the fiscal balances, normalized to household disposable income
(Equation 4.2).
across countries, a few exceptions include those which are expected to face significant
population growth (e.g. Sweden) or have a greater reliance on private pension schemes,
such as Ireland or the UK. Another interesting finding is a positive contribution of ex-
penditures in some Eastern European countries and Germany (tough scenario), which
can be explained by large decreases in the total population.
With wage adjustments, the fiscal outlook is less bleak. The average change in fis-
cal balance is still negative but reduced to -3% (-1%) in the tough (friendly) scenario
(columns labeled DW in Table 4.1). The net budget change in the Nordic and Anglo-
Saxon countries becomes even positive, on average. The Continental countries also im-
prove their position substantially, while improvements are less drastic for the Southern
and Eastern countries. As can be seen in Figures 4.6 and 4.7, improvements in the fis-
cal balance from the wage change are mainly due to higher tax revenues (bars labeled
DW compared to D). Revenues from contributions and spending on benefits vary rela-
tively little. While the friendly scenario shows fiscal balances in nearly all EU countries
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Figure 4.6: Decomposed balance changes by country, tough scenario
Note: The figure depicts the percentage change in the components of the normalized fiscal balance
(Eq. 4.2) for each step, relative to 2010. TAX: Personal Taxes; SIC: Social Insurance Contributions; BEN:
Benefit and Pension Payments; EXP: Demography-related expenditures.
close or above zero after the wage reactions, a couple of countries perform poorly in
the tough demographic scenario: Hungary, Latvia, Romania and Slovakia end up with
deficits above 5% of total household disposable income.
The retirement age reform brings EU average fiscal balance close to break even in
both scenarios. Compared with the outcome after the demographic and wage changes
(columns labeled DRW compared to DW in Table 4.1), fiscal balances improve most in
the Southern and Eastern Europe, while we project stagnating or even falling balances
for the other country groups. This is explained by the fact that there are two devel-
opments following the retirement age increase. Mechanically, cash benefits decrease
and revenues increase with higher employment among the older cohorts. Additionally,
there is a wage decrease due to higher labor supply, working against the positive rev-
enue effect. The additional budget change from the retirement age reform is marked by
a clear decrease in benefit payments (bars labeled DRW compared to DW in Figures 4.6
and 4.7). This positive effect on balances is offset by decreases in tax revenues, in some
cases even dropping below the level with pure demographic changes (D).
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Figure 4.7: Decomposed balance changes by country, friendly scenario
Note: The figure depicts the percentage change in the components of the normalized fiscal balance
(Eq. 4.2) for each step, relative to 2010. TAX: Personal Taxes; SIC: Social Insurance Contributions; BEN:
Benefit and Pension Payments; EXP: Demography-related expenditures.
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4.5 Intergenerational Distributional Impact
Figure 4.8: Payment burden of working-age population
The graph contrasts changes in the payment share of taxes and social security contributions by the
working-age population with its change in population share. The revenue amounts take wage reactions
into account (DW).
The previous section demonstrated fiscal strains for most countries from the ex-
pected demographic change. A related question is how the financing of public goods
is going to be distributed across the population in the future. We therefore investigate
the consequences of the demographic change on the intergenerational distribution of
financial burden. Governments are financed to a large extent by the working-age popu-
lation: the share of total taxes and contributions paid by people aged 15 to 64 amounts
to 91% on average for the base year. Our demographic scenarios show that the share of
working-age population, on average, decreases from 67.9% to 63.4% (tough) and 62.3%
(friendly) respectively. Figure 4.8 plots the change in the share of the working age pop-
ulation between 2010 and 2030 on the horizontal axis, and the change in the share of
the taxes and social security paid by the working-age population on the vertical axis (in
the absence of a retirement age reform). Most of the countries (in both demographic
scenarios) appear to the left of the 45-degree line. This means that, while the share of
working-age people in the population is projected to decrease from 68% in average in
2010 to around 63% in 2030, the fiscal burden for this group does not decrease by the
same magnitude. In other words, the working-age population pays a larger share of
total tax and social security in 2030 than in 2010, relative to its share in population. The
fiscal burden accrues more towards the working age population than the non-working
age population. This result is intuitive on two grounds. First, it is mainly the working-
age population profiting from higher average wages. Second, most income tax and
contribution systems treat pension incomes preferentially (OECD, 2013a).
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4.6 Conclusion
It is widely believed that ageing populations in European countries will put pressure
on public finances through higher spending on old age benefits and lower tax revenues.
The issue has gained evenmore relevance in the aftermath of theGreat Recessionwhich
hasweakened governments’ fiscal positions ahead of demographic developments. This
chapter assesses to what extent these concerns are justified and explores a raise in the
statutory retirement age as one likely policy response.
Linking EU-27 demographic projections for 2030with rich household-level data and
employing microsimulation methods, we simulate the fiscal effects of demographic
change, accounting for substantial population heterogeneity and the complexity of tax-
benefit systems. Using the EU tax-benefit model EUROMOD, our analysis covers 27
EU countries in a consistent way in a common framework. This is complemented by a
partial equilibriummodel of the labor market, relying on recent micro-based empirical
evidence.
We quantify the scale of fiscal stress which the demographic change is likely to in-
cur. Assuming constant real wages, public fiscal balances would decrease by around
6% of household disposable income on average — less than the drastic fiscal adjust-
ments carried out in European countries following the recent crisis but of a comparable
magnitude.23 This is driven by increased spending on (old age) cash benefits, in most
countries partly counterbalanced by increased taxes and social insurance contributions
due to the older and better educated labor force. The fiscal outlook is broadly simi-
lar across countries, a few exceptions include those which are expected to face more
favorable demographic developments and have a greater reliance on private pension
schemes. Overall, the results are not particularly sensitive to the underlying demo-
graphic scenarios. Under flexible wage conditions, however, labor scarcity leads to a
strong wage growth and small employment increases (compared to the situation with
fixed wages) which, together, notably reduce the worsening in fiscal balances though
are not sufficient to withstand it entirely.
We also consider a retirement age reformwhich increases the current (gender-speci-
fic) statutory retirement age by 5 years — roughly corresponding to the projected in-
crease in life expectancy. We model effective retirement ages by extrapolating current
employment profiles. Our results demonstrate that such reforms couldmore than offset
the impact of demographic processes on fiscal balances. This is due to increased taxes
as there is a strong correlation between the increase in the number of people in work
and improvement in the fiscal balance, though the reduction of the welfare bill also
matters. These effects are, however, moderated and sometimes even reversed, by lower
wages due to higher labor supply. As a result, the likely wage reaction to the demo-
23 Replicating our fiscal balance concept with revenue statistics, EU-27 balances worsened during the
Great Recession, on average, by 7.4% of disposable income.
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graphic change, coupled with a retirement age reform are sufficient to avoid worsening
in fiscal balances in nearly all countries. An analysis of the change of the fiscal burden
reveals that under the existing tax-benefit systems, the working-age population will as-
sume even a greater role in financing the government. Their share of payments relative
to the population share is projected to rise. Overall, our results paint a less worrying
outlook on the fiscal implications of the demographic change. This is linewith previous
findings on the country level (Aaberge et al., 2007; de Blander et al., 2013).24
We conclude that wage dynamics are highly relevant for the analysis as dramatic
demographic shifts may engender important wage adjustments. This highlights the
importance of taking interactions between the demand and supply sides of the labor
market into accountwhen evaluating retirement reforms— looking at static effects only
can be highly misleading. Nevertheless, our results should be considered in light of
some limitations. Extensions to our work could address broader general equilibrium
effects by considering the role of technological change and associated changes in labor
productivity and returns to education. A more comprehensive concept of fiscal bal-
ance, taking e.g. indirect taxes into account, could be useful. Applying our setting to a
dynamic microsimulation model could improve accuracy with respect to the change in
individual pension entitlements in particular. Further work can also explore alternative
policy options available such as reducing public pensions and increasing the tax bur-
den for those currently employed. Another option to counterbalance decreasing labor
force is pursuing policies which encourage higher migration. Even though migrants
are likely to be net fiscal contributors (see e.g. Dustmann et al., 2010), this topic remains
politically highly sensitive. Lastly, this chapter examined the effect of demographic
change on labor supply, wages and fiscal revenue. Other outcomes of interest include
inequality and poverty levels and we leave this for future research.
24 See also recent OECD projections on pension payments, which are projected to increase from 9.2%
of GDP to 11.7% up to 2050 (OECD, 2013a, pp. 174ff).
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4.A Appendix
4.A.1 Labor supply elasticities
The total supply elasticity for subgroup g ∈ [1, . . . , 12] in country c is defined as a
percentage change in total hours in relation to the percentage change in wages: εSgc =
∂Hgc
∂wgc
wgc
Hgc
. The intensive elasticity is this ratio conditional on working at least one hour.
The extensive elasticity is defined as the relative change of the employment rate Egc:
εS,extgc =
∂Egc
∂w
w
Egc
. This corresponds to the extensive margin (participation) in the result
tables of Bargain et al. (2014).
Looking first at single females in Table 4.2, we see that the labor supply elasticity
of low skilled single females ranges from 0.1 in the Eastern European countries to just
over 0.3 in the British Isles. In the medium skilled category, it is the Southern European
countries which display the highest labor supply elasticity for single females (at around
0.3) while the same figure for the British Isles is almost unchanged compared to the
low skilled category. The Nordic and Continental countries show a similarly low labor
supply elasticity for this group of medium skilled single women. The labor supply
elasticities of high skilled single women are much higher than those of low or medium
skilled, ranging from 0.25 in Eastern Europe to 0.5 in the Southern European countries
and in the UK and Ireland.
In general, women in couples display higher labor supply elasticities than their sin-
gle counterparts (except for the high skilled category). Once again, there are discrep-
ancies by country groups although the labor supply elasticity of women in couples
displays less variability by skill group than that of single women. Eastern European
women in couples have the lowest labor supply elasticity, regardless of skill type, at
around 0.1. Non-single southern European women have the largest labor supply elas-
ticities which range from 0.35 among the high skilled to 0.5 among the medium skilled.
The labor supply elasticity of continental Europeanwomen is fairly constant across skill
groups at around 0.3 while the Nordic countries and the British Isles also have stable
elasticities of around 0.2 across skill groups.
Among single men, the highest labor supply elasticities are to be found among the
high and low skilled with the group of medium skilled single men displaying reason-
ably stable labor supply elasticities across countries of between 0.1 (in the Continental
countries) and 0.2 (in the Nordic countries). Among the low-skilled single men, the
British Isles have the largest labor supply elasticity of around 0.45. The smallest, of
0.15, are to be found in the Continental and Eastern European countries. Meanwhile
theNordic and Southern European low skilled singlemen have labor supply elasticities
of around 0.25. Similar cross-country grouping patterns are found for the high-skilled
with the highest elasticities found in the British Isles (0.65), followed by theNordic (0.35)
and Southern European (0.3) countries.
Finally, we observe very low labor supply elasticities for men in couples, regardless
of their skill level. These range from 0.06 to 0.14 with the largest values observed for
high skilled men, followed by low skilled and then medium skilled men. The Nordic
countries display the largest elasticities across country groups for men in couples, re-
gardless of the skill group.
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Table 4.2: Supply and Demand Elasticities
Skill Level
High Medium Low
(Total) Labor supply elasticities
Single Male
Continental 0.15 0.11 0.23
Nordic 0.27 0.21 0.34
Anglo-Saxon 0.46 0.14 0.65
Southern 0.27 0.18 0.27
Eastern 0.15 0.17 0.24
Single Female
Continental 0.23 0.14 0.38
Nordic 0.19 0.11 0.36
Anglo-Saxon 0.32 0.20 0.51
Southern 0.26 0.29 0.48
Eastern 0.09 0.10 0.48
Married Male
Continental 0.09 0.08 0.10
Nordic 0.11 0.09 0.14
Anglo-Saxon 0.09 0.06 0.11
Southern 0.06 0.08 0.07
Eastern 0.08 0.08 0.08
Married Female
Continental 0.28 0.30 0.27
Nordic 0.18 0.17 0.22
Anglo-Saxon 0.20 0.23 0.19
Southern 0.40 0.49 0.36
Eastern 0.11 0.12 0.11
Labor demand elasticities
Continental -0.53 -0.62
Nordic -0.48 -0.54
Anglo-Saxon -0.66 -0.91
Southern -0.58
Eastern -0.66
Note: Supply elasticities based on estimations from Bargain et al. (2014). The values refer to
mean value by country group. Where possible, elasticities are country-specific. If a specific
countrywas not covered in the initial study, it was assigned themean valuewithin the country
group. Demand elasticities are from Lichter et al. (2015a), by adding an interaction between
skill and country group to the main specification and setting the time trend to 2030. Due to
insufficient empirical estimates, we had to partly aggregate skill levels for the demand side.
4.A.2 Analytical derivation of new labor market equilibrium
Denoting total hours worked with H and the average wage w, the labor demand elas-
ticity η with respect to wage is defined by η = ∂H
∂w
w
H
= H ′(w) w
H
. We assume an isoelastic
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demand curve of the form HD(w) = cwη, where c is derived from the observed combi-
nation of hours and (average) wages.
HD(w) = c
LD
0 w
η =
H0
wη0
wη. (4.3)
Assuming an equilibrium state initially, both the supply and the demand curve go
through this point. Defining the wage elasticity of labor supply ε analogously25, the
analytical labor supply curve looks as
HS(w) = c
LS
0 w
ε =
H0
wε0
wε (4.4)
Now suppose a labor supply shock due to demographic change, i. e. HS1 = λH0. This
shifts the labor supply curve (4.4) by manipulating c0, i. e. c1 = λH0wε0 .
At the same time, we mimic general equilibrium effects from demographic change
on the labor demand side by scaling cLD0 in Eq. 4.3 in proportion to the population
change pi. The new labor market equilibrium is found at the intersection of both equa-
tions
piH0
wη0
wη︸ ︷︷ ︸
new LD curve
!
=
λH0
wε0
wε︸ ︷︷ ︸
new LS curve
(4.5)
This yields the new equilibrium wage
w∗ =
(
λ
pi
) 1
η−ε
w0 (4.6)
The relative wage effect w∗
w0
=
(
λ
pi
) 1
η−ε for the respective population subgroup can then
be fed into the tax-benefit calculator to compute labor market reactions on the indi-
vidual level, and, finally, fiscal effects. Note that measurement error in the individual
wage does not constitute a problem here, as w∗
w0
is independent of w0. We distinguish
individual reactions by extensive and intensive labor supply elasticities. First, people
in work adjust their number of hours according to the intensive elasticity. In a next
step, the number of people in work is adjusted such that the employment rate changes
according to the extensive elasticity.
25 At this stage, the total labor supply elasticities are used.
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Table 4.3: Projected Total Population in 2010 and 2030
Million People % Change
Base tough friendly tough friendly
AT 8.4 8.3 9.1 -1.2 8.7
BE 10.8 11.7 12.5 8.1 15.1
BG 7.6 5.8 7.2 -22.9 -4.5
CY 0.8 0.9 1.0 10.4 23.9
CZ 10.5 10.1 11.2 -3.8 6.5
DE 81.8 72.3 80.8 -11.6 -1.2
DK 5.5 5.7 6.0 2.5 7.9
EE 1.3 1.1 1.4 -15.4 5.9
EL 11.3 10.9 11.8 -4.0 4.4
ES 46.0 44.8 52.0 -2.6 13.0
FI 5.4 5.5 5.8 2.6 7.6
FR 62.8 66.2 69.5 5.4 10.6
HU 10.0 9.2 9.7 -8.3 -2.7
IE 4.5 4.7 5.3 4.2 18.0
IT 60.3 60.6 67.6 0.5 12.1
LT 3.3 2.8 3.1 -15.2 -5.9
LU 0.5 0.6 0.7 21.4 30.4
LV 2.2 1.8 2.1 -21.4 -5.1
MT 0.4 0.4 0.4 -9.5 4.6
NL 16.6 17.0 18.1 2.6 9.0
PL 38.2 34.8 38.3 -8.8 0.3
PT 10.6 10.0 11.1 -5.8 4.0
RO 21.5 18.0 21.9 -16.0 2.0
SE 9.3 10.3 11.0 10.6 17.5
SI 2.0 2.1 2.3 0.6 10.8
SK 5.4 5.3 5.7 -3.2 5.2
UK 62.0 67.5 70.8 8.8 14.2
Mean -2.7 7.9
Population-weighted
mean
-2.3 7.4
Note: Own calculations based on projections in Huisman et al. (2013) applied to EU-SILC
data for the EU-27.
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Table 4.4: Projected Total Labor Force in 2010 and 2030
Million Workers % Change
Base tough friendly tough friendly
AT 5.7 5.2 5.6 -7.7 -0.9
BE 7.1 7.3 7.6 1.5 6.3
BG 5.2 3.7 4.6 -28.6 -12.3
CY 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 12.4
CZ 7.4 6.6 7.2 -10.9 -3.5
DE 53.9 43.8 47.9 -18.7 -11.1
DK 3.6 3.5 3.6 -3.3 -0.1
EE 0.9 0.7 0.9 -22.3 -2.2
EL 7.5 7.0 7.4 -7.6 -2.0
ES 31.4 28.9 33.2 -8.0 5.8
FI 3.6 3.3 3.4 -7.6 -5.2
FR 40.7 39.6 40.9 -2.7 0.5
HU 6.9 6.1 6.2 -10.9 -9.1
IE 3.0 2.9 3.4 -3.2 11.5
IT 39.7 38.0 41.5 -4.1 4.8
LT 2.3 1.8 2.0 -21.2 -14.4
LU 0.3 0.4 0.4 16.3 22.7
LV 1.5 1.2 1.4 -25.5 -12.6
MT 0.3 0.2 0.3 -19.6 -8.0
NL 11.1 10.4 10.8 -6.8 -2.8
PL 27.2 22.9 24.5 -16.0 -10.2
PT 7.1 6.5 7.0 -8.3 -1.9
RO 15.0 12.1 14.6 -19.3 -2.8
SE 6.1 6.3 6.6 3.4 8.2
SI 1.4 1.3 1.4 -8.6 -1.0
SK 3.9 3.5 3.7 -10.3 -5.1
UK 41.0 41.7 43.2 1.8 5.5
Mean -9.2 -1.0
Population-weighted
mean
-8.7 -1.4
Note: Own calculations based on Huisman et al. (2013) applied to EU-SILC data for the
EU-27. Labor force is defined by the population aged between 15 and 64.
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Table 4.5: Assumed annual net migration flows in 2030
Country last observed net flow projected net flows
tough friendly
in 1000
AT 21.1 12.9 58.4
BE 64.1 23.3 62.0
BG -15.7 -57.4 50.8
CY 1.8 1.8 9.2
CZ 28.3 -5.6 56.7
DE -10.7 -100.3 366.2
DK 15.3 5.9 18.0
EE 0.0 -11.8 11.2
EL 35.1 11.2 60.3
ES 50.3 -5.8 513.8
FI 14.6 5.6 13.9
FR 70.0 5.0 169.0
IE -27.6 -3.9 45.4
IT 311.6 128.2 549.1
HU 17.3 18.4 25.9
LT -15.5 -9.5 7.4
LV -4.7 -12.6 13.5
LU 6.6 2.1 4.7
MT -0.2 -1.7 2.4
NL 38.5 -13.4 37.0
PL -1.2 -85.3 91.7
PT 15.4 10.1 64.4
RO -1.6 -144.2 150.6
SE 62.6 9.0 43.0
SI 11.5 -0.6 11.9
SK 4.4 -2.6 18.9
UK 201.3 100.8 255.5
EU-27 892.6 -120.4 2710.9
Source: Huisman et al. (2013), Table 4.
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Table 4.7: Hours worked in 2010 and 2030
Base D DW DRW
to fr to fr to fr
Mill. Hours % change
AT 148.0 -11.1 -3.1 -9.4 0.1 2.4 14.1
BE 177.9 4.7 11.8 3.5 11.3 24.0 32.4
BG 179.0 -27.4 -8.6 -30.7 -12.1 -17.4 2.1
CY 17.0 2.5 16.7 2.5 16.6 18.7 34.0
CZ 221.4 -8.6 1.0 -8.9 1.8 3.2 14.3
DE 1442.5 -20.3 -10.1 -19.8 -9.4 -7.4 4.8
DK 109.4 -0.3 3.9 0.1 5.2 5.4 10.8
EE 29.8 -20.9 2.3 -23.1 -0.6 -12.4 11.7
EL 218.1 -9.0 -2.9 -10.0 -3.2 4.8 11.6
ES 910.5 -6.2 9.5 -8.0 7.7 10.5 27.7
FI 110.2 -4.4 -0.3 -5.9 -1.0 3.9 8.8
FR 1080.2 -0.2 4.5 -2.6 2.6 18.5 25.0
HU 188.5 -8.2 -5.0 -14.0 -9.9 -1.6 2.9
IE 82.1 2.0 19.0 -0.4 15.2 11.9 28.3
IT 1169.6 1.1 10.3 -5.0 4.6 16.6 27.1
LT 69.6 -17.6 -7.5 -19.6 -9.1 -1.3 9.8
LU 9.5 17.3 24.7 17.4 26.1 48.9 56.9
LV 51.6 -22.6 -6.5 -25.6 -9.9 -17.4 -0.7
MT 6.7 -12.5 2.1 -13.7 1.6 -7.7 8.0
NL 270.6 -4.6 0.9 -4.1 2.2 4.0 10.9
PL 745.3 -11.1 -3.2 -12.3 -3.9 -1.3 7.8
PT 206.5 -4.4 0.5 -7.1 -1.7 8.2 15.1
RO 376.3 -22.3 -0.5 -22.2 -1.3 -5.9 17.8
SE 177.9 7.0 13.7 4.3 11.8 11.6 18.8
SI 40.3 -8.8 -0.0 -10.4 -1.2 6.8 17.0
SK 119.5 -7.3 -0.8 -8.1 -0.8 7.5 14.7
UK 1033.9 3.1 8.6 3.1 9.1 14.3 20.3
Mean -7.0 3.0 -8.5 1.9 5.5 16.7
Notes: Own calculations based on Euromod input datasets reweighted
for 2010 and 2030 and labor demand and labor supply elasticities.
Hours refer to total hours worked per week. D=demographic change
only; DR=Retirement Age Reform. W indicates scenarios with wage
effect.
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Table 4.8: Employment in 2010 and 2030
Base D DW DRW
to fr to fr to fr
Millions % change
AT 3.6 -11.3 -3.7 -9.9 -0.5 4.8 17.7
BE 4.5 3.8 10.1 4.8 12.8 29.2 37.7
BG 3.9 -27.5 -8.6 -30.1 -10.9 -14.6 5.0
CY 0.4 1.7 15.7 5.0 19.6 27.8 44.5
CZ 4.7 -8.5 0.9 -3.8 7.4 12.7 24.7
DE 35.2 -20.2 -10.9 -18.0 -7.4 -3.0 13.3
DK 3.0 0.3 4.7 0.9 5.8 11.3 17.1
EE 0.7 -20.9 1.7 -21.7 1.1 -8.1 16.8
EL 4.7 -8.9 -2.5 -6.8 0.8 11.5 18.1
ES 21.5 -6.3 9.5 -5.4 11.7 18.2 36.6
FI 2.7 -4.5 -0.6 -4.7 0.0 9.2 14.3
FR 27.5 -1.3 2.9 -1.8 3.1 22.5 28.8
HU 4.5 -9.1 -6.3 -12.9 -9.0 2.1 6.6
IE 2.1 1.8 18.8 0.8 17.7 18.1 35.9
IT 26.8 0.2 9.4 -2.5 7.7 20.5 30.7
LT 1.7 -17.7 -7.9 -19.0 -8.4 -0.6 11.0
LU 0.2 15.2 21.6 20.3 28.7 48.7 57.6
LV 1.2 -22.1 -6.9 -23.5 -7.7 -12.6 4.4
MT 0.2 -13.8 0.1 -13.8 1.9 -5.9 9.4
NL 7.8 -5.0 0.2 -4.5 1.9 8.4 16.1
PL 16.2 -10.6 -2.4 -8.9 -0.1 5.1 14.9
PT 4.9 -6.0 -0.3 -5.6 -0.6 12.9 19.7
RO 8.5 -22.1 0.3 -19.7 3.0 -0.4 25.8
SE 5.3 6.8 13.2 3.7 10.9 13.0 20.1
SI 0.9 -9.7 -1.1 -9.5 -0.3 7.6 18.2
SK 2.7 -7.5 -0.7 -8.3 1.7 8.7 16.2
UK 28.7 3.5 8.9 4.5 10.6 22.3 28.8
Mean -7.4 2.5 -7.0 3.8 10.0 21.9
Notes: Employment is defined by working a positive amount
of hours. Own calculations based on Euromod input datasets
reweighted for 2010 and 2030 and labor demand and labor supply
elasticities. Notes: Hours refer to total hours worked per week.
D=demographic change only; DR=Retirement Age Reform. W in-
dicates scenarios with wage effect.
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Table 4.9: Tax revenues in 2010 and 2030
Base D DW DRW
to fr to fr to fr
bn. eper
year
% change
AT 21.6 11.6 26.1 30.7 53.6 -3.0 23.8
BE 37.0 15.3 24.6 26.0 40.9 -3.0 9.3
BG 1.2 -24.1 -0.9 -23.0 0.7 -21.8 2.7
CY 1.0 28.3 47.0 39.9 81.8 30.8 76.1
CZ 4.4 -3.7 11.1 5.8 34.8 -17.7 4.3
DE 221.0 -16.3 -2.4 8.4 12.4 -20.6 -15.4
DK 45.7 6.8 13.4 16.0 37.5 2.6 17.2
EE 1.0 -18.9 8.4 -9.7 14.7 -20.8 3.6
EL 11.8 18.0 32.6 19.2 31.4 9.8 22.6
ES 65.0 23.5 44.8 31.2 57.6 1.7 21.9
FI 29.6 11.9 20.0 25.7 46.2 8.2 24.0
FR 129.0 21.5 29.8 28.9 46.3 6.9 19.6
HU 3.7 -3.8 8.2 -13.7 -2.9 -25.2 -17.0
IE 10.9 29.2 45.7 40.6 45.2 17.8 24.1
IT 218.2 25.0 38.8 30.7 45.9 23.4 35.3
LT 1.5 -12.3 1.2 -6.4 7.6 -20.1 -6.6
LU 2.2 32.1 45.6 41.9 64.1 15.8 32.1
LV 2.1 -19.4 1.7 -20.2 2.4 -23.8 -0.2
MT 0.2 2.0 25.4 -11.9 20.3 -16.4 9.4
NL 58.9 9.9 18.1 31.7 48.5 12.4 25.0
PL 28.4 8.4 22.4 8.1 26.9 2.7 20.6
PT 10.1 33.5 45.8 21.3 38.0 -16.5 -4.4
RO 6.2 -5.8 23.5 -4.0 11.2 -16.2 -0.1
SE 47.0 15.9 24.7 24.3 53.8 17.3 40.5
SI 2.3 5.2 19.6 42.6 39.9 23.5 24.4
SK 1.2 -1.0 12.0 2.4 33.7 -21.2 7.0
UK 243.4 13.5 20.7 20.5 29.0 14.9 21.8
Notes: Own calculations based on Euromod input datasets
reweighted for 2010 and 2030 and labor demand and labor
supply elasticities. Taxes include taxes on personal income,
capital income and property. D=demographic change only;
DR=Retirement Age Reform. W indicates scenarios with wage
effect.
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Table 4.10: SSC revenues in 2010 and 2030
Base D DW DRW
to fr to fr to fr
bn. eper
year
% change
AT 42.9 -5.1 6.2 4.4 16.2 4.3 18.6
BE 47.2 7.1 15.0 16.0 28.2 4.8 15.3
BG 3.6 -26.3 -3.2 -24.2 -1.3 -21.4 3.2
CY 1.5 5.4 21.4 12.1 26.1 19.9 41.3
CZ 20.6 -6.6 5.9 -1.4 17.9 -5.7 11.1
DE 357.7 -19.6 -8.1 -10.0 -0.1 -9.7 -0.5
DK 11.3 2.6 7.9 9.1 23.9 1.4 12.2
EE 2.3 -20.0 6.5 -12.4 12.0 -18.9 5.9
EL 23.9 -2.1 7.0 -0.2 7.7 13.3 23.2
ES 140.0 -2.4 16.4 4.7 25.1 2.9 22.7
FI 25.5 -1.6 4.2 9.1 23.9 1.6 13.4
FR 357.2 4.2 10.2 12.2 24.6 8.3 18.4
HU 9.2 -8.0 0.8 -13.1 -3.7 -12.4 -4.0
IE 14.1 10.6 27.6 18.2 26.9 3.9 13.0
IT 239.0 3.2 14.9 8.9 22.4 18.5 30.7
LT 4.4 -13.6 -1.0 -9.0 4.2 -16.8 -3.6
LU 3.1 20.6 31.3 29.1 45.1 28.3 40.5
LV 3.1 -22.1 -1.4 -23.0 -0.8 -25.1 -1.9
MT 0.4 -9.2 7.3 -11.6 3.6 -5.0 11.4
NL 99.1 2.9 10.0 7.8 14.8 5.8 12.9
PL 41.6 -4.9 7.6 -4.0 12.3 -0.5 16.1
PT 21.5 5.6 14.9 4.3 17.2 -5.7 6.5
RO 9.6 -15.1 14.1 -13.3 1.4 -17.1 -0.0
SE 54.8 10.4 17.7 15.6 30.5 15.8 28.6
SI 6.2 -2.6 9.7 18.2 23.4 14.2 21.5
SK 8.9 -8.2 1.5 -7.2 7.9 -10.0 4.2
UK 151.3 5.7 12.6 16.6 23.9 8.0 13.9
Notes: Own calculations based on Euromod input datasets
reweighted for 2010 and 2030 and labor demand and labor
supply elasticities. Social security contributions from employ-
ees, employers, self-employed and pensioners are captured.
D=demographic change only; DR=Retirement Age Reform. W in-
dicates scenarios with wage effect.
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Table 4.11: Benefit payments in 2010 and 2030
Base D DW DRW
to fr to fr to fr
bn. eper
year
% change
AT 40.1 29.5 43.1 29.4 42.9 12.3 25.0
BE 33.1 41.9 54.7 41.8 54.7 -3.3 7.6
BG 3.3 0.5 20.1 0.6 20.3 -29.3 -14.6
CY 1.8 42.7 57.1 42.3 56.7 -10.0 0.6
CZ 13.9 13.5 26.5 13.4 26.5 -9.8 2.0
DE 370.1 8.3 20.2 8.7 20.5 -10.9 -0.3
DK 30.5 11.5 21.0 11.1 20.5 -8.0 -0.4
EE 1.0 2.7 20.8 2.8 21.0 -19.2 -4.6
EL 20.3 29.5 44.6 29.2 44.3 -4.3 8.9
ES 70.2 49.8 67.3 49.3 66.7 -1.3 10.8
FI 23.7 33.2 44.5 33.0 44.0 7.5 17.0
FR 263.0 35.3 45.8 34.9 45.7 1.7 10.1
HU 9.1 10.8 20.5 11.2 20.7 -2.6 6.8
IE 17.7 13.8 27.0 13.9 27.2 2.0 14.3
IT 200.6 41.7 56.6 41.4 56.1 5.7 17.6
LT 2.3 2.4 14.8 2.7 15.4 -20.2 -10.1
LU 3.0 43.7 55.9 42.4 54.2 9.7 19.4
LV 1.2 -3.2 14.7 -2.8 14.7 -19.6 -4.0
MT 0.6 19.6 35.8 19.4 35.7 12.5 27.0
NL 47.1 23.9 34.2 22.7 33.0 13.0 21.6
PL 38.1 24.8 38.2 24.6 37.8 5.0 16.1
PT 18.2 36.8 51.2 36.3 50.2 -11.1 -1.0
RO 11.6 21.1 39.6 20.8 39.2 -0.5 14.9
SE 35.4 24.0 36.0 23.9 36.0 -2.3 7.2
SI 4.1 35.6 49.1 34.4 47.8 4.7 15.8
SK 5.0 25.3 37.2 25.5 37.8 -4.2 10.0
UK 175.7 16.2 23.9 13.6 20.8 0.9 7.4
Notes: Own calculations based on Euromod input datasets
reweighted for 2010 and 2030 and labor demand and labor sup-
ply elasticities. Benefits includes pensions (old-age, widower,
orphan, disability pensions) and other social transfers includ-
ing benefits for children, housing, education, unemployment,
maternity as well as tax credits. D=demographic change only;
DR=Retirement Age Reform. W indicates scenarios with wage
effect.
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Table 4.12: Other public expenditures in 2010 and 2030
Base 2030
tough friendly
bn. eper year % change
AT 35.6 2.0 13.0
BE 43.7 11.9 20.6
BG 3.3 -18.2 0.7
CY 1.9 15.1 27.5
CZ 14.3 4.0 15.3
DE 290.2 -7.3 4.2
DK 35.7 6.1 13.2
EE 1.4 -9.0 11.1
EL 21.0 0.9 11.2
ES 114.8 5.2 21.2
FI 22.4 10.4 17.4
FR 267.7 9.0 14.8
HU 8.2 -8.9 -0.7
IE 19.4 18.0 28.8
IT 175.0 2.3 15.5
LT 2.8 -11.5 -1.8
LU 3.8 23.8 33.7
LV 1.9 -20.1 -2.4
MT 0.7 -5.6 9.1
NL 90.6 9.9 18.3
PL 27.9 -6.7 3.7
PT 19.3 -6.5 5.7
RO 12.2 -13.0 4.8
SE 46.1 17.2 26.1
SI 3.9 8.0 19.4
SK 5.9 2.7 12.4
UK 221.5 14.6 21.1
Notes: Imputed values based on per capita expenditures by country
and age group from Eurostat (2013). Expenditures include health
care, old-age care, child care and education. Expenditures are as-
sumed irresponsive to changes in wages or employment and are
hence fix across all scenarios. In lack of country values for RO,
BG, CY, MT, LV and LT, the age-specific amount is imputed by the
age-specific mean from the other countries in the respective country
group.
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Table 4.13: Changes in normalized budgets between 2010 and 2030
D DW DRW
to fr to fr to fr
AT -9.82% -10.96% -3.17% -2.65% -3.57% -1.24%
BE -7.29% -7.94% -1.37% 1.01% -2.15% -0.63%
BG -3.92% -4.92% -3.43% -4.44% 3.25% 3.67%
CY -6.30% -6.98% -4.32% -3.25% 4.38% 7.35%
CZ -6.93% -7.25% -4.29% -1.09% -2.05% 0.01%
DE -10.06% -10.55% -2.46% -5.32% -1.61% -4.09%
DK -2.03% -3.61% 2.47% 7.84% 1.42% 4.11%
EE -8.38% -1.94% -4.32% 0.94% -5.05% 0.90%
EL -4.89% -6.32% -4.20% -6.23% 5.39% 4.38%
ES -6.40% -4.31% -3.04% 0.33% 0.03% 3.13%
FI -7.93% -8.36% -0.23% 6.07% -1.41% 2.91%
FR -8.87% -10.18% -4.18% -1.45% 1.20% 2.96%
HU -4.21% -5.26% -7.47% -8.41% -4.19% -5.81%
IE -1.83% -2.19% 1.54% -2.48% -1.97% -5.34%
IT -3.17% -2.55% 0.14% 1.76% 9.95% 10.97%
LT -4.34% -2.69% -1.90% -0.06% -2.14% 0.23%
LU -6.61% -7.53% -2.77% -0.91% 0.18% 0.64%
LV -7.65% -1.47% -8.20% -1.13% -7.62% 0.33%
MT -4.40% -7.89% -5.66% -8.76% -3.36% -6.30%
NL -4.45% -4.64% 2.58% 4.30% -0.78% 0.31%
PL -4.74% -3.98% -4.49% -1.75% 0.35% 3.49%
PT -1.10% -3.29% -2.92% -3.43% 0.48% 0.05%
RO -7.49% -6.60% -6.58% -12.02% -2.82% -6.48%
SE -2.18% -2.32% 2.38% 11.54% 6.48% 13.43%
SI -10.63% -10.11% 2.17% -2.12% 5.31% 2.82%
SK -9.57% -10.27% -9.04% -6.77% -4.79% -3.48%
UK -1.99% -1.99% 1.94% 2.43% 1.50% 1.48%
Mean -5.82% -5.78% -2.62% -1.34% -0.13% 1.10%
Notes: Balance change to 2010 according to Equation 4.2. Own
calculations based on Euromod input datasets reweighted for
2010 and 2030 and labor demand and labor supply elasticities.
D=demographic change only; DR=Retirement Age Reform; 2. W
indicates scenarios with wage effect.
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5Productivity Effects of Air Pollution:Evidence from Professional Football∗
5.1 Introduction
Air pollution is considered an important environmental risk factor for human health.
The European Environment Agency reports that exposure to air pollution causes more
than 550,000 premature deaths per year in Europe alone (EEA, 2016). Against this back-
drop, a vast body of empirical literature has beendevoted to quantitatively assessing the
health impacts of exposure to various air pollutants to comprehensively trade off social
benefits from limiting hazardous emissions against negative impacts such as reduced
industrial activity and employment.1 While existing studies have typically focused on
infant health and mortality2, the costs of ambient air pollution are not limited to spe-
cific parts of the population: high concentrations of air pollution have been found to
increase premature death among the elderly as well as hospitalization rates among the
working-age population (Deschênes et al., 2012; Schlenker and W. R. Walker, 2016).
In addition to causing damage to individual health, exposure to ambient air pol-
lution may also trigger further costs for societies by lowering individual labor market
performance and consequently hindering economic growth. Recent studies show that
poor air quality reduces workers’ labor supply (Hanna and Oliva, 2015) as well as the
short-run performance of low-skilled agricultural and factory workers (Chang et al.,
2016; Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2012; He et al., 2016).
This chapter contributes to this strand of the literature by analyzing the effect of
ambient air pollution on the physical performance of young adults who are positively
selected with respect to their general physiological condition, namely professional ath-
∗ A previous version of this chapter, co-authored with Andreas Lichter and Nico Pestel, is also pub-
lished as: A. Lichter et al. (2015b). Productivity Effects of Air Pollution: Evidence from Professional
Soccer. IZA Discussion Paper No. 8964.
1 See Graff Zivin and Neidell (2013) for an overview. In addition, there is a large epidemiological
literature on various other aspects of air pollution (see, e.g., Pope III, 2000; Pope III and Dockery, 2006).
2 For studies on infant mortality, see Chay and Greenstone (2003), Luechinger (2014) and Tanaka
(2015). Effects of air pollution on infants’ general health are studied by Currie and Neidell (2005), Currie
et al. (2009), Lleras-Muney (2010), Currie and R. Walker (2011), Coneus and Spiess (2012) and Janke
(2014). Ebenstein et al. (2016) and Isen et al. (2016) show that exposure to air pollution in early life may
also affect long-term educational attainment and earnings.
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letes.3 For this purpose, we make use of panel data on the universe of players and
teams in Germany’s top professional football league (Bundesliga) over the period from
1999 to 2011. The setting of our analysis offers a useful “laboratory” to study the causal
relationship between air pollution and individual performance (see Kahn, 2000, for an
assessment of the sports business for labormarket research). First, we are able to exploit
rich data on individual performance, which ismeasured in a consistent and comparable
way in 2,956matches at 32 different stadiums throughout the country on aweekly basis
over a twelve-year period. Such a comprehensive coverage is unavailable formost other
occupations. For eachmatch, we combine information on individual performance with
hourly data on the concentration of particulate matter (PM10) and ozone (O3) in spatial
proximity to the stadium at the time of kick-off. Both air pollutants negatively affect
the respiratory system of the human body. We measure players’ performance by the
total number of passes per match, which is strongly related to physical performance
and holds relevance for a team’s success. Second, due to match scheduling rules that
are beyond the control of teams and players, individual exposure to ambient air pol-
lution can be considered as exogenous. Hence, our approach overcomes endogeneity
concerns arising from residential sorting and avoidance behavior.
Overall, our analysis shows significant negative effects of ambient air pollution on
players’ performance. Using within-player variation and controlling for weather con-
ditions on the matchday as well as a variety of player, team and match variables we
find that a one percent increase in the concentration of particulate matter leads to a
0.02% reduction in the number of total passes played. While this linear effect is small
in magnitude, allowing for a non-linear dose-response relationship reveals substantial
negative effects: performance significantly decreases if the concentration of particulate
matter exceeds the European Union (EU) regulatory threshold. For particulate pollu-
tion levels above 50 micrograms per cubic meter, the elasticity is around −0.15. How-
ever, negative effects of pollution are found well below the current limit set by the EU,
starting at around 15 micrograms per cubic meter. By contrast, we do not find a statisti-
cally significant effect of ozone concentration on players’ performance once controlling
for weather characteristics and the time of kick-off. We show that this is most likely due
to limited variation in ozone pollution in our estimation sample, given that Bundesliga
matches are generally not held during the summer months when ozone concentrations
peak due to intense solar radiation and high temperatures.
3 Professional sports data have been frequently used to analyze economic questions. For example,
Parsons et al. (2011) study behavioral implications of racial/ethnic discrimination using umpire decisions
in professional baseball. Brown (2011) shows howworkers’ effort in competitions depends on the relative
ability among competitors by exploiting the presence of a superstar in professional golf tournaments.
Kleven et al. (2013) exploit cross-country differences in labor market regulation and income taxation
to analyze the effect of top tax rates on international migration decisions of football players in Europe.
Using data on professional golf players, Rosenqvist and Skans (2015) investigate how past success can
boost future performance.
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Our analysis further points to considerable heterogeneity across individuals. We
find that negative effects of particulate matter on short-run performance increase with
age and are largest for players aged above 30. Moreover, the performance of midfield-
ers and defenders is particularly affected by pollution because these players are more
attached to the game by exerting a larger number of passes. Our analysis further sug-
gests that particulate pollution causes marginal reductions in individual pass accuracy
and style of play, with athletes substituting short with long passes at high levels of pol-
lution. Finally, we show that aggregate team- and match-level regressions offer similar
results, suggesting that interaction effects between pollution, individual performance
and the player’s team-mates’ or opponents’ physical capacity are either small or cancel
out.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the in-
stitutional background and the data. Section 5.3 introduces the empirical strategy. The
results are presented in Section 5.4 before Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Background and Data
Professional football in Germany. In our analysis, we exploit rich data on athletes’
performance in matches of the Bundesliga, Germany’s top professional league of men’s
football. Every season, eighteen teams face each other at home and away (see Figure 5.1
for the geographic spread of teams across Germany). Therefore, a season comprises
34 matchdays and 306 matches, which are typically held on weekends between late-
August and May.4 At the beginning of every season, the German Football League de-
termines the match schedule for the entire season and specifies the weekend on which
a specific matchday takes place as well as which teams face each other at which sta-
dium. The exact day and time of each match is determined several weeks in advance
and is subject to a set of factors, such as international football competitions, television
agreements or security considerations.5 Importantly, match schedules are thus beyond
any control of teams and players.
Performance of football players. Information on players’ performance is provided by
deltatre, a commercial enterprise collecting data on professional sports and serving as
an external service provider to the media and sports clubs. The dataset comprises in-
formation on all Bundesligamatches for every season from 1999/2000 to 2010/2011 and
contains detailed information for each match (location, date and kick-off time, home
4 The season pauses for a winter break, generally lasting from late-December until late-January. Af-
ter each season, the worst three teams are relegated, while three teams are promoted from the second
division (2. Bundesliga).
5 For example, rivaling teams from the same city or neighboring areas do not play matches at home
on the same day.
109
Chapter 5 Productivity Effects of Air Pollution
Figure 5.1: Geographic distribution of stadiums across Germany
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Note: Location of Bundesliga stadiums across Germany. The number of stadiums in each city is indicated in brack-
ets. The Rhine-Ruhr Area comprises (from west to east) the stadiums in Mönchengladbach (2), Düsseldorf, Duisburg,
Gelsenkirchen, Bochum and Dortmund.
and away teams) and each player who was on the pitch at any point during the match.6
For every player, we observe the number of minutes played (up to the full duration of
90 minutes), the team played for, the position played (defender, midfielder or striker)
as well as various measures of performance. We exclude goalkeepers from our analysis
as they constitute a very different style of play.
We use players’ total number of ball passes during a match as our main measure of
interest, a widely used statistic for assessing football players’ individual performance.
Although teams might generally be successful by pursuing a rather defensive style
of play and thus passing the ball less often than their opponent, research shows that
the number of passes represents an essential element of team success. For example,
Redwood-Brown (2008) shows that a team’s number of completed passes significantly
increases in the five minutes before scoring. Moreover, focusing on the major Euro-
pean football leagues (including the Bundesliga), Collet (2013) documents a strong pos-
itive relationship between the number of passes and various measures of team success,
such as the number of goals or points per season. Players’ running distance might
serve as another interesting measure of performance. Unfortunately, information on
running distance was not collected prior to the 2010/2011 season, which precludes us
from analyzing this measure. However, using publicly available data for the seasons
from 2013/2014 to 2015/2016, we show in Appendix Figure 5.5 that the relationship
6 Even if matches end in a draw after 90 minutes, there is no single elimination element or over-
time/penalty shootout in the Bundesliga.
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between players’ running distance and the number of passes per match appears to be
strongly positive.7
Air Pollution and Weather. We combine the data on football players’ performance
with detailed information from the air pollution monitor system of the German Fed-
eral Environment Agency (Umweltbundesamt). For each match, we extract all available
hourly monitor readings for the concentration of particulates with a diameter smaller
than ten micrometers (PM10) and ozone (O3) in ambient air within a radius of ten
kilometers (about 6.2 miles) around the stadium at the hour of kick-off and compute
inverse-distance weighted means for both pollutants. Matches without pollution read-
ings within this radius are dropped from the sample (716 out of 3,672).8
We expect that both pollutants — particulate matter and ozone — negatively affect
the physical performance of football players. A high concentration of particulatematter
in ambient air is particularly harmful to humans’ health as it enters deep into the lungs
and affects the pulmonary and cardiovascular functioning.9 While particulate pollu-
tion may have natural sources (e.g. wildfires, sandstorms or volcano eruptions), there
are variousman-made emission sources such as automobile exhaust, electricity genera-
tion or any other industrial activity involving combustion processes. By contrast, ozone
is not directly emitted to ambient air but emerges from complex chemical interactions
between specific precursors (nitrogen oxides or volatile organic chemicals) under con-
ditions of substantial solar radiation and high temperatures. Ozone has been shown to
impede the respiratory system of the human body by irritating lung airways.10
Sinceweather conditions are important environmental confounders of air pollution,
we further supplement our dataset with a rich set of weather controls. The data are pro-
vided by the German Meteorological Service (Deutscher Wetterdienst) and contain daily
information on temperature, precipitation, humidity, air pressure and wind speed. As
before, we derive inverse-distanceweightedmeans frommonitor readings in proximity
to each stadium (40 kilometers or 24.9 miles) on each matchday.
7 The underlying data were obtained from the German football magazine Kicker, see www.kicker.de.
8 The results of our analysis are robust to relying on monitor readings from the closest station within
a ten kilometer radius only.
9 The sports medicine literature provides evidence of a negative relationship between ambient air
pollution and performance through particulate matter inhalation (see Rundell, 2012, for an overview).
10 Alternatively, one could also study the effect of other air pollutants such as sulfur dioxide (SO2) or
nitrogen dioxide (NO2). However, particulate matter acts as a suitable proxy for air pollution in general
given that it is positively correlated with all other main air pollutants except for ozone (Ziebarth et al.,
2013). Rather than studying the effect of PM10, one could also analyze effects of fine particulate mat-
ter (PM2.5), given that smaller particulates can penetrate deeper into the human body and thus are even
more harmful than PM10. Unfortunately, the concentration of PM2.5 has been onlymonitored since 2008
in Germany, which substantially limits both the sample size (by around 83%) and variation in air pollu-
tion. Nevertheless, we find a negative — albeit insignificant — effect of PM2.5 on player performance.
Regression results are available upon request.
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Descriptive Statistics. Ourfinal dataset covers twelve seasons (1999/2000—2010/2011)
and comprises 1,771 professional athletes playing for 29 different teams in 2,956matches
in 32 stadiums across Germany, totaling to 75,163 player-match observations. On aver-
age, we observe 42 matches per player. Table 5.1 provides descriptive statistics at the
player and match level. Panel A summarizes players’ characteristics and measures of
performance. On average, a player passes the ball about 26 times per match (34 times
conditional on playing for the full match) at an average accuracy of 77%, with more
than 90% of these passes being short ones (less than 30 meters). On average, profes-
sional athletes in the Bundesliga are aged 27, play 71 minutes per match and cover the
full duration (90 minutes) in 58% of games played.
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics on player- and match-level variables
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Median Minimum Maximum Obs.
Panel A: Player-level data
Player performance
Total passes 26.3 16.48 25 0 138 75,163
Total passes (full-time players) 34.2 14.47 32 1 138 43,346
Log of total passes 2.92 1.11 3.22 -2.3 4.93 75,163
Short passes 23.95 15.06 23 0 123 75163
Pass accuracy (completed over total) .77 .15 .79 0 1 73,832
Pass ratio (long over short) .1 .15 .06 0 6 73,718
Player characteristics
Age (years) 26.81 3.93 26.71 16.92 39.55 75,163
Tenure (matches for team) 51.22 52.08 34 1 390 75,163
Played full-time (0/1) .58 .49 1 0 1 75,163
Minutes played 70.6 28.97 90 1 90 75,163
Home match (0/1) .5 .5 1 0 1 75,163
Panel B: Match-level data
Pollution variables
PM10 (µg/m3) 23.76 16.22 20.05 .53 158.28 2,956
Ozone (µg/m3) 55.06 34.27 53.21 .13 248 2,956
Ln(PM10) 2.96 .68 3 -.64 5.06 2,956
Ln(Ozone) 3.69 1.01 3.97 -2 5.51 2,956
Weather variables
Maximum temperature (◦C) 12.59 7.6 12.35 -12.15 36.06 2,956
Precipitation (mm/m2) 1.97 3.81 .2 0 34.03 2,956
Dewpoint (◦C) 4.47 5.69 4.56 -17.06 18.79 2,956
Air pressure (hpa) 992.99 22.74 998.73 924.84 1044.7 2,956
Wind speed (m/sec) 3.61 1.84 3.2 .8 16.6 2,956
Match characteristics
Stadium attendance (in 1,000s) 38.34 17.18 36.09 6 83 2,956
Matchday: Tuesday (0/1) .02 .15 0 0 1 2,956
Matchday: Wednesday (0/1) .03 .17 0 0 1 2,956
Matchday: Thursday (0/1) 0.01 .04 0 0 1 2,956
Matchday: Friday (0/1) .05 .23 0 0 1 2,956
Matchday: Saturday (0/1) .69 .46 1 0 1 2,956
Matchday: Sunday (0/1) .2 .4 0 0 1 2,956
Kick-off: 3pm (0/1) .69 .46 1 0 1 2,956
Kick-off: 5pm (0/1) .18 .38 0 0 1 2,956
Kick-off: 6pm (0/1) .02 .15 0 0 1 2,956
Kick-off: 7pm (0/1) 0 .03 0 0 1 2,956
Kick-off: 8pm (0/1) .11 .31 0 0 1 2,956
Note: This table provides descriptive statistics on our estimation sample. Information on players’ performance and match
characteristics was provided by deltratre. Data on pollution levels and weather conditions was obtained from the German
Federal Environment Agency (Umweltbundesamt) and the GermanMeteorological Service (Deutscher Wetterdienst), respectively.
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Figure 5.2: Variation of particulate matter across matches
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Note: Boxplots of the concentration of particulate matter (PM10) at the hour of match kick-off by seasons (panel (a)), calendar
months (panel (b)) and across different stadiums (panel (c)). Monitor readings from July (N=4) are merged with August. There
are no matches scheduled in June. Stadiums with less than ten match observations are excluded from this graph. The horizontal
line indicates the EU regulatory threshold of 50 µg/m3. Dots indicate matches where very high levels of PM10 concentration
have been observed.
Panel B of Table 5.1 shows summary statistics for our two pollution variables of
interest as well as the set of weather and match controls. The mean concentration of
particulate matter at the time of kick-off is 23.8 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m3)
but substantially varies from 0.5 to 158 µg/m3. The mean concentration of ozone is 55
µg/m3 in our sample, varying from 0.1 to 248 µg/m3 at the hour of kick-off. The table
further reveals that matches usually take place at moderate weather conditions on a
weekend afternoon.
In order to better understand the observed variation in pollution levels, we present
additional information on differences in the emergence of the two pollutants by season,
calendarmonth and location. In Figure 5.2, panel (a) reveals that there is no remarkable
time trend of PM10 concentration across seasons: at most, there is a slight reduction
in average PM10 levels after 2005 when the EU regulation became binding. Panel (b)
further shows a weak seasonal pattern in PM10, with pollution levels being slightly
higher during winter months. Finally, panel (c) ranks stadiums with respect to the
median level of PM10 concentration, reflecting patterns of population size and density
as well as the degree of industrialization in proximity to the stadiums to some extent.
The EU regulation threshold of 50 µg/m3 – indicated by the horizontal line – is exceeded
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Figure 5.3: Variation of ozone across matches
0
50
100
150
200
250
O
zo
ne
 (µ
g/
m
3 )
19
99
/0
0
20
00
/0
1
20
01
/0
2
20
02
/0
3
20
03
/0
4
20
04
/0
5
20
05
/0
6
20
06
/0
7
20
07
/0
8
20
08
/0
9
20
09
/1
0
20
10
/1
1
(a) by season
0
50
100
150
200
250
Ju
l/A
ug
S
ep O
ct
N
ov
D
ec Ja
n
Fe
b
M
ar
A
pr
M
ay
(b) by calender month
0
50
100
150
200
250
U
nt
er
h.
H
am
. M
.
B
oc
h.
N
ür
nb
.
Fr
an
kf
.
Le
ve
rk
.
R
os
t.
B
er
lin
D
ui
sb
.
G
el
se
n.
M
G
 P
a.
K
öl
n
B
re
m
en
B
ie
le
.
K
'la
ut
.
M
 O
ly
m
.
W
ol
f. 
E
.
H
am
. V
.
D
or
tm
.
M
ai
nz
M
 A
ll.
H
an
n.
A
ac
he
n
S
tu
ttg
.
W
ol
f. 
A
.
K
ar
ls
r.
C
ot
tb
.
M
G
 B
o.
Fr
ei
b.
(c) by stadium
Note: Boxplots of the concentration of ozone (O3) at the hour of match kick-off by seasons (panel (a)), calendar months (panel (b))
and across different stadiums (panel (c)). Monitor readings from July (N=4) are merged with August. There are no matches
scheduled in June. Stadiums with less than ten match observations are excluded from this graph. The horizontal lines indicate
the EU target, information and alert values at 120, 180 and 240 µg/m3. Dots indicate matches where very high levels of O3
concentration have been observed.
in around 7% of the observed matches.11 Note that the EU threshold value is exceeded
in all seasons, calendar months and stadium locations at least once.
Analogously, we plot differences in the level of ozone in Figure 5.3. As for PM10,
panel (a) provides no evidence of a strong time trend across seasons. By contrast, panel
(b) displays a very strong seasonal pattern. High levels of ozone are only observed for
thosematches scheduled in summermonths, which reflects the fact that ozone emerges
under heat and sunlight. The EU target value of 120 µg/m3 – the bottom horizontal line
– is exceeded in 4% of the matches covered, virtually all of them taking place between
April and September. The EU information and alert thresholds at 180 and 240 µg/m3
– indicated by the upper two horizontal lines – are only exceeded in a tiny number of
matches (0.02% and 0.003%, respectively).
11 In EUmember states, air pollution is regulated by the “Directive 2008/50/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe”. Since 1 January 2005, the
daily mean concentration of PM10 may not exceed the limit value of 50 µg/m3 on more than 35 days per
calendar year. The annual mean may not exceed 40 µg/m3 (Annex XI).
115
Chapter 5 Productivity Effects of Air Pollution
5.3 Empirical Strategy
Researchers face several empirical challenges when estimating the causal effect of air
pollution on short-run performance (see Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2013). Residential
sorting of healthier and more productive individuals into areas with lower levels of
pollution may bias cross-sectional estimates of the performance-pollution relationship.
Moreover, workers may opt to reduce their labor supply at short notice when being
subject to high concentrations of air pollutants on a given day. The present setting pro-
vides a suitable framework to overcome these challenges as match scheduling rules are
beyond the control of both players and teams, exposing these athletes to varying levels
of pollution for exogenous reasons.12 Moreover, avoidance behavior is virtually impos-
sible in our context, given that there is no option to reschedule matches and players
cannot evade air pollution on the field even in case of awareness.
Our empirical strategy exploits this exogenous variation in players’ exposure to pol-
lution. The underlying empirical model reads as follows:
Passesimt = β1PM10m +β2Ozonem +X ′imtγ+W ′mδ+M ′mµ+Ctm +Tts +αi + εimt, (5.1)
where the number of passes of player i in match m for team t (Passesimt) is regressed
on the concentration of particulate matter and ozone at the hour of kick-off (PM10m
and Ozonem). In our main specification, both the dependent variable as well as the two
pollution variables enter our model in logarithmic form. This allows us to interpret the
coefficients of interest (β1 and β2) as elasticities.13
We control for individual player characteristics (X ′imt) such as age (age squared),
overall tenure (tenure squared), minutes played (minutes squared) and indicators for
the position played in a particular match (defender, midfielder or striker).14 Moreover,
we include a dummy variable indicating a team’s home stadium advantage. Given that
weather conditions are important confounders for air pollution and may also have a
direct effect on individual performance (Adhvaryu et al., 2014; Graff Zivin and Neidell,
2013), we further include controls for the maximum temperature, total precipitation,
humidity, air pressure and wind speed at a daily level in spatial proximity to the sta-
12 Note that even in the very unlikely case of athletes self-selecting into teams in low-pollution loca-
tions, only half of a season’s matches are held at the home stadium, while away matches take place at
stadiums across Germany (see Figure 5.1).
13 We assign zero passes a log value of zero and account for the difference between one and zero
passes by means of a corresponding dummy variable. When dropping all observations with zero passes
from our sample (N=1,331; 1.8% of the sample), the results remain unaffected. In columns (1)–(4) of
Appendix Table 5.6, we show that our results are robust to using log-level and level-level specifications
of the pollution-performance relationship instead.
14 Minutes playedmay be affected by the level of pollution in caseswhere coaches selectively substitute
at an earlier stage of the game. If this were true, the variable would be a “bad control”. However, the
estimates in columns (1) to (4) of Table 5.7 show that there is no effect of pollution on the minutes played
or the probability of playing the full duration in a given match. Note that our results are robust when
including higher order polynomials of the minutes played in the regressions.
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dium for a given match (W ′m). In our baseline specifications, all weather controls are
standardized and enter themodel in linear and quadratic form.15 Moreover, match con-
trolsM ′m account for features of the particular match. We further include indicators for
the day of the week and the time at kick-off and also control for stadium attendance (in
1,000s).16 In addition, we add fixed effects for the coach of team t in match m (Ctm) as
well as team-by-season fixed effects (Tts) to capture all factors that are specific to a team
within a season s, such as the squad’s composition, style of play or the club’s budget.
Finally, we add player fixed effects to control for unobserved time-invariant differences
across players (αi). Identification of our model thus relies on exogenous variation in
players’ exposure to pollution at different locations over time. Accordingly, standard
errors are clustered at the match level.
5.4 Results
We begin our analysis by examining the baseline linear effect of exposure to air pol-
lution on player performance. Subsequently, we address the question concerning the
extent to which the relationship between pollution and passes is non-linear in nature,
before showing results on effect heterogeneity by player characteristics as well as for
additional outcomes.
Baseline estimates. In Table 5.2, we present the results for different specifications of
the model laid out in equation (5.1), subsequently including the different sets of con-
trol variables.17 We present the results from our leanest specification in column (1),
controlling for player characteristics only. We find statistically significant negative – al-
beit economically small – effects of both PM10 and ozone on players’ performance. In
column (2), we add player fixed effects to our model and thus identify the effect of air
pollution on performance by using within-player variation only. Both coefficients of in-
terest remain statistically significant and of similar magnitudes, suggesting that there is
no systematic selection of players with respect to the degree of air pollution on match-
days. Next, we add the defined set of weather controls in column (3). While the effect
of PM10 becomes even more negative, the coefficient for ozone and its statistical signif-
icance slightly decline. This is not particularly surprising because high temperatures
act as a precondition for the emergence of ozone in ambient air. Hence, the inclusion of
temperature as a control variable substantially reduces the remaining variation of ozone
15 Appendix Table 5.8 shows that results for the baseline regression model are robust to different spec-
ifications of the set of weather controls.
16 Wedo not find any evidence that stadiumattendance is significantly affected by PM10 concentration.
Hence, we can rule out the notion that our results are driven by pollution-induced reductions in support
from the spectators.
17 For the sake of clarity, we abstain from reporting the coefficients of the control variables. Detailed
regression outputs are available upon request.
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Table 5.2: The effect of air pollution on performance: Baseline effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(PM10) -0.021∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Ln(Ozone) -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.004 -0.004 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Player controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Player FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weather controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Match controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Coach FE No No No No Yes Yes
Team × Season FE No No No No No Yes
Observations 75,163 75,163 75,163 75,163 75,163 75,163
Adjusted R-Squared 0.770 0.746 0.746 0.749 0.752 0.756
Note: Dependent variable: Log number of passes. Player controls: age (squared), tenure (squared), position (defender, mid-
fielder, striker), minutes played (squared), home match indicator. Weather controls on daily basis: maximum temperature
(squared), precipitation (squared), dew point (squared), wind speed (squared), air pressure (squared). Match controls: day of
week, kick-off time, stadium attendance and homematch indicator. Standard errors are clustered at the match level (N=2,956).
The usual significance levels apply: 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
conditional on weather conditions. However, when further controlling for match-level
characteristics (see column (4)), and in particular the time of kick-off, the effect of ozone
declines even more and becomes statistically insignificant. By contrast, the estimated
coefficient for PM10 remains almost unchangedwith the inclusion of this additional set
of controls. In columns (5) and (6), we subsequently add coach and team×season fixed
effects to our model. Point estimates are not affected by either set of controls. Overall,
the results from our preferred specification presented in column (6) indicate a statisti-
cally significant elasticity between the concentration of PM10 and the number of passes
of −0.021, implying that an increase in PM10 by 1% reduces the number of passes by
about 0.02%.18 Put differently, this estimate thus implies that a one-standard-deviation
increase in PM10 concentration (by roughly 16 µg/m3) reduces passing by around 1.6%
on average (see column (2) of Appendix Table 5.6). In turn, we find a small and negative
— albeit statistically insignificant — effect of ozone on player performance.
As previously indicated, the results suggest that the observed differences in the im-
pact of weather and match-level controls on the coefficients of PM10 and ozone reflect
the fact that variation in ozone concentration in our sample is rather limited, especially
when conditioning on temperature and the time of kick-off. This is mainly because al-
most no matches take place during June or July, when levels of ozone peak in Germany
due to long sunshine duration and high temperatures (see panel (b) of Figure 5.3). By
18 In Appendix Table 5.6, we present baseline estimates for the subsample of full-time players. The
results are virtually identical to the full sample. We also use passes per minute as an alternative outcome
measure. We find a statistically significant negative effect on passes per minute. In another, unreported
specification we additionally control for stadium × home field fixed effects. The results are hardly af-
fected by the inclusion of these additional control variables, with the point estimate being−0.017 (0.005).
However, as this specification limits the identifying variation in PM10 to home matches within one sea-
son, we abstain from controlling for these fixed effects in the remainder of this chapter.
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contrast, elevated levels of particulate pollution are observed throughout the year (see
panel (b) of Figure 5.2). For this reason, we will focus on the effect of PM10 in the re-
mainder of the chapter, while controlling for log ozone concentration at kickoff time in
all specifications.
Non-linear dose-response relationship. Wenext test for non-linear effects in the rela-
tionship of particulate matter and player performance. Moderate levels of PM10 might
not affect individual performance, while substantial negative effectsmay arise once pol-
lution levels exceed a given threshold. In order to investigate this relationship more ex-
plicitly, we first examine potential non-linear effects in a non-parametric way, running a
kernel-weighted local fourth-order polynomial regression ofmatch-level PM10 concen-
tration on players’ total passes without any further controls. The results of this regres-
sion are presented in Figure 5.4, which plots the predicted number of passes against the
level of pollution. At low levels of pollution (up to approximately 15 µg/m3, equivalent
to around the bottom third of the observed distribution of PM10 concentration), player
performance does not seem to be impeded. Beyond this value, we observe a moderate
negative effect of PM10 on the number of total passes. This negative effect becomes
significantly larger for PM10 levels above the EU’s daily limit value, which is set at 50
µg/m3.19
Based on this non-parametric evidence, we further test whether the observed non-
linear effect is confirmed in our regression framework. We allow for different marginal
effects below and above the threshold values that have been identified by the non-
parametric model visualized in Figure 5.4. As displayed in columns (1) and (2) of Ta-
ble 5.3, the results of our analysis first confirm that player performance is not impeded
at low levels of air pollution (PM10 ≤ 15 µg/m3), with the effects being small and not
significantly different from zero. By contrast, performance significantly decreases at
higher levels of PM10 concentration. In columns (3) and (4), we next allow for different
marginal effects below and above the EU threshold of 50 µg/m3. As indicated in Fig-
ure 5.4, we find effects of air pollution to be particularly pronounced at very high levels
of pollution. At PM10 levels above 50 µg/m3, our estimates imply that a 1% increase
in particulate pollution reduces the number of passes by around 0.15%. However, neg-
ative effects can be already observed at lower levels of PM10 concentration, implying
that the linear effect displayed in Table 5.2 is not entirely due to very high concentra-
tions of particulate matter. Finally, we allow for different marginal effects for the three
identified segments. The regression results displayed in columns (5) and (6) confirm
the overall pattern displayed in Figure 5.4. Negative effects of PM10 are already found
19 For the sake of clarity, we exclude information from the bottom and top 1% of the PM10 distribu-
tion in the polynomial regression underlying Figure 5.4. These observations are outliers with respect to
the overall distribution and would inflate the confidence intervals at the tails to a considerable extent.
However, note that we include these observations in all other regressions.
119
Chapter 5 Productivity Effects of Air Pollution
Figure 5.4: The effect of particulate matter on performance: Non-linear relationship
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Note: Non-linear relationship between PM10 concentration and players’ number of total ball passes. The line shows the result
from a kernel-weighted local fourth-order polynomial regression of players’ passes on the concentration of particulate matter in
ambient air absent any further controls. For the sake of clarity, the bottom and top percent of the PM10 distribution are discarded
from this particular analysis. Dots indicate the mean number of passes at a given level of PM10 concentration rounded to the next
integer value.
at moderate levels well below the current EU threshold of 50 µg/m3 but become much
stronger at very high levels of PM10 concentration.
Heterogeneity by player characteristics. We further investigatewhether the observed
effect of air pollution varies for different types of players. While professional football
players constitute a rather homogeneous group that is positively selected with respect
to their overall physical condition, we proxy general physiological status by age and test
whether (slightly) older athletes may be more sensitive to pollution than their younger
counterparts. When interacting the log of PM10 with the players’ age in columns (1)
and (2) of Table 5.4, we first find that the negative effect of PM10 increases with age.
The results displayed in columns (3) and (4) further show that the performance of the
youngest group of players (athletes aged below 21) is not affected by PM10, whereas all
other players are negatively affected. The estimated effect is strongest for players older
than 30 years, although differences are not statistically significant among the three older
age groups. Nevertheless, we take these results as suggestive evidence that older indi-
viduals appear more vulnerable to detrimental environmental conditions, even among
this group of professional athletes.
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Table 5.3: The effect of air pollution on performance: Non-linear effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(PM10)× (PM10 ≤ 15) 0.004 0.012 0.004 0.012
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
ln(PM10)× (PM10 > 15) -0.019∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008)
ln(PM10)× (PM10 ≤ 50) -0.017∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)
ln(PM10)× (15 < PM10 ≤ 50) -0.028∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012)
ln(PM10)× (PM10 > 50) -0.127∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗ -0.155∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Player controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weather/Ozone controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Match controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Coach FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Team × Season FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 75,163 75,163 75,163 75,163 75,163 75,163
Adjusted R-Squared 0.746 0.743 0.746 0.743 0.746 0.743
Note: Dependent variable: Log number of passes. All regressions include player fixed effects. Player controls: age (squared),
tenure (squared), position (defender, midfielder, striker), minutes played (squared), homematch indicator. Weather controls on
daily basis: maximum temperature (squared), precipitation (squared), dew point (squared), wind speed (squared), air pressure
(squared). Match controls: day of week, kick-off time, stadium attendance. Standard errors are clustered at the match level
(N=2,956). The usual significance levels apply: 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
We further account for differential effects of PM10 concentration by players’ posi-
tion, given that strikers, midfielders and defenders generally fulfill varying tasks dur-
ing a game andmay thus exert different levels of physical effort. This is partly reflected
in the number of passes played, ranging from an average of 15.7 passes per match for
strikers to 32.7 for defenders. However, our results in columns (5) and (6) of Table 5.4
show that PM10 affects the performance of all players irrespective of their position. At
most, we find that defenders and midfielders are slightly stronger affected than strik-
ers. While differences are not statistically significant, this finding is consistent with the
notion that defenders and midfielders exhibit more physically demanding tasks and
play a more active role in the game than strikers, and that pollution generally affects
the performance of workers with more strenuous tasks to a larger extent.
Effects on pass accuracy and the style of play. We next investigate whether high lev-
els of pollution affect players’ pass accuracy, i.e., the number of completed over total
passes, or style of play. Pass accuracy has been shown to serve as an important indi-
cator of performance as it increases a team’s overall ball possession and thereby raises
the chances of scoring (Collet, 2013; Oberstone, 2009; Redwood-Brown, 2008). As dis-
played in columns (5) and (6) of Appendix Table 5.7, we find a statistically significant
— albeit very small — negative effect of PM10 concentration on pass accuracy once the
full set of control variables is included. We further test whether players adjust their
style of play — measured by the ratio of long to short passes — when exposed to high
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Table 5.4: The effect of air pollution on performance: Heterogeneous effects by player charac-
teristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(PM10) 0.016 0.014
(0.016) (0.017)
Ln(PM10) × Age -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Ln(PM10) × (Age < 21) -0.007 -0.004
(0.010) (0.010)
Ln(PM10) ×(Age 21–25) -0.011∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)
Ln(PM10) ×(Age 26–30) -0.018∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)
Ln(PM10) × (Age > 30) -0.024∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
Ln(PM10) × Defender -0.020∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)
Ln(PM10) ×Midfielder -0.015∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005)
Ln(PM10) × Striker -0.009 -0.015∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
Player controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Match controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Coach FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Team × Season FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 75,163 75,163 75,163 75,163 75,163 75,163
Adjusted R-Squared 0.746 0.743 0.746 0.743 0.746 0.743
Note: Dependent variable: Log number of passes. All regressions include player fixed effects. Player controls: age (squared),
tenure (squared), position (defender, midfielder, striker), minutes played (squared), homematch indicator. Weather controls on
daily basis: maximum temperature (squared), precipitation (squared), dew point (squared), wind speed (squared), air pressure
(squared). Match controls: day of week, kick-off time, stadium attendance. Standard errors are clustered at the match level
(N=2,956). The usual significance levels apply: 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
levels of pollution. While passing the ball over longer distances is riskier in terms of
retaining ball possession, it may reduce the overall physical burden. As displayed in
column (7) and (8) of Appendix Table 5.7, we find that pollution slightly increases this
ratio.
Team- and match-level effects. So far, our analysis has been conducted at the indi-
vidual athlete level. However, a given football player’s performance should also be
dependent upon his team-mates’ and opponents’ performance levels, which are also
affected by pollution. Hence, we might miss important interactions within a player’s
team and/or with the opponent when using variation at the player level. While nega-
tive effects of pollution on opponents’ performance should bias our estimates towards
zero (as it becomes easier to pass), the oppositemay be true for the effect of pollution on
team-mates’ performance. To account for this potential concern, we estimate equation
(5.1) at the aggregate team and match level, respectively. Interaction effects between
122
Productivity Effects of Air Pollution Chapter 5
Table 5.5: The effect of air pollution on performance: Team- and match-level effects
Team-level regressions Match-level regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(PM10) -0.029∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Player controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weather/Ozone controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Match controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Coach FE No Yes Yes No No No
Team × Season FE No Yes Yes No No No
Opponent × Home FE No No Yes No No No
Season FE No No No No No Yes
Observations 5,912 5,912 5,912 2,956 2,956 2,956
Adjusted R-Squared 0.091 0.307 0.426 0.075 0.098 0.193
Note: Dependent variable: Log number of passes. Player characteristics: mean age (squared) and tenure (squared) at team
or match level, respectively. Weather controls on daily basis: maximum temperature (squared), precipitation (squared), dew
point (squared), wind speed (squared), air pressure (squared). Match controls: day of week, kick-off time, stadium attendance.
Standard errors are clustered at the match level. The usual significance levels apply: 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
levels of PM10 concentration, the individual’s and his team-mates’ and/or opponents’
performance are explicitly accounted for at these aggregate levels.
Displayed in Table 5.5, we find that team- and match-level estimates are of simi-
lar magnitude and hence in line with our baseline results. Controlling for player and
weather characteristics, column (1) suggests that a 1% increase in the level of pollu-
tion reduces the total number of team passes by around 0.03%. This effect declines
to −0.015% when subsequently adding match-level, team×season or opponent×home
fixed effects to the model (see columns (2) and (3)), but remains highly statistically sig-
nificant. A similar conclusion arises when turning to the match-level regressions dis-
played in columns (4)–(6). The number of match-level passes statistically significantly
decreases with higher concentrations of particulate matter in ambient air, even in our
most comprehensive specification including seasonfixed effects. Overall, these findings
suggest that interaction effects between pollution, the individual’s and his team-mates’
and/or opponents’ performance either cancel out or are of minor importance.
In a last exercise, we test whether air pollution impairs the overall attractiveness of
the game, focusing on the number of scored goals per match and a potential asymmet-
ric effect on the odds of winning the game, i.e., whether high levels of pollution affect
the probability of an “underdog victory”.20 The corresponding results are displayed
in Appendix Table 5.9. While the linear effect on goals per match is close to zero and
not statistically significant, pollution values above the EU threshold of 50 µg/m3 sub-
stantially reduce the number of scored goals per match. Ceteris paribus, the coefficient
indicates that an increase in the level of pollution from 50 to 60 µg/m3 would reduce
the number of goals per match by about 0.2 goals, which is sizable compared to the
20 We define the match result as an underdog victory in case a team finishing among the top three in
a given season loses against a lower-ranked team. Out of 839 matches, 18% are won by the underdog.
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overall mean of 2.9 goals per match. At the same time, we do not find evidence of un-
derdogs being more likely to win. This is consistent with the notion that pollution has
a symmetrical effect on players of both teams and does not affect their relative strength.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we estimate the causal effect of ambient air pollution on individual per-
formance. Using panel data on the universe of football players in theGermanBundesliga
and hourly information on the concentration of particulate matter and ozone in spatial
proximity to the stadium at the hour of kick-off, we exploit exogenous variation in play-
ers’ exposure to air pollution due to match scheduling rules that are beyond the control
of the players and teams.
Our results show that the concentration of particulate matter in ambient air has a
negative effect on players’ performance, measured by the total number of passes. While
the linear effect is statistically significant and robust, the magnitude is quite small.
When allowing for a non-linear dose-response relationship, we find substantial neg-
ative effects: performance significantly decreases when the concentration of particulate
matter exceeds the EU regulatory threshold of 50 micrograms per cubic meter. Never-
theless, we find significant negative effects at levels well below this threshold, emerging
at around 15 micrograms per cubic meter. When accounting for heterogeneous effects
across players, we further find that the overall effect is mainly driven by players of rel-
atively older age and those playing in positions that require more physical exertion.
Overall, our analysis complements previous empirical evidence on the negative ef-
fects of air pollution on the performance of low-skilled agricultural and factory work-
ers from single-plant case studies (Chang et al., 2016; Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2012;
He et al., 2016). Even moderate concentrations of particulate matter commonly expe-
rienced in developed countries impede the performance of professional athletes to a
considerable extent. While our data allows us to consistently measure individual per-
formance over a long period, generalizing our findings beyond the realm of sports is
not straightforward. As young professional athletes are in better shape than the aver-
age individual, we might expect to observe even stronger effects of pollution on other
workers’ performance. However, professional sports is also associated with substan-
tially higher physical strain compared to more common occupations, suggesting that
athletes are particularly vulnerable to ambient air pollution. Hence, future research on
the effects of air pollution for different types of workers may broaden our knowledge
on the benefits of environmental regulation.
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5.A Appendix
Figure 5.5: Relationship between passes and running distance
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Note: Relationship between players’ running distance and number of passes, controlling for player fixed effects and the number of
minutes played. The data stem from the seasons 2013/2014 to 2015/2016 and were obtained from the German football magazine
“kicker”, see www.kicker.de. The graph is based on Stata’s “binscatter” command, which groups the number of passes into 100
equally sized bins. Data bins are depicted by circles, the dashed line indicates a linear fit.
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Table 5.6: The effect of air pollution on performance: Alternative specifications
Sample All players Full-time players All players
Outcome Ln(passes) Passes Ln(passes) Passes per minute
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PM10 (µg/m3) -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.005)
Ln(PM10) -0.015∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002)
Player characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weather controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Match controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Coach FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Team × Season FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 75,163 75,163 75,163 75,163 43,346 43,346 75,163 75,163
Adjusted R-Squared 0.746 0.743 0.436 0.465 0.017 0.083 0.142 0.060
Note: All regressions include player fixed effects. Player characteristics: age (squared), tenure (squared), position dummies
(defender, midfielder, striker), minutes played (squared), home match indicator. Weather controls on daily basis: maximum
temperature (squared), precipitation (squared), dew point (squared), wind speed (squared), air pressure (squared). Match
controls: day ofweek, kick-off time, stadiumattendance. Standard errors are clustered at thematch level. The usual significance
levels apply: 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
Table 5.7: The effect of air pollution on alternative outcomes
Outcome Minutes Played Playing full-time Pass accuracy Pass ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln(PM10) -0.100 -0.038 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.003∗ 0.001 0.003∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.094) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Player characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weather/Ozone controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Match controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Coach FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Team × Season FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 75,163 75,163 75,163 75,163 73,832 73,832 73,718 73,718
Adjusted R-Squared 0.038 0.064 0.027 0.045 0.002 0.026 0.019 0.036
Note: All regressions include player fixed effects. Player characteristics: age (squared), tenure (squared), position dummies
(defender, midfielder, striker), minutes played (squared), home match indicator. Weather controls on daily basis: maximum
temperature (squared), precipitation (squared), dew point (squared), wind speed (squared), air pressure (squared). Match
controls: day of week, kick-off time and stadium attendance. Standard errors are clustered at the match level. The usual
significance levels apply: 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
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Table 5.8: The effect of air pollution on performance: Alternative specifications of weather
controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(PM10) -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.023*** -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.020***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Ln(Ozone) -0.006** -0.004 -0.007** -0.005 -0.008** -0.006*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Maximum temperature (◦C) -0.005 -0.007 -0.002 -0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012)
Precipitation (mm) -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
Dew point (◦C) 0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.000
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Wind speed (m/sec) -0.004 -0.007** -0.002 -0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008)
Air pressure(hpa) 0.006** 0.000 -0.156 -0.112
(0.003) (0.003) (0.238) (0.239)
Maximum temperature2 -0.003 -0.003
(0.011) (0.011)
Precipitation2 -0.000 0.005
(0.008) (0.007)
Dew point2 0.008 0.007
(0.005) (0.005)
Wind speed2 -0.001 0.001
(0.008) (0.008)
Air pressure2 0.162 0.112
(0.237) (0.238)
Air pressure dummies (omitted: Air pressure < 975)
975 ≤ Air pressure < 1000 0.014* 0.003
(0.008) (0.009)
1000 ≤ Air pressure < 1010 0.024*** 0.008
(0.009) (0.009)
Air pressure ≥ 1010 0.014 -0.003
(0.009) (0.009)
Wind speed dummies (omitted: Wind speed < 2.5)
2.5 ≤Wind speed > 3.5 0.007 0.003
(0.007) (0.007)
3.5 ≤Wind speed > 4.5 0.003 -0.001
(0.008) (0.008)
Wind speed ≥ 4.5 -0.003 -0.010
(0.008) (0.008)
Precipitation dummies (omitted: Precipitation = 0)
0 < Precipitation < 2.5 0.001 0.005
(0.007) (0.007)
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Table 5.8 — continued
2.5 ≤ Precipitation < 10 -0.014* -0.014*
(0.009) (0.008)
Precipitation ≥ 10 -0.002 0.012
(0.015) (0.014)
Max. temperature dummies (omitted: Max. temperature < 7.5)
7.5 ≤Max. temp. < 15 -0.012 -0.014
(0.009) (0.009)
15 ≤Max. temp < 22.5 -0.013 -0.010
(0.012) (0.012)
Max. temp. ≥ 22.5 -0.018 -0.019
(0.016) (0.016)
Player controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Match controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Team × Season FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Coach FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 75,163 75,163 75,163 75,163 75,163 75,163
Adjusted R-Squared 0.746 0.756 0.746 0.756 0.746 0.756
Note: Dependent variable: Log number of passes. All regressions include player fixed effects. Player characteristics: age (squared),
tenure (squared), position (defender, midfielder, striker), minutes played (squared), home match indicator. Match controls: day of
week, kick-off time, stadium attendance. Standard errors are clustered at the match level (N=2,956). The usual significance levels
apply: 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
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Table 5.9: The effect of air pollution on alternative outcomes at the match level
Goals per match Underdog victory
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(PM10) 0.005 0.012 -0.025 -0.022
(0.057) (0.064) (0.025) (0.027)
Ln(PM10) × (PM10 > 50) -0.964∗∗ -0.087
(0.454) (0.167)
Player Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weather controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Match controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Season FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,956 2,956 839 839
Adjusted R-Squared 0.009 0.010 0.089 0.087
Note: Player controls: mean age (squared) and tenure (squared) at the match level. Weather controls on daily basis: maximum
temperature (squared), precipitation (squared), dew point (squared), wind speed (squared), air pressure (squared). Match
controls: day ofweek, kick-off time, stadiumattendance. Standard errors are clustered at thematch level. The usual significance
levels apply: 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
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